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ABSTRACT 
 
Defence Review 2015 concluded that the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF) was in a “critical state of decline”, faced imminent and 
irreversible loss of capabilities and questioned its ability to meet all of its 
ordered defence commitments (Department of Defence, 2015c, pp.  ix; 9-
9).  This is a grave indictment considering it is entrusted with the 
constitutional mandate to defend the Republic (Republic of South Africa, 
1996, Sec 200).  This begs the question “what went wrong?” Causes 
raised include the apparent disjuncture between the defence mandate and 
budget.  It is unlikely, however that the blame can be attributed to a 
funding shortfall and overly ambitious defence mandate, alone.  Some 
question whether a flawed institutional civil control structure might be to 
blame for compromising military command and thereby the ability of the 
armed forces to ensure effective defence. Did the new government go too 
far in imposing robust civil control over the SANDF in 1994, effectively 
emasculating the SANDF? Alternatively is the selected model for South 
Africa’s civil control and oversight regimes simply inappropriate or 
otherwise ineffective? Whether the failure lies with the selected model 
itself or in its execution are issues that were examined in the study. 
 
This study takes as its point of departure, various Defence Review 2015 
policy proposals that, it was argued, point to deeper flaws in the 
institutional civil-military arrangements within the DOD.  As such, they are 
fundamental to our understanding of the civil control challenges 
confronting the DOD and the formulation of policy options and 
recommendations.  What the study highlighted was that the ultimate 
challenge for the DOD could be reduced in simple terms to finding an 
agreeable solution that would satisfy both the statutory civil control 
precepts and the Chief SANDF’s desire for freedom from undue 
interference with his executive military command. Central to the entire civil 
control debate is of course the balance DOD design, around which the 
DOD transformation project is structured, and the role of the Sec Def in 
exercising civil control in a ‘collaborative relationship’ with the Chief 
SANDF. There is general consensus that the balance DOD design has 
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failed to live up to expectations and that it has proven difficult to establish 
and maintain the optimum balance between civil control and an effective 
armed service.  What is equally obvious is that even after more than two 
decades of democratic consolidation; the DOD has yet to complete its 
transformation. If Defence Review 2015 is anything to go by then it can be 
expected that the process is set to continue for at least the next 25 years. 
 
That civil control remains a contested concept within the DOD is not in 
doubt.  The solutions may be elusive; however, there is strong evidence 
that the answers lie more with how the Def Sec should be capacitated 
rather than the current focus on repositioning to better enable civil control 
of defence and to perform the duty assigned to it. Structural issues are 
clearly a factor and should indeed be dealt with in the broader DOD 
reorganisation. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument presented that 
instead of restructuring, better use should be made of performance 
agreements, delegations and detailed instructions. Given that the DOD is 
recognised in law as a ‘special case’, there should be a strong legal 
argument for amending the applicable legislation to make provision for a 
‘special delegation regime’ or performance agreements, as a solution to 
the DOD’s immediate needs for providing an effective armed service. 
 
 
Keywords: Civil control; oversight; Defence Review 2015; South African 
National Defence Force; armed services; budget; civil-military relations; 
Constitutional mandate; defence ministry, military command and control, 
defence secretariat. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
I declare that this report is my own, unaided work.   It is submitted in 
partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of 
Management (in the Field of Security) in the University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.  It has not been submitted before for any 
degree or examination in any other university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Clyde Brad Hepburn                                       
         March 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Deftly guided by my supervisor Prof Gavin Cawthra, aided by colleagues 
at the Department of Defence and loyally supported by family and friends. 
Special thanks to Nick Sendall, Aida van der Colf and Jeanette Smith for 
going the extra mile. 
I am grateful to you all. 
 
i 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
 Table of Contents 
  List of Acronyms and Abbreviations   iv 
  List of Figures      v 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction  and Background2    1 
  1.1 Introduction      1 
  1.2 Background      3 
   1.2.1 Problem Statement    4 
   1.2.2 Purpose Statement    5 
   1.2.3 Research Questions   6 
1.3 Research Methodology    6 
   1.3.1 Research Paradigm    6 
   1.3.2 Conceptual Frame    7 
   1.3.3 Research Design    9 
   1.3.4 Data Collection and Analysis  10 
   1.3.5 Trustworthiness of Data   12 
  1.4 Summary of Chapters    13 
 
Chapter 2 Literature review      14 
  2.1 Introduction      14 
  2.2 Terminology      16 
   2.2.1 Military, Armed Forces and Armed  
Services – in Search of Clarity  16 
 
   2.2.2 Civilian versus Civil Control – the  
Debate     17 
 
  2.3 Making the Case: Reassessing Civil Control 20 
   
2.4 Theory and Concepts    24 
   
2.5 Conclusion      36 
  
 
                                                          
2 With acknowledgment to the Research Guidelines for Masters Degrees by Coursework 
and Research, for the research report framework/template, as adapted (Wits School of 
Governance, 2011). 
 
ii 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
Chapter 3 Institutional Dimensions     39 
  3.1 Introduction       39 
  3.2 Civil Control under Apartheid Rule   40 
   
3.3 The transition 1990 - 1994    46 
  3.4 Defence in Transformation: Minister Modise 61 
   3.4.1 Civil Control Constitutional Frameworks 61 
   3.4.2  Department of Defence Transformation 
      Project     67 
 
   3.4.3 Implementing the Balance DOD Design 88 
   
  3.5 Conclusion      108 
 
Chapter 4 Organisational Renewal Post Integration  111 
  4.1 Introduction      111 
  4.2 Ministerial Task Team Report on the  
Restructuring of the Office of the  
Secretary for Defence    112  
4.3 Parys Resolution     123 
 
4.4 Change of Command: Minister Sisulu  130 
 
4.5 Defence Review 2014    136 
 
4.6 Conclusions      140 
 
Chapter 5 Repositioning the Secretariat for Effective  
Civil Control      143 
   
5.1 Introduction      143 
5.2 Statutory Roles and Functions of the   
Secretary for Defence    145 
 
5.3 Delegations of Powers    147 
 
5.4 Core Challenges with Statutory Functions 150 
 
 5.4.1 Accounting Status    151 
 5.4.2 Comprehensive Instructions  152 
 
iii 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
5.4.3 SANDF Compliance to Minister of  153  
Defence’s Instructions 
 
5.5 Alternative Approaches to Civil Control   154 
 5.5.1 Desire DOD Accountability and Staff 
           Liaison Structure    155 
  
5.5.2 Outer Office Model    159  
 
5.6 Analysis       165 
5.7 Conclusion      167 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusion and recommendations   170 
  6.1 Chapter Outline     170 
  6.2 Introduction      170 
  6.3 Reassessing Civil Control of the Defence 
   Force       177 
    
6.3.1 Repositioning and Capacitating the  
Defence Secretariat    179  
 
   6.3.2 Modifying the Organisational 
    Structure and Realigning Functions 183 
 
   6.3.3 New Accountability Concept for the 
    Department of Defence   185 
   
  6.4 Insight on Data Collection and Challenges 187 
 
   6.4.1 Restrictions     189 
 
  6.5 Concluding Remarks    190 
  
References                          192 
 
 Personal Communications and Private Documents  198 
 
 List of Respondents Interviewed     200  
iv 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
    
ANC   African National Congress 
Chief SANDF Chief of the South African National Defence Force 
CODESA  Conference for a Democratic South Africa 
The Constitution The Constitution of South Africa, 1996  
Def Sec  Defence Secretariat 
DOD   Department of Defence (South Africa) 
JMCC   Joint Military Coordinating Committee 
JSCD   Joint Standing Committee on Defence 
JSCPA  Joint Standing Committee on Public Accounts  
MCC   Military Command Council 
MK   Mkhonto we Sizwe 
Minister  Minister of Defence and Military Veterans 
MOD&MV  Minister of Defence and Military Veterans  
MOD   Ministry of Defence (South Africa) 
NP   National Party 
PAC   Pan Africanist Congress 
PCD &MV  Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans 
PDSC   Plenary Defence Staff Council 
PFMA   Public Finance Management Act, 1999 
PSA   Public Service Act, 1994 
SADF   South African Defence Force (Pre 29 April 1994) 
SANDF  South African National Defence Force 
SC   Secretariat Council 
SCOPA  Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
Sec Def  Secretary for Defence 
TBVC   Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei  
TEC   Transitional Executive Council 
 
 
v 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
List of Figures   
 
 
Figure 1 Civil-Military Relations under President P.W. Botha 44 
Figure 2 SADF Organisational Structure circa 1990  45 
Figure 3 Option 2: CSANDF Reports via Sec Def to Minister 74 
Figure 4 Sec Def forms part of the Outer Office    75 
Figure 5 Balance/Compromise Model    77 
Figure 6 Balance DOD Design     84 
Figure 7 Macro Design – 1998     98 
Figure 8 DOD Macro Design 2001 – 2004    104 
Figure 9 Joint Support Macro Structure 2001 – 2004  105 
Figure 10 DOD Macro Design Post-DODW    127 
Figure 11 DOD Macro Design 2015     139 
Figure 12 Delegation Dilemma     148 
Figure 13 Required Delegation Situation    149 
Figure 14 Desired DOD Accountability and Staff Liaison  
Structure        158 
 
1 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUALISATION 
 
“The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the 
fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its 
thinking done by cowards."  
Sir William Francis Butler 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Nowadays, the exercising of ‘civilian’3 control over the armed services is a 
phenomenon that is widely accepted by most countries worldwide.  
Notwithstanding a few notable exceptions, the majority have in place a 
coherent system of civilian oversight and control that is founded upon the 
principle of the armed services’ subordination to the civilian leadership 
(Bruneau, 2008; Cawthra, 2003; Chuter, 2011; Croissant, Kuehn, 
Chambers, & Wolf, 2010; Edmonds, 1988; Feaver, 1996).   Aside from a 
few noted consolidating democracies still struggling with civilian control 
tensions (for example Thailand, Egypt, Kenya, Burundi and Venezuela) 
(Freedom House, 2015) – the practice of democratic civil control has 
matured substantially beyond its initial purpose of simply preventing coups 
(Croissant et al., 2010, p.950) and otherwise ameliorating the threat of 
“...praetorian military intervention in domestic politics…” (Cottey, Edmunds 
& Forster, 2002, p. 31). Even Huntington (1957, p.20) was moved to 
observe that the “…problem of the modern state is not armed revolt…”  
 
The concern, therefore, is that the arguments put forward – which hold 
that the primary problem confronting governments is the threat of military 
intervention in domestic politics – may well serve to distort the concept of 
civil control, ultimately manifesting in the imposition of rigid civil control 
regimes at the expense of good governance and effective defence.  
Feaver (2003, p.4), in reflecting on this myopic view, cautions that it 
cannot be assumed that negating a threat of military intervention or coup, 
will necessarily translate into an improvement in civil-military cooperation 
                                                          
3
 This is of course a contested term and as will be later argued it is probably better to 
speak of ‘civil control’ (Chuter, 2011).  The use of these different terms will be debated 
and clarified in a later section.  
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and military effectiveness.  Civil-military challenges will remain an issue 
even when civil control over the armed services is asserted (Feaver, 2003, 
p.4).     
 
South Africa is a remarkable case in point.  The recent, long awaited, 
release of Defence Review 2015 has served to rekindle interest in the 
country’s civil-military relations.  The conclusions, although refreshingly 
frank, were not particularly surprising.  South Africa’s nascent National 
Defence Force (SANDF), created in the euphoria of the first democratic 
elections and subjected to sweeping reforms and ‘civilianisation’4, has 
attracted steady criticism over the years, variously for being unaffordable 
and/or for defects in its design and structure (Cilliers, 2014; Chuter, 2011; 
Le Roux, 2004; Mills, 2011; Shaw, 1995; Williams, 2000).  The Defence 
Review went so far as to conclude that the SANDF was in a “critical state 
of decline”, and unable to meet all of its ordered defence commitments 
(Department of Defence, 2015c, p. ix).  This is a grave indictment against 
the national department entrusted with the constitutional mandate to 
defend and protect the Republic and its people (Republic of South Africa, 
1996, Sec 200) and that in 2014 alone, consumed a budget in excess of 
42.8 billion Rand (Department of Defence, 2014, p. 22).  This begs the 
question “what went wrong?”  
 
The disjuncture between the defence budget and level of defence ambition 
has attracted much of the blame for the state of decline (Department of 
Defence, 2015c, p.ix).  It is, however, unlikely that the Department of 
Defence’s (DOD) decline can be attributed to a funding shortfall and overly 
ambitious defence mandate, alone.  It is argued that whilst recognising 
that defence funding will always feature prominently, there is a greater risk 
in allowing the funding argument to dominate the debate to the exclusion 
of all other evidence.  Evidence such as the misalignment of the Defence 
Force and Secretariat functions, an ineffective institutional civil-military 
                                                          
4
 ‘Civilianisation’ in the defence sector is defined by Ratchev (2011, p.14) as “a transfer of 
control and/or a select number and type of working positions from military to civilian 
personnel.” The presumption is that the defence organisational structure was initially 
designed around uniformed personnel only. 
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arrangement and the compromised integrity of military command, simply 
cannot be ignored.    
 
That being the case then, left unresolved, these additional shortcomings 
have the similar potential to impede not only the exercising of civil 
oversight by Parliament and civil control by the National Executive, 
Minister of Defence (hereinafter referred to as the Minister) and Secretary 
for Defence (Sec Def) but equally the capability of the SANDF in executing 
its ordered commitments.  The key issue here is as much about the 
SANDF’s efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery as it is about 
guaranteeing civil assurance. 
This hypothesis raises a number of possibilities.  Did the new government 
go too far in their efforts to impose robust civil control over the SANDF, in 
the period leading up to 1994 and in the years that followed, effectively 
emasculating the SANDF? Alternatively is the selected model for South 
Africa’s transformed DOD and civil control and oversight regimes simply 
inappropriate or otherwise ineffective? Alternatively, put another way, 
whether the failure lies with the selected model itself or in its execution – a 
victim of the dilemma of balancing power between the civil authorities and 
the armed services – are issues that require further interrogation? 
Ultimately, given that there is acceptance on the need for civil control, then 
the question arises as to what the ideal institutional civil control and 
oversight regimes should look like.   
1.2 Background 
This study is broadly situated within the South African public policy field, 
the locus being defence policy; in the contexts of the DOD and the 
analysis of both the Constitutional imperative for civil control of the SANDF 
and the unfolding defence strategy.  It takes as its point of departure, 
various Defence Review 2015 policy proposals that, it will be later argued, 
point to deeper flaws in the institutional civil-military arrangements within 
the DOD.  As such, they are fundamental to our understanding of the civil 
control challenges confronting the DOD and the formulation of policy 
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options and recommendations.  The focus of this study was expressly 
narrowed to concentrate on assessing the civil control of the transformed 
SANDF in the period immediately prior to 1994 and the decades 
thereafter. Of particular interest are those defence policy issues which 
impact on the exercising of the Minister’s and Sec Def’s statutory 
functions, the statutory accountability and delegation regimes regulating 
relationships between the Sec Def and Defence Force, and ultimately the 
bearing this has on the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the 
SANDF.  The research design is a basic interpretative qualitative study 
applying a constructivist/interpretative paradigm with the researcher as a 
participant observer (Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2012).  The study was 
conducted primarily at the South African Department of Defence 
Headquarters, ARMSCOR Building, Pretoria, between April and 
December 2015.   
1.2.1 Problem Statement 
The functions and composition of the Defence Secretariat (Def Sec) are 
not aligned with the changing Defence Mandate and the Minister’s specific 
support requirements.  The crux of the problem appears to be both 
institutional in origin as well as a consequence of the inherent civil-military 
tensions within the DOD that impacts on the co-existence, power relations 
and working procedures between the Def Sec and the SANDF.  It seems, 
perversely, that the current institutional civil control arrangements have 
effectively compromised the integrity of military command, and thereby the 
ability of the armed services to fulfil the roles and missions assigned to it.  
What are not so clear are the solutions.   
 
Although considerable research has been conducted on the subject of 
civil-military relations and to a lesser degree civil control of armed 
services, and notwithstanding wide acceptance of the need (Bruneau, 
2008; Cawthra, 2003; Chuter, 2011; Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, & Wolf, 
2010; Edmonds, 1988; Feaver, 1996), there is little agreement on the ideal 
model that should be applied (Bland, 1999; Bruneau, 2015; Burk, 2002; 
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Chambers, 2011; Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002; Feaver, 1996; 
Huntington, 1957; Ratcheve, 2011; Schiff, 1995; Williams, 2003).   Even 
the extensive report of Defence Review 2015, although identifying 
numerous shortcomings, only offers “…strategic level guidance…” 
(Department of Defence, 2015c, pp. 9-14) and not specific operational or 
managerial level recommendations for restructuring the DOD to effect 
improved civil control and deliver an effective SANDF. 
 
Therefore, whilst the literature on the subject of civil-military relations – 
and more particularly civil control of the armed services – is helpful in 
providing a broad framework and concepts with which to guide the study, 
there is no apparent blueprint for a universally applicable model that can 
be converted directly to South Africa, with its own unique context and 
history.  In addition there are no definitive empirical studies of particular 
significance in the literature that could be considered explicit advice on 
how to transform the DOD by means of realigning the functions and 
composition of the Secretariat with the changing defence mandate and the 
Minister’s specific support requirements, to assure effective defence.  
 
While this research builds our understanding from the perspective of 
foreign armed services, which have all experienced, to varying degrees, 
challenges with flawed institutional and legislative civil control 
arrangements, it is more important for what is missing rather than any 
particular solution for South Africa.  It is this lacuna which is debated in the 
coming chapters. 
 
1.2.2   Purpose Statement 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore how the functions and composition 
of the Defence Secretariat can be realigned – whilst enhancing the civil 
control regime and the integrity of military command – with the changing 
Defence Mandate and the Minister’s specific support requirements, as a 
means to achieve effective defence.  The usefulness of the research 
paper will be in the articulation of options and recommendations that can 
be taken up as part of the DOD’s overall policy review. 
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1.2.3 Research Questions 
 
The central question in this study is: “How can the functions and 
composition of the Defence Secretariat be realigned with the changing 
Defence Mandate and the Minister’s specific support requirements, whilst 
striking the optimum balance between civil control and the integrity of 
military command, so as to assure effective defence?” 
 
The following questions will guide the research: 
 
1.   How should the Defence Secretariat be repositioned and capacitated 
to better enable civil control of defence and to perform the duty assigned 
to it? 
 
2.  How can the organisational structure be modified to clarify the 
responsibilities and realign the functions of the Minister and the 
Accounting Officer (Sec Def)? 
 
3.   What is the requirement for a new accountability concept within the 
DOD?  
 
1.3 Research Methodology5 
1.3.1 Research Paradigm 
 
A constructivist/interpretative research paradigm was selected as being 
the most appropriate for the study, using a basic interpretative qualitative 
study research design with the researcher as a participant observer 
(Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2012).  The underpinning assumptions are, 
that reality is socially constructed (Ontology), knowledge is subjective and 
culturally-bound as well as historically and context dependent  
(Epistemology), and that the enquiry is value-laden in nature and that it will 
be necessary to report on the researcher’s values and biases that may 
affect the neutrality of the study (Axiology) (Wagner, 2012).  In terms of 
                                                          
5
 With acknowledgement to the Research Guidelines for Masters Degrees by Coursework and Research, 
Wits University, that was consulted liberally in compiling the Research Methodology section (Wits School of 
Governance, 2011). 
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methodology, the researcher; as a participant observer and Deputy 
Director Departmental Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, operating 
from the DOD Headquarters study site; was entirely responsible for 
gathering the data (Wagner, 2012).  Although every effort was made to 
limit ideological biases, the researcher’s service as a commissioned officer 
in the SANDF, since 1981, should be noted, as well as the fact that he is 
staffed at the DOD study site.  With regards to relationship of the 
researcher to the participants, most are fellow DOD employees, whether 
as peers or superiors (Wagner, 2012).  Some recently retired DOD 
members were also interviewed based on their direct involvement in, and 
primary knowledge of, the defence transformation processes.  In a few 
cases academic and military experts were interviewed as participants who 
have no particular relationship to the researcher.  It should also be noted 
that although the research topic is not directly related to the researcher’s 
day-to-day duties, providing some separation, his work in the Directorate 
Departmental Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, brought him into 
regular contact with a number of the identified study participants and there 
was frequent informal engagement and debate on the research topic 
(Wagner, 2012). 
 
1.3.2 Conceptual Frame     
 
As explained in more detail in the literature review, section 2.4 Theory and 
Concepts, the premise of this study is that civil control over the armed 
forces is a necessary precondition for democratic rule, and for democratic 
consolidation to flourish (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, & Wolf, 2010, p. 
950).  Civil control of the armed services should, however, not be 
confused with democratic control (Cawthra et al., 2003, p.  305) and 
neither is the exercising of civil control the preserve of democratically 
elected governments alone. Civil control is both possible and is often 
exercised, in the absence of democracy (Cawthra et al., 2003, p. 305; 
Feaver, 1996).  This study has, accordingly, been conducted through the 
lens of democratic civil control and is positioned within the broad debate 
on the mechanisms to balance civil control of the armed services on the 
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one hand and effective defence on the other – and not the notion of civil 
control per se.   The departure point is that – whilst it is acknowledged that 
there are a number of consolidating democracies still struggling with civil 
control tensions, the practice of democratic civil control has matured 
substantially beyond its initial purpose of simply preventing coups 
(Croissant et al., 2010, p. 950), and “...the threat of praetorian military 
intervention in domestic politics…” (Cottey et al., 2002, p. 31). 
 
In developing the conceptual frame, the study takes cognisance of the late 
Rocky Williams’ argument for a new approach, one that adapts 
Westernised “…late modern civil-military relations theory…” for the African 
environment (Williams, 1998, pp. 2 - 22). What is proposed is an approach 
which sees a combination of objective and subjective mechanisms being 
utilised to achieve civil control of the armed services. When viewed 
through this lens, it appears that the solution for the DOD lay more with 
Schiff’s (1995) ‘concordance theory’ based on a three-way partnership and 
cooperative arrangement between the government, the armed services 
and society, than it did with Huntington’s (1957) ‘institutional separation’  
model. In terms of a theoretical approach, the study could not, however, 
ignore the ‘institutional separation’ model (Huntington, 1957) 
notwithstanding its limits, because of the strong influence it had on the 
post-democratic DOD design. Schiff’s (1995) ‘concordance theory’, on the 
other hand, resonates much more closely with the current DOD 
developments on civil-military relations and is aligned to the overarching 
principles contained in government’s National Development Plan Vision 
2030 (Department:The Presidency, National Planning Commission, 2011). 
 
In order to conceptualise and then analyse civil-military relations as they 
exist in the MOD/DOD, the author developed the following five 
assessment indicators, as adapted from Bruneau (2006, pp.6-7), as the 
framework of analysis (model) for this study: 
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a. Analyse both institutions (Def Sec and SANDF) individually, as part of 
the larger DOD, to acquire an in-depth understanding of each before 
analysing their impact on one another. 
 
b. Analyse what influences the institutions exert on actors and processes. 
 
c. Evaluate the means by which the Executive Authority exercises civil 
control of SANDF and the SANDF’s concomitant effectiveness in 
fulfilling the roles and missions assigned to it. 
 
d. Analyse the extent to which a particular model copied from another 
country/institution and context can be translated into the DOD. 
 
e. Determine how the DOD (as an institution) structures power 
relationships and maintains the balance between the Def Sec and 
SANDF – include a review of: 
 
o Conditions under which the transformed DOD was created. 
o Interests of the stakeholders involved in creating the 
institutions. 
o Influence of pre-existing institutional models on the 
transformed DOD.   
 
1.3.3 Research Design 
 
 
The study was conducted empirically using a basic interpretative 
qualitative study research design with the researcher as a participant 
observer (Wagner, 2012).  Non-probability purposive sampling was used 
and the data collection methods included a literature study, analysis of 
documentary data sources and interviews with internal and external 
stakeholders (Wagner, 2012).  Primary and secondary documentary 
sources included public documents (open-published sources such as Acts 
of Parliament, published DOD and other national department public 
material) and, where appropriate, private documents (official restricted 
10 
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DOD and MOD files, minutes of meetings and general correspondence).  
The researcher was fortunate to have been granted access to a restricted 
archive of DOD and Ministerial internal correspondence that covers the 
earlier pre-election and transitional periods under review.  A selective 
literature review was also undertaken, supported by an evaluation of the 
practices of foreign armed services of select countries, chosen on the 
basis of shared similarities in liberal-democratic systems, Commonwealth 
influences and structure of defence.  Respondents were also purposively 
selected, based on the researcher’s judgement, as both primary and 
secondary data sources respectively, who were intimately involved in the 
policy development and design and structuring of the DOD.  This also 
includes academic and other experts who were used to corroborate data 
and generally add value to the discourse (Wagner, 2012).    
 
This research design answers the aim of describing, understanding and 
explaining the DOD as the unit of analysis and was shown to be the most 
appropriate in answering the research questions and achieving the 
research outcome. The interpretative qualitative study method was 
selected, particularly as it supported the study aim to understand the 
practices and the cultural and social contexts that shape the defence 
policy development activities (Wagner, 2012).  This allowed the researcher 
to develop a coherent story, told through the eyes of the participants, that 
is textually rich and highly descriptive.  Ultimately the qualitative method 
facilitated the acquiring of knowledge by means of a structured, 
comprehensive data- analysis (Wagner, 2012).  The researcher as the 
research instrument – participant observer – was provided an advantage 
through his employment in the DOD, which allowed him to leverage his 
access to both the study site and study participants.   
 
1.3.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The DOD was the unit of analysis and the methods of data collection 
mainly featured document analysis and interviews – structured, semi-
structured and unstructured (Wagner, 2012).  These proved to be the most 
11 
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appropriate methods, based on the constructivist/interpretative paradigm 
and basic interpretative qualitative research study methodology selected 
to answer the research problem (Wagner, 2012).  Both primary and 
secondary data sources were utilised and are equally important to the 
study but were treated differently.  The data analysis methods linked the 
gathered data inductively and included thematic content analysis, 
documentary analysis and discourse analysis of various types (Wagner, 
2012).  The utilisation of a wide range and type of data sources also 
formed the cornerstone of the efforts to enhance trustworthiness and 
credibility, as will be described in more detail in the section to follow. 
 
Primary data.   Primary data accessed was in the form of public 
documents (open-published sources such as Acts of Parliament, 
published DOD and other national department public material, formal legal 
opinions and other published and/or gazetted material and respondent 
interviews) and private documents (restricted official DOD and MOD files, 
minutes of meetings, diaries, and pertinent correspondence between 
officials engaged in the transformation process) which proved critical to 
the study and achievement of the outcome.  Much of the primary data was 
made available from a restricted archive (private) of DOD and Ministry 
internal material (unpublished) that covers the critical period under review.  
Care was taken to exclude all specifically designated confidential data 
sources from the research report – that were not otherwise cleared by the 
DOD for public release.  Additional non-restricted internal sources used 
were material that addressed the design, structure, organisation, 
approach, doctrine, concepts and capabilities of the DOD.   
 
Respondents/participants were identified during the initial literature review 
and formulation of the research proposal, and were updated as the study 
progressed.  The respondents were purposively selected, based on the 
researcher’s judgement (Wagner, 2012), who are or were intimately 
involved in the policy development and design and structuring of the DOD.  
The serving DOD officials request for anonymity has been respected.  The 
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respondent’s interview transcripts were allocated an alphanumeric 
reference code to protect the respondent’s identity.  
 
Secondary data.    The secondary data, in the form of the select literature 
review, internal minutes of general meetings and reports, and interviews 
with ad hoc respondents who could add value, depth and richness to the 
discourse proved invaluable. Literature and data sources were consulted 
to provide the background information on and theoretical underpinning for 
the concepts of civil-military relationships, civil control, and civil oversight 
of the armed services.   
 
1.3.5 Trustworthiness of Data  
 
For purposes of this qualitative study the terms trustworthy and credible 
are used to describe data validity and reliability.  The key criteria applied is 
that the study is designed to ensure that the results are applicable, 
dependable and confirmable (Wagner, 2012).  The researcher made every 
effort to be as ‘unobtrusive’ as possible and encouraged participants by 
creating a non-threatening, safe environment conducive to building trust 
with the researcher and free and open discourse (Wagner, 2012).  In 
addition, participants were reassured that, where requested, that the data 
provided would be treated in a manner that assured that respondents were 
not directly linked by name to any inputs to the research paper and that all 
transcripts would be confidentially secured. Multiple methods of data 
collection were also utilised, as set out in paragraph 1.3.4 above, to 
identify any discrepancies and it proved useful in providing a factual basis 
for the review of data collection results and, where necessary, re-
questioning participants to clarify understanding (Wagner, 2012). Multiple 
data collection methods were also utilised as the basis of triangulation 
between primary and secondary data collected and the literature.   
Trustworthiness was also enhanced by utilising participant and peer 
validation to ensure that the results are credible (Wagner, 2012).   
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1.4 Summary of Chapters 
  
The study is arranged in the following sections: Chapter one provides an 
introduction and contextualisation of the problem under investigation.  This 
includes the background, research purpose, research problem, research 
questions, research methodology and data collection and analysis 
methods.  Chapter two provides a survey of previous studies on the 
research topic, and positions the research within the literature by linking 
the research to the current academic debates.  The chapter focuses on 
theory, particularly civil-military relations theory, defence management and 
defence strategy. Chapter three provides the institutional background to 
defence policy and strategy in South Africa in general, and civil control of 
the armed services in particular. It commences with a historical overview 
of civil-military relations and the civil control practices prior to 1994 and 
then focuses on the post-1994 transitional and consolidating phases up to 
2002 (end of the integration of Statutory and Non-statutory Forces). 
Chapter four focuses on the post-integration period from 2003 to 2015 and 
concludes with the current policy and organisational renewal challenges. 
Chapter five focuses on identifying and analysing in detail the (current) 
statutory duties and functions of the Sec Def as well as the challenges 
with the present structural arrangement. This includes discussions 
regarding various options for realigning the functions and composition of 
the Def Sec to restructure power relations and achieve the optimum 
balance between the Def Sec and SANDF. Chapter six analyses and 
discusses the research findings in relationship to the research questions. 
Chapter seven closes with a summary and conclusions. Further research 
is proposed that can build upon the findings of the limited research report. 
The limitations of the study are also debated as well as a few of the 
challenges that arose. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
“Many of the key concepts which have been used to justify the existence of 
armed forces in the past are inadequate in their ability to explain the complexities 
of the present and new interventions are required to create the space within 
which the boundaries of the civil-military relations debate can be expanded.  It is 
the responsibility of African scholars to seize this initiative…” Rocky Williams 
(Williams, 2003, p.  281) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Lieutenant General (Rtd) P.  Steyn (1994), the first Secretary for Defence 
(Sec Def) to be appointed in the post-democratic Department of Defence 
(DOD), commented shortly after the birth of the new South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF), on the difficulty in constructing the ideal 
system of institutional civil-military cooperation between the civilian 
political authority and the armed services:   
 “…there is, however, absolute agreement…that the commander-in-
chief of a national defence force, the state President will be obeyed 
by the nation’s military...  In other words, civilian command of the 
military is not at issue. 
…the problem appears to be how to adjust the traditional relations 
between the civil authority and the military establishment sufficiently 
to mount a credible deterrence… the search for effective 
institutional arrangements to ensure sound civil-military 
cooperation…” 
Steyn (1994) advances a number of important sub-themes.  Firstly, that it 
is not ‘civilian command’ or more commonly described as ‘civilian control’ 
of the armed services per se that is the problem, but rather the challenges 
of striking a balance between the power of the armed services and the civil 
authorities in a practical system of institutional civil control.  Secondly that 
“mount[ing] a credible deterrence” (Steyn, 1994) or in this case effective 
defence is dependent upon the success of this arrangement.  In essence it 
is the obedience of the armed services to the state which is at the core of 
the relationship, and that in the absence of such willingness by the armed 
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services to subject itself to the authority of the state; the question of civil 
control becomes moot.   
Huntington supports this position, in that “…the military are servants of the 
statesman” and “civilian control is essential to military professionalism” 
(1957, p.79).  Finer (1975, p.229) makes reference to “…tradition of 
civilian control…” and later that a function of the armed services “…is to 
come to the aid of the civil power…” In his seminal work Armed Services 
and Society, Edmonds (1988, p.10) speaks of the strict control of the 
armed services as, “…being the sine qua non of democratic 
government…”.  Edmonds (1988,p.11) also provides a thought-provoking 
example of a core principle of  ‘civilian control’ in reference to Mao Tse-
tung’s guerrilla campaign against the Chinese Nationalist government, in 
which he is credited with observing  that when political power is achieved 
through “… the barrel of a gun…” then the “…critical question was always 
who controlled the gun.”    
The central theme that is emerging is that – given that the armed services 
can be relied upon to unreservedly obey the ‘civilian’ commander in chief – 
the immediate question then is how civil control of the armed services can 
best be exercised in a manner that does not compromise its effectiveness 
as a fighting force.  In the case of South Africa this calls for a civil control 
‘model’ that provides for enhanced cooperation between all levels of the 
DOD’s macro-organisational structure and greater transversal 
departmental effectiveness and efficiency if the DOD is to realise its vision 
of “[e]ffective defence for a democratic South Africa” (Department of 
Defence, 2015).  Undoubtedly the solution, as Steyn (1994) 
acknowledges, is much more complex than simply implementing “effective 
institutional arrangements” and “sound civil-military co-operation”.  It is this 
theme that this study intends to explore and develop in the coming 
sections.     
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2.2 Terminology 
 
2.2.1 Military, Armed Forces and Armed Services, in search of clarity  
 
The Constitution, in Section 200 (1), states that “… [t]he defence force 
must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force” (Republic 
of South Africa, 1996).  The Defence Act, under Chapter 1, Section 1 (1) 
Definitions, confirms that for the purposes of the Act, whenever reference 
is made to ‘Defence Force’, (used in this case to mean the South African 
National Defence Force to quote the full title) that  “ 'force' means a military 
force” (Republic of South Africa, 2002).   In any number of publications 
(Bland, 1999; Bruneau, 2015; Cawthra, 2003; Chuter, 2011; Feaver, 1996; 
Huntington, 1957; Williams, 2003), the terms ‘armed forces’ and ‘military’ 
are used interchangeably.  Edmonds (1998), in his landmark study, Armed 
Services and Society, comments extensively on this conundrum.   
Ultimately the distinction is only important as far as it is useful in 
preventing confusion and misunderstanding when the particular terms are 
used.    
 
Edmonds (1998) argues that both the term ‘armed forces’ and ‘military’ 
can and are used to describe a wide range of armed groups that are 
“structured in such a way as effectively to apply coercive means to 
achieve specific objectives” (Edmonds, 1998, p.  21).   Therefore such 
armed forces or military can include along a continuum everything from a 
nation state’s regular army to partisan irregular guerrillas and Para-military 
units (Edmonds, 1998, p. 21).  Edmonds (1998) argues persuasively that 
the preferred term, to properly describe and differentiate the state 
organisation, permanently established by constitutional law, which enjoys 
a monopoly on the management of violence, including the constrained 
application of violence to defend and protect the country’s sovereignty and 
it citizens, is ‘armed services’ (Edmonds, 1998, p. 26).  This term best 
describes the various national militaries and/or regular armed services, 
which are the subject of this study, and will be consistently applied.    
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2.2.2 Civilian versus Civil Control: the Debate 
 
In a number of publications, particularly the earlier seminal works on ‘civil-
military relations’ (Huntington, 1957; Finer, 1975; Edmonds, 1988), the 
authors variously adopt the term ‘civilian control’ in reference to the control 
exercised by the state, or statesman in some instances, over the armed 
services. The White Paper on Defence 1996, also, in reference to the 
duties of the Sec Def, Section 24, speaks of “…civilian control of the 
defence function…” (Department of Defence, 1996). A contemporary 
scholar David Chuter argues, in respect to the confusing practice of 
authors interposing ‘civilian’ and ‘civil’  in relation to control over the armed 
forces, that “…by civil control is meant the obedience which the military 
owes to civis, the State” (2011, p.63). As a concept, its value lies in its 
function as a reminder to the citizens and the armed services “…that the 
latter owes obedience to the State” (Chuter, 2011, p. 68).  This ‘obedience 
to the state’ must be viewed in the context of the argument that armed 
services exist as a legitimate organ of state because most citizens believe 
that the application, or threat, of violence, is justified under certain 
circumstances (Chuter, 2011). It is therefore imperative that the armed 
services are resourced and organised for the execution of ordered 
defence commitments in a manner that best balances effective and 
efficient performance with what is acceptable to the people.  
 
Chuter (2011, p.64) considers three situations where ‘control’ by civilians, 
could arguably be said to exist. When applied to the DOD we observe that 
firstly the Minister, as the political head of the ministry, can approve or 
reject any proposal put to her by the SANDF. Secondly, appointed civil 
servants, whether within or external to the DOD, can rule on whether or 
not a particular proposal put forward by the SANDF is aligned with 
government policy or not. Thirdly the Sec Def as the Director-General of 
the department is responsible to Parliament for the spending of his budget. 
He is therefore expected to exercise due diligence in approving or 
otherwise rejecting expenditure if he believes it is fruitless or wasteful 
(Chuter, 2011, p.64).  
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In another approach, the influential Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) promotes the term ‘civilianisation’ in 
respect to transformation of defence ministries (Ratchev, 2011). 
‘Civilianisation’ in the defence sector is defined by Ratchev (2011, p.14) as 
“a transfer of control and/or a select number and type of working positions 
from military to civilian personnel.” The presumption is of course that the 
defence organisational structure was largely designed around uniformed 
personnel only. It is further stressed that the term ‘civilianisation’ should 
not be confused with ‘demilitarisation’, a term which is also used in the 
context of civil-military relations, but is only applicable to countries in 
transition from military dictatorships or martial law-based governance, for 
example Turkey and Greece (Ratchev, 2011, p. 15).  
Civilianisation is not seen, therefore, as simply a process of replacing 
uniformed personnel with civilians in the same job category. The focus of 
main effort is directed at “…creating or transforming former military 
organisations into civil-military institutions” (Ratchev, 2011, p. 15). The 
transformed institution should be better able to contribute to national 
security and be more effective and efficient in meeting ordered 
commitments. The addition of civilians should thus contribute to the 
streamlining of the organisation and freeing up uniformed personnel to 
“focus on their core missions…” (Ratchev, 2011, p. 15). This is a useful 
framework and it will be extensively applied in the study of the DOD’s 
transformation from a military to a civil-military institution. 
Castro (2013, p.11) in a divergent view, goes as far as to question the 
existence of the ‘civilian’ construct. He disputes the common notion, 
embraced by not only the military but also by numerous researchers of 
civil-military relations, that there are in fact ‘civilians’ or a ‘civilian 
world/environment’. According to Castro “…civilian is a military invention. I 
am only a civilian in relation to the military and when I am classified by 
them as such…” (2013, p.11). The gist of his argument is that, civilians do 
not necessarily define themselves as such and that it is rather the military 
that emphasises the difference between themselves (as the military) and 
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the rest who are civilians. There are understandably, various sound 
legislative reasons for defining civilian personnel (such as in South Africa 
where they are managed under the Public Service Act) as distinct from 
uniformed personnel (who are managed under the Defence Act). Castro’s 
(2013) underlying argument, nonetheless, is that both groups are a lot 
closer and probably more unified than the theoretical differences would 
indicate and for that matter questions whether such rigid distinctions are 
entirely necessary in an integrated defence headquarters. 
Notwithstanding the various positions on civilian versus civil control – what 
is clear is that the Ministry is not responsible for coercing the armed 
services to cooperate and subject itself to civil control; rather the Ministry 
provides direction to ensure that the DOD keeps on track and maintains 
the agreed course (Chuter, 2011, p.6). One should also be cautious not to 
over emphasise the use of control in respect to the relationship between 
the civilian secretariat and the armed services. The civilian officials have 
an important role to play as the agents of the Minister and Parliament but 
not to control the Chief SANDF (Fourie, 1996, p. 27). Control in this sense 
is a light touch to provide direction and to guide the uniformed services 
and divisions to effect civil control whilst contributing to the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the department (Chuter, 2011, p.69). What Nathan (1996, 
p.107) describes as a relationship “…characterized by creative tensions 
and dynamic interaction.” Failure to adhere to these guidelines risks 
alienating the armed services – leading to resistance and attempts to 
circumvent the very processes and conditions that civil control intended to 
bolster (Chuter, 2011). 
There are a number of cogent arguments supporting the crucial role of 
civilians in transformed civil-military institutions. This paper supports the 
argument that ‘civil control’ is much more useful as an all-encompassing 
term for the execution of ‘civilian-led’ control of the armed service.  It is 
further suggested that the term finds greater acceptance amongst the 
uniformed personnel, who are generally sensitive about the concept of 
civilians’ ‘exercising control’ over the armed services. For purposes of 
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clarity the term ‘civil control’ to denote political oversight and Executive 
Authority control over the armed services is used consistently throughout 
the rest of this study. In addition the term civilianisation is also used, albeit 
sparingly, in relation to the transformation of the defence organisation from 
previously purely military institution to a civil-military institution. 
 
2.3 Making the Case for Reassessing Civil Control 
 
Generally the interest shown in the theory and practice of civil control of 
the South African armed services, has seen a marked decline since the 
peak in the period immediately before the 1994 democratic elections and 
decade thereafter (Baynham, 1992; Cawthra, 1997; Cawthra, 2003; 
Cawthra & Luckman, 2003; Gutteridge, 1996; Hamann, 2001; Mollo, 2000; 
Nathan, 1994; Shaw, 1995; Steyn, 1994; Stott, 2002; Wiliams, 2002; 
Williams, 2003). Then later still in the new decade (Chuter, 2011; Le Roux, 
2004; Malan, 2006; Mills, 2011; Ngoma, 2006; de Vries, 2006).  The 
waning interest was recently boosted by the long awaited release of the 
report on South African Defence Review 2015, initially approved by 
cabinet on 19 March 2014, and finally passed by the National Assembly 
on 7 June 2015 (Department of Defence, 2015c).  The highly anticipated 
release of the detailed report, although refreshingly frank, did not present 
many surprises.  South Africa’s nascent Defence Force, created in the 
euphoria of the first democratic elections, had attracted steady criticism 
over the years, variously for being unaffordable and/or for defects in its 
design and structure (Cilliers, 2014; Chuter, 2011; Le Roux, 2004; Mills, 
2011; Shaw, 1995; Williams, 2000).   
 
The Defence Review concluded that the SANDF was in a “critical state of 
decline”, bedevilled by numerous challenges that impacted on its ability to 
meet all of its ordered defence commitments, further exacerbated by the 
gross misalignment of expenditure between personnel, operating and 
capital (Department of Defence, 2015c, pp.  ix; 9-9).  The final caveat 
being that the SANDF faced imminent and irreversible loss of capabilities, 
unless decisive and immediate action was taken to check the decline and 
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revise the funding levels (Department of Defence, 2015c, p.  ix).  This is a 
grave indictment against the national department entrusted with the 
constitutional mandate to defend and protect the Republic and its people 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996, Sec 200) and that in 2014 alone, 
expended a defence budget in excess of 42.8 billion Rand (Department of 
Defence, 2014, p. 22).  This begs the question “what went wrong?”  
 
There are a number of reasons posited for the current state of decline, 
chief amongst them being the disjuncture between the defence budget 
and level of defence ambition (Chuter, 2011; Cilliers, 2014; Department of 
Defence, 2015c; Department of Defence, 2015a; Le Roux, 2004; Maynier, 
2015; Mills, 2011; Shaw, 1995; Williams, 2000).  More recently, in April 
2015, the Department of Defence (DOD) acknowledged this threat, as 
being serious enough to warrant being registered as a strategic risk to the 
achievement of ordered defence commitments (Department of Defence, 
2015b, p. 133).  There is therefore no shortage of arguments supporting 
the position that the disjuncture between the defence mandate and budget 
vote not only exists, but that it has contributed materially to the decline in 
capabilities. It is, however, unlikely that the impairment of defence 
capabilities can be attributed to a funding shortfall and overly ambitious 
defence mandate, alone.    
 
The Defence Review does suggest other contributory causes and 
although it posits its advice as “…strategic-level guidance…” (Department 
of Defence, 2015c, pp. 9-14) and thus not as specific operational or 
organisational level recommendations, it nevertheless proposes four 
interventions that, on examination, appear to point to a deeper 
organisational crisis.  These are to: 
 
 Reposition the Defence Secretariat to better exercise civil control.   
 Establish a legally sound defence delegation regime. 
 Review and overhaul the current defence organisational structure. 
 Restructure the SANDF so as to clarify and confirm command (line) 
authority (Department of Defence, 2015c, pp.  9-16 to 9-17). 
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It could be argued that these proposed interventions are indicators of 
much more profound shortcomings in the institutional civil-military 
arrangements within the defence organisation, other than simply a 
question of budget misalignment. That being the case, then left 
unresolved, these shortcomings have the potential to continue to impede 
not only the exercising of civil control by the Executive Authority 
(represented by the Minister) and civil oversight by Parliament but, also 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the SANDF in meeting its ordered 
defence commitments.   
This hypothesis raises a number of possibilities.  Did the new government 
and its stakeholders go too far in their efforts to impose robust civil control 
over the SANDF, in the period leading up to 1994 and in the years that 
followed, effectively emasculating the SANDF? Alternatively is the 
selected model for South Africa’s civil control and oversight regimes 
simply inappropriate or otherwise ineffective? Alternatively, put another 
way, whether the failure lies with the selected model itself or in its 
execution – because of the dilemma of balancing power between the civil 
authorities and the armed services – are issues that require further 
interrogation. Ultimately, given that there is acceptance on the need for 
civil control, then the question arises as to what the ideal institutional civil 
control and oversight regimes should look like.  
These questions, and others, are interrogated against the background of 
South Africa’s developmental agenda6, foreign policy objectives 
(Department of Defence, 2015c, pp. 0-2) and a SANDF grappling with the 
inevitable tension between its constitutional mandate, which is to defend 
and protect the Republic and its people (Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
Sec 200 (2); Department of Defence, 2015, p.  31), and the mandate of 
the civilian Secretariat which is to enhance civil control over defence (in 
this case the SANDF) (Department of Defence, 2002, Sec 8 (d); 
Department of Defence, 2015, p.  33).   
                                                          
6
 Particularly the New Growth Path (Department of Economic Development, 2010), 
National Development Plan 2030 (Department: National Planning Commission, 2011), 
Medium-term Strategic Framework 2014 – 2019 (Department: The Presidency, 2014). 
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The solution requires much more than simply striking a balance between 
civil control of the armed services on the one hand and effective defence 
on the other.  It is, rather, vested in the imperative for the SANDF to 
execute its constitutional mandate.  That being the case, then it is posited 
that it can only be achieved – granted that the DOD must be adequately 
funded for the level of defence ambition – through a more effective and 
efficient model for Executive Authority oversight and civil control of the 
armed services. This would similarly require increasing the transversal 
cooperation between the Secretariat and Defence Force at departmental 
level.  It is argued that this does not necessarily have to be achieved at the 
expense of the integrity of military command and discipline, and line 
management cohesion.   
The key theme to be explored, in reassessing civil control of the DOD, is 
whether the department can be designed, structured and organised in a 
manner that better aligns the SANDF and Secretariat functions, through 
stipulating and clarifying roles, to achieve optimal performance tempered 
by the need for democratic civil control.  What must be acknowledged, all 
the same, is that whilst the armed services must be governed 
democratically, it can never, in itself, be a democratic institution (Cawthra 
et al., 2003, p.  305) – and therein lies the challenge. 
 
This study, therefore, approached the subject of defence policy, within the 
context of both the Constitutional imperative for civil control of the SANDF 
and, the overarching higher defence organisational design for the DOD.  
Of particular interest was the identification of those policy issues that 
affected the exercising of sound civil control and civil oversight, the 
capacity of the defence secretariat to perform the duty assigned to it, and 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the SANDF in conducting its ordered 
commitments in accordance with government policy and strategy.   
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2.4 Theory and Concepts 
 
It is not the intention to undertake a detailed thematic study of civil-military 
relations and the concomitant concept of civil control. The focus of the 
study is reassessing civil control of the South African armed services 
which requires a more particular understanding of defence ministry reform 
in a consolidating democracy and the higher defence organisational 
design as the foundation of the defence establishment. The emphasis was 
therefore on the exercising of democratic civil oversight and control over a 
civil-military integrated DOD, the capacity of the defence secretariat to 
perform the duty assigned to it, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
armed services in executing ordered commitments in accordance with 
government policy and strategy.  It remains helpful, however, as a general 
background for the reader, to touch on the main theories for purposes of 
positioning this research within the literature.   
 
The standpoint is that it is a given that civil control is achieved when the 
armed services are subordinate to and accountable to the elected civil 
authority. It is both a necessary precondition for democratic rule, and for 
democratic consolidation to flourish (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, & Wolf, 
2010, p. 950).  It is important, however, not to confuse civil control of the 
armed services with democratic control as the armed services can never 
themselves be considered a democracy (Cawthra et al., 2003, p. 305). 
Neither is the exercising of civil control over the armed services the 
preserve of democratically elected governments alone.  Civil control is 
eminently possible in the absence of democracy (Cawthra et al., 2003, p. 
305; Feaver, 1996).  The supremacy of The Constitution, the authority of 
Parliament (Legislature) and Cabinet (National Executive) underpin the 
concept of civil control in South Africa as a constitutional democracy. It is 
for those reasons, that this study was conducted through the lens of 
democratic civil control.   
 
Although considerable research has been conducted on the subject of 
civil-military relations, and to a lesser degree civil control of armed 
25 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
services, and notwithstanding wide acceptance on the need (Bruneau, 
2008; Cawthra, 2003; Chuter, 2011; Croissant, Edmonds, 1998; Kuehn, 
Chambers, & Wolf, 2010; Feaver, 1996; Nathan, 1994), there is little 
agreement on either the precise definition of civil control (Chuter, 2011; 
Feaver, 1999; Finer, 1962; Schiff, 1995) or the ideal model that should be 
applied (Bland, 1999; Bradford Jr et al.,1973; Bruneau, 2015; Burk, 2002; 
Chambers, 2011; Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002; Huntington, 1957; 
Moskos Jr, 1973; Schiff, 1995; Williams, 2003).   
 
Most of the mainstream theories were created in the context of 
industrialised states (Edmonds, 1988; Feaver, 1996 & 2003; Finer, 1975; 
Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Roman & Tarr, 2001), with a particular 
focus on mature ‘consolidated democracies’ (as defined by Linz & 
Stephan, 1996).  Whilst useful, they present examples of decidedly 
sophisticated models of civil control, which are more important for what 
they lack rather than any particular solution for South Africa.   
 
In contrast, the literature focusing on consolidating democracies (as 
defined by Linz & Stephan, 1996), (see for instance Bachmann, 2014; 
Chambers, 2011; Heiduk, 2011; Khuehn & Lorenz, 2011; Ngoma, 2006; 
Zaman & Biswas 2014; Webber, 2006), although interesting, does not 
provide significant data as their contexts and experiences differ somewhat 
from those of South Africa, as a self-styled developmental country and 
more recent democratic transition. Even the useful expose on the 
governance of Namibian Defence (Mwange, 2009), although enlightening 
in respect to the British civil-military influences that in some way parallel 
South Africa’s own experience, provides little by the way of a specific 
solution to the research problem. While this research builds our 
understanding from the perspective of foreign armed services, which have 
all experienced, to varying degrees, challenges with flawed institutional 
and legislative civil control arrangements, there is no apparent blueprint for 
a universally applicable model that can be converted directly to South 
Africa, with its own unique context and history.  This problem is not 
exclusive to this study alone and Schmitter (1995, p. 536) acknowledges 
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the difficulty with democracies in transition, in attempting to generalise 
across cases and draw parallels. There is generally little value until the 
democracies in the study reach the ‘consolidation’ phase. It is at this point 
that distinct parallels and common threads first become evident 
(Schmitter, 1995).  Ratchev (2011, p.1) further identifies that there is a 
distinct lack of empirical studies available in the literature, specifically on 
defence ministry reforms in a consolidating democracy context. Mostly the 
studies focus on civil-military relations and the transformation of the armed 
services. 
 
In this study, the focus lies with transformation of the Ministry and DOD, 
and not as such the SANDF.  The interest is in establishing democratic 
civil control, and its locus within the broader discipline of civil-military 
relations is fundamental to the debate on the mechanisms to balance civil 
control of the armed services with effective defence – and not the concept 
of civil control per se.  The departure point is that – whilst it is 
acknowledged that there are a number of consolidating democracies7 still 
struggling with civil control tensions between the civilian authorities and 
the armed services, (Freedom House, 2015) – the practice of democratic 
civil control has matured substantially beyond its initial purpose of simply 
preventing coups (Croissant et al., 2010, p.  950), and the conviction that 
states are perpetually subject to “...the threat of praetorian military 
intervention in domestic politics…” (Cottey, Edmunds, & Forster, 2002, p.  
31). Even Huntington (1957, p.20) was moved to observe that the 
“…problem of the modern state is not armed revolt…”  
 
There is, therefore, a danger that the arguments put forward – which rely 
on the underpinning assumption that the primary problem is the threat of 
military intervention in domestic political affairs – unfairly distorts the 
concept of civil control of the armed services, thereby encouraging 
governments to enforce debilitating control regimes that contribute little to 
advancing military efficiency and effectiveness.  Feaver (2003, p.4) 
                                                          
7
 For example Thailand, Egypt, Kenya, Burundi and Venezuela. 
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moreover cautions that it is short-sighted to assume that once such a 
threat of military intervention or coup has been negated, it will 
automatically translate into an increase in civil-military cooperation and 
military effectiveness.  Civil-military challenges will remain an issue even 
when civil control over the armed services is asserted (Feaver, 2003, p.4).    
 
Take the DOD for example; although no current empirical study of civil-
military relations in the DOD is available, there are persuasive arguments, 
albeit anecdotal, that point to serious flaws in the institutional civil control 
arrangements. It is through these arrangements that it is claimed the 
integrity of military command and discipline has been compromised and 
thereby the ability of the armed services to fulfil the roles and missions 
assigned to it (Department of Defence, 2015c, pp. 9-16 to 9-18).  The 
establishment of the MOD alone is also no guarantee of either civil control 
or an effective armed service.  Indeed, on further examination it is evident 
that the Ministry is grappling with problems in the design, structure and 
implementation of the various institutions that regulate civil-military 
relations and that appear to be obstructing the Sec Def from exercising his 
statutory functions and the SANDF achieving operational effectiveness 
(Department of Defence, 2015c, pp. 9-16 to 9-18). The central problem for 
the DOD is as a result no longer about the desirability or otherwise of 
democratic civil control, but rather in striking a balance between 
‘controlling’ the SANDF and ensuring its effectiveness (Pion-Berlin, 2006).   
 
The literature offers two broad approaches to civil control (whilst 
recognising that various scholars use the term ‘civilian’ interchangeably 
with ‘civil’), namely: ‘subjective civil control’ (maximising civilian power) 
and ‘objective civil control’ (maximising military professionalism) (Chuter, 
2011; Finer, 1962; Huntington, 1973; Moskos Jr, 1973). These two 
approaches represent the extremes on a scale of possibilities with the 
tendency of the public to relate civil control with democratic government 
and military control with totalitarian government, which is not entirely 
surprising given South Africa’s history. 
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The simplest way of minimising military power would appear to be to 
maximise the power of the civilian polity (civis) in relation to the armed 
services (subjective control) and to reduce the size and capability of the 
military (and in so doing guard against a military coup d’état). Feaver 
(1996, p.154) describes this tension as “…the need to have protection by 
the military and the need to have protection from the military…” Reducing 
the capability of the DOD, however, beyond a certain point makes little 
sense considering the size of the defence budget and the expectations of 
the public that the DOD (as a public service) shall be structured and 
resourced to fulfil its constitutional mandate to defend and protect South 
Africa (Chuter, 2011; Department of Defence, 2015d). The rise of the 
military profession in the 1960’s seemed to offer an alternative form of civil 
control, ‘objective control’ by maximising military professionalism.   
 
Huntington’s thesis, from his 1957 seminal work The Soldier and the 
State, sets out that the most effective form of civilian control of the armed 
services is ‘objective control’ which is described as “that which maximizes 
professionalism by isolating soldiers from politics, and giving them as free 
a hand as possible in military matters” (quoted in Cohen, 2003, p. 4). 
Further that a military professional is someone who has the intellectual 
skill and professional responsibility to carry out “the management of 
violence” (Huntington, 1973, p.506). This peculiar skill sets the military 
professional (officer) apart from the enlisted man and by default the 
civilian.  Further that in accepting his social responsibility it “…impose[s] 
upon the professional man the responsibility to perform the service when 
required by society…” (Huntington, 1973, p. 506). What Huntington 
espouses is that the professional officer holds himself subordinate to the 
civilian leadership and will execute his duty, without question, when 
required by society.   
 
The military officer, portrayed in Huntington’s (1973) thesis, is a 
professional, apolitical soldier, loyal to the government of the day and 
belonging to an organisation with its own value framework. The armed 
services eschew politics and concentrate their energies on developing and 
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applying their functional military expertise, in what is commonly referred to 
as Huntington’s ‘institutional-separation’ model. Civil-military scholars also 
generally refer to it as the ‘normal theory of civil-military relations’ (Cohen, 
2003, p. 4). This position is interestingly also adopted by the DOD, which 
under Nathan’s influence, included a section in the White Paper on 
Defence, 1996, on ‘Military professionalism’ that mirrors Huntington’s 
thesis (Department of Defence, 1996, Sect. 29-30).  
 
The cornerstone of objective civil control is accordingly the recognition by 
the state of autonomous military professionalism. Introducing objective 
civil control (maximise military professionalism) depends, as a result, upon 
the achievement of an appropriate balance in the distribution of power 
between the civilian and military institutions. The conundrum is of course 
determining exactly where this balance lies.    
 
Finer (1962) is less convinced that the armed services can be trusted to 
refrain from praetorian ambitions, professional or not. Given the era in 
which he was writing, he identified that “…independent political activity by 
armed forces is…frequent, widespread, and of long standing…” (Finer, 
1962, p. 3).  In his summation the “…army is a purposive instrument… 
[that] comes into being by fiat.” (Finer, 1962, p. 7). Given these conditions 
he identifies a number of features peculiar to armed services that are 
aligned to its central purpose, namely “(1) centralised command, (2) 
hierarchy, (3) discipline, (4) intercommunication, (5) esprit de corps and 
corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency…” (Finer, 1962, p. 7). The 
thrust of Finer’s (1962, p.7) argument is that modern armed services are 
highly organised and usually more so than any other national department 
or division within the state and enjoy overwhelming superiority in the 
application of violence. The argument Finer (1962, p.6) advances is that 
given all these overwhelming advantages, the surprise is “…not why it [the 
armed service] rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys 
them.”   
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Bradford Jr & Murphy (1973) writing in the era of the early 1970’s, in a 
dissenting opinion, take issue with the core of Huntington’s thesis, which 
defines the military professional in terms of someone who possesses the 
intellectual skill and professional responsibility to carry out “the 
management of violence”. They argue that “the management of violence” 
is too narrow a definition and is essentially woefully inadequate to be 
applied to a defence organisation as large and complex as the United 
States military establishment, particularly given its global security 
commitments (Bradford Jr et al., 1973).   
 
Bradford Jr et al. (1973) also challenged the second leg of Huntington’s 
thesis, that military professionalism can be sufficiently defined in terms of 
its functional expertise alone. Even during this early period of the 1970s, 
Bradford Jr et al. (1973) realised that secondary ‘military’ tasks had a 
fundamental bearing on the execution of missions assigned to the armed 
services, and that in some cases took priority over primary missions8.   
The point they were making was that although the objective civil control 
approach (maximising military professionalism) was an important 
contribution to the body of knowledge, functional ‘military’ expertise alone, 
was insufficient to meet the needs of a modern armed service. One which 
had need of a wide-range of technical and management expertise to meet 
ordered commitments as dictated by the particular missions and in support 
of national security policies. As will be argued later, strong parallels are 
observed with the transformation project of South Africa’s DOD.  
 
Rebecca Schiff (1995) is a more contemporary scholar who likewise 
challenges the enduring civil-military theory that “militaries should remain 
physically and ideologically separated from political institutions.” (Schiff, 
                                                          
8
 South Africa is a case in point. Following the euphoria of the first democratic elections the political climate 
favoured tightening control over the armed services and a smaller force over a larger one. The principal aim 
of the White Paper on Defence 1996 was to align defence policy with the new South African democracy and 
described the national strategy for defence, primary mission being protection of the state and its people, and 
defensive posture. A key aspect of which was a decision not to pursue a military role on the continent. This 
position had to be adjusted as the demand for South Africa to contribute to peace and security on the 
continent (and internal borderline security patrols) and provide troops and resources (secondary tasks that 
require widely divergent skill sets) escalated considerably to the point that it now rivals the DOD’s primary 
mission (Department of Defence, 1996, Chapter 5, par. 19-25). 
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1995, p. 7).  Huntington’s (1957) ‘institutional-separation’ model has held 
sway for decades, particularly in the United States of America (USA) and, 
was exported widely throughout the world.  Schiff’s (1995) main challenge 
is that the institutional-separation’ model was based on the USA 
experience and a “…particular standard of military professionalism…” that 
“…highlights military insularity, political neutrality, and conservative 
defense planning” (Schiff, 1995, p. 10).  The crux of the problem is that 
this ‘model’ was being ‘exported’ to consolidating democracies that had 
different standards, own unique contexts, history and forms of military 
professionalism very different from that found in the West (Schiff, 1995, p. 
10).   
 
Like Schiff, Feaver (1999, p.235) questions the validity of linking together 
military professionalism and armed services subordination to civil control.  
More specifically he disagrees with Huntington’s (1957) hypothesis in that 
he believes an overreliance is placed on military professionalism as being 
fundamental to civil control (Feaver, 1999, p.235). Schiff (1995) proposes 
an alternative ‘concordance theory’ that argues for a three-way partnership 
and cooperative arrangement between the government, the armed 
services and society, the defining aspect of which is that they should strive 
for a “cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation but 
does not require it” (Schiff, 1995, p. 7).   
 
Moskos Jr (1973, p.527), a contemporary of Huntington, argues for 
“convergence [civilianisation] of the military with the structures and values 
of society”. Whilst recognising the role of what he calls the ‘traditional’ 
military in the all-volunteer era, there remains a danger of the organisation 
‘turning inward’ (divergence) in the absence of broadly based civilian 
representation.  Moskos Jr (1973, p.529) posits that the solution is a 
‘pluristic’ (segmented) military model which “…will be both convergent and 
divergent with civilian society…” The key is compartmentalisation within 
the organisation which “…seems to offer the best promise for an armed 
force that maintains organisational effectiveness whilst embracing civilian 
values (Moskos Jr, 1973, p. 529).  
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Williams (2003) – whilst acknowledging the strengths of traditional western 
theories and models of civil-military relations, and the influence on African 
governments and their relationships with their armed services – concluded 
that many of these key concepts are limited, particularly in respect to their 
ability to articulate the complexities of African civil-military relations 
(Williams, 2003; see also Ngoma, 2006).  As such he proposes that the 
‘western influenced’ theoretical basis for the assumptions – that currently 
underpin the study of African civil-military relations – be reconsidered and, 
that a new approach, one that adapts traditional civil-military relations to 
render it more applicable to Africa, be adopted (Williams, 2003, pp.  277-
280).   What is proposed is an approach which sees a combination of 
objective and subjective mechanisms being utilised to secure effective civil 
control of the armed forces.  This approach is based on a revision of the 
conceptual framework, to quote an earlier work of Williams (1998), of 
“…late modern civil-military relations theory…” adapted for the African 
environment (Williams, 1998, pp.  2-22).   
 
Williams (2003) writes extensively on the various merits and demerits of 
western-influenced civil control models that have been applied in various 
degrees of success to Africa.  He has in particular analysed both 
Huntington’s ‘institutional-separation model’ and Schiff’s ‘concordance 
theory’ and concludes that – whilst the concordance theory has much 
merit for application in the developing world (Williams, 2003, p.  268) – the 
institutional-separation model had limited application for Africa as a “model 
upon which an effective African civil-military relations tradition can be 
established” (Williams, 2003, p. 273). Williams makes a compelling 
argument and when viewed through this lens, it appears that the solution 
for the South African DOD lies more with Schiff’s (1995) ‘Concordance 
Theory’ based on a three-way partnership and cooperative arrangement 
between the government, the armed services and society, than it has with 
Huntington’s ‘institutional-separation’  theory (Huntington, 1957). 
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Bruneau (2006, p. 4) advances the position that the theoretical works of 
Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, although useful in providing a 
grounding in civil-military relations, “…offer a level of generalisation that is 
too broad…” to be of benefit to the current study.  What is missing in these 
works is specific insight into the central challenge confronting stable 
consolidated democracies in the 21st Century (where the right to rule is 
uncontested) which is regulating and balancing the relationship between 
the civil authority and the armed services (Bruneau, 2006, p. 4). 
 
Ratchev (2011, p.4), in what he calls the “holy trinity of modern civil-
military relations” expands upon the central challenge of regulating and 
balancing the relationship between the civil authority and the armed 
services, identified by Bruneau (2006, p. 4) above. Instead of the standard 
two-dimensional approached favoured in the literature (balancing civil 
control with military effectiveness), Ratchev (2011, p.4) proposed a new 
approach that includes, in addition, a third dimension ‘defence efficiency’. 
The three key dimensions are: 
 Civil control – performed by the National Executive  
 Military effectiveness – in achieving ordered commitments 
 Defence efficiency – sound resource management. 
As with the two dimensional approach there will be tensions within the 
‘trinity’ that have to be managed to find the correct balance. It is 
hypothesised that the ‘trinity’ approach is much more useful as a concept, 
and it is this approach which is applied in the rest of the study. 
 
What is critical to determine within the overall debate is where the DOD 
fits into the argument. On the face of it there is compelling evidence that 
the Joint Military Coordination Committee (JMCC)9 embraced Huntington’s 
(1957) ‘institutional-separation’ model as the basis for the selection of the 
‘balance DOD design’ (Document No. 3, 1996). This is further 
                                                          
9
 The JMCC was the military workgroup of the sub-council on defence, chaired 
alternatively by General Meiring, representing the SADF, and Siphiwe Nyanda, at the 
time MK Chief of Staff. 
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strengthened by S. Rabkin’s claim that Huntington’s (1993) Clash of 
Civilisations10 paper had also been considered by the committee during 
the earlier JMCC discussions (Interview, February 15, 2016).  
 
In a later MOD reported penned in 1996 by the Minster, the clear influence 
of Laurie Nathan is also evident (Document No. 3, 1996).  In the report for 
example, in reference to the principle of ‘separation of powers’ 11 it was 
stated that the armed services were encouraged to eschew politics and 
concentrate their energies on developing and applying their functional 
military expertise. It goes further in emphasising the “…clear structural 
distinction between the powers of the government and the armed 
forces…” and that “…neither party should venture beyond these 
boundaries…” failing which it could endanger the foundations of the 
democratic system (Document No. 3, 1996; Nathan, 1996, p. 98).   
 
The MOD report does proceed to provide some balance to this position, 
and in a following paragraph, it qualifies that professional military officers 
should be encouraged to contribute to the formulation and development of 
defence policy, based on their functional expertise. The caveat is that this 
should be done in a manner that does not undermine the authority of the 
civil decision-makers (Document No. 3, 1996; Nathan, 1996, p. 98).  There 
is also conversely a civil role in contributing to the formulation of military 
strategy, for example, under the same terms.  
  
The challenge remains how to conceptualise and then analyse civil-
military relations in a consolidating democracy, where it is accepted that 
the power lies with the elected civil authority and the DOD respects the 
supremacy of that authority. Bruneau12 (2006, p.6), proposes a 
                                                          
10
 Huntington, S.P. (1993). Clash of Cultures. Foreign Affairs Journal, Council on Foreign 
Relations and Foreign Affairs (US). Later republished as Huntington, S.P. (1996). Clash 
of Cultures and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster.  
11
 Four principles for governance of democratic civil control and civil-military relations 
were approved at the joint meeting of the sub-council on defence and JMCC on 30 March 
1994, and taken up by the DOD 
12
 At the time of writing he was Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and the Academic Liaison for the 
Centre for Civil-Military Relations. 
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contemporary version of Max Weber’s original work on political power and 
bureaucracy13, particularly regarding the armed services and its locus 
within state and society, known as ‘New Institutionalism’, as a model on 
which the analysis of defence institutions is loosely based.  Bruneau 
(2006, p.6) argues that it is necessary to understand the role of institutions 
in order to undertake a study of how power relations are managed within a 
society, and in this case within the Ministry and DOD as a department of 
state.  Institutions are defined as “…formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure 
of the polity or political economy…” (Hall & Taylor quoted in Bruneau, 
2006, p.6).   
 
Bruneau’s (2006, pp.6-7) New Institutionalism approach or model has the 
potential to be used as a framework to support this study. The approach is 
described in broad terms in the literature and it required extensive 
reworking in order to adapt it to meet with the requirements of this study  ̶
for a tool to support the analyses of civil-military relations in the DOD. The 
following framework of analysis (model) was developed, based on the 
works of Bruneau (2006, pp.6-7): 
 Analyse both institutions (Def Sec and SANDF) individually, as part 
of the larger DOD, to acquire an in-depth understanding of each 
before analysing their impact on one another; 
 Analyse what influences the institutions exert on actors and 
processes; 
 Evaluate the means by which the Executive Authority exercises civil 
control of SANDF and the SANDF’s concomitant effectiveness in 
fulfilling the roles and missions assigned to it; 
 Analyse the extent to which a particular model copied from another 
country/institution and context can be translated into the DOD; and 
                                                          
13
 C. Wright Mills. (1958). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York. Oxford 
University Press.  
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 Determine how the DOD (as an institution) structures power 
relationships and maintains the balance between the Def Sec and 
SANDF – include a review of: 
o Conditions under which the transformed DOD was created. 
o Interests of the stakeholders involved in creating the 
institutions. 
o Influence of pre-existing institutional models on the 
transformed DOD.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
That the Department of Defence is in a crisis is undeniable.  The challenge 
for the DOD is to find an agreeable solution that will satisfy both the 
statutory civil control precepts and the Chief SANDF’s desire for freedom 
from undue interference with his executive military command. The threat 
of military intervention by the SANDF in domestic political affairs is no 
longer the risk it may once have been in 1994, and therefore any attempts 
to overburden the SANDF with an onerous and debilitating civil control 
regime contributes little to advancing military utility.  The key issue here is 
as much about the Defence Force’s efficiency and effectiveness in service 
delivery as it is about guaranteeing civil assurance.   
  
That the current institutional civil control arrangements have effectively 
compromised the integrity of military command, and thereby the ability of 
the SANDF to fulfil the roles and missions assigned to it, is moot. What is 
not debatable is that the armed services, by its own admission, are in a 
“critical state of decline”, and unable to meet all of its ordered defence 
commitments (Department of Defence, 2015c, p. ix). There is no argument 
then that military effectiveness is highly prized. What is missing is the 
question of efficiency in resource management. It is for this reason, 
therefore, that Ratchev’s (2011, p.4) expanded approach to modern civil-
military relations (that although not a new concept, it is unique in 
specifically including the crucial third dimension of ‘defence efficiency’) is 
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preferred over Huntington’s simpler two dimensional approach of 
balancing civil control with military effectiveness. 
   
What is critical to the debate is where the DOD fits into the argument. On 
the face of it there is compelling evidence that the JMCC embraced 
Huntington’s (1957) ‘institutional-separation’ model as the foundation for 
developing the ‘balance DOD design’ (Document No. 3, 1996; S. Rabkin, 
Interview, February 15, 2015). Numerous scholars (Bruneau, 2006; 
Chuter, 2011; Feaver, 1999; Finer, 1962; Moskos Jr, 1973; Schiff, 1995; 
Williams, 2003) have all variously challenged Huntington’s central theory 
of ‘institutional-separation’. In terms of a theoretical approach, what 
scholars generally accept is that, to secure effective civil control of the 
armed forces, requires utilising a combination of objective and subjective 
mechanisms. The concern with Huntington (1957) has to do with identified 
limitations regarding his overreliance on military professionalism as being 
fundamental to civil control (Feaver, 1999, p.235). Moreover, the lack of 
specific insight into the central challenge confronting stable consolidated 
democracies in the 21st Century, namely regulating and balancing the 
relationship between the civil authority and the armed services (Bruneau, 
2006, p. 4; Ratchev, 2011).  
 
Collectively the authors make a compelling argument and when viewed 
through this lens, it appears that the solution for the South African DOD 
lies more with Schiff’s (1995) ‘concordance theory’ based on a three-way 
partnership and cooperative arrangement between the government, the 
armed services and society, than it has with Huntington’s (1957) 
‘institutional-separation’  model.  In effect the DOD’s choice of the balance 
DOD design reflected the influences of a ‘model’ that held sway during the 
1960s and 70s, but has now been found wanting.  A number of 
fundamental flaws in the design elements continue to impede the 
transformation of the DOD. These will need to be resolved if the DOD is to 
achieve its vision of “…effective defence for a democratic South Africa…” 
and rightfully take its place as the preeminent defence organisation on the 
continent (Department of Defence, 2015).   
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Whilst the literature on the subject of civil-military relations – and more 
particularly civil control of the armed services – is helpful in providing a 
broad framework and concepts with which to guide the study, there is no 
apparent blueprint for a universally applicable model that can be converted 
directly to South Africa, with its own unique context, history and legislation. 
In addition no recent empirical studies of any significance have been 
published which provide explicit guidance on how best to reform the DOD, 
particularly regarding the realignment of the functions and composition of 
the Secretariat with the changing Defence Mandate and the Minister’s 
specific support requirements, to assure effective and efficient defence.  
 
Three possible exceptions are works by Bruneau (2006), Chuter (2011) 
and Ratchev (2011) which have all proven useful. The study will 
particularly draw upon Chuter (2011) for his fresh and incisive views on 
civil-military relations and the functioning of integrated (civilianised) 
Ministries of Defence; Bruneau’s (2006) ‘New Institutionalism framework’ 
(as adapted) and Ratchev’s (2011) ‘framework for civilianisation of the 
defence ministry’ as well as Ratchev’s (2011, p.4), trinity of modern civil-
military relations approach. These models or ‘tools’ proved valuable in the 
analysis of the DOD and both were applied judiciously to the study. The 
chapter to follow will explore in detail the institutional dimension of civil 
control in the DOD and the transformation project.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL CONTROL 
 
“…the central issue is never strategy, structure, culture, or systems. All those elements, 
and others, are important. But the core of the matter is always about changing the 
behaviour of people and behaviour changes happens in highly successful situations 
mostly by speaking to people’s feelings.” (John Kotter, The Heart of Change, 2002)  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter three provides the institutional background to the development of 
defence policy and strategy in South Africa in general and civil control of 
the armed services in particular. Of specific interest is the identification of 
those policy issues that affected the exercising of civil oversight by 
Parliament and civil control by the Executive Authority and Secretary for 
Defence (Sec Def). The capacity of the defence secretariat to perform the 
duty assigned to it, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) in conducting its ordered 
commitments in accordance with government policy and strategy.  
Likewise what cannot be ignored, is the influence of the inherent civil-
military tensions on the co-existence, power relations and working 
procedures within the civil control structures, principally between the main 
controllers, the Minister, Sec Def and the Chief SANDF.  
 
The framework of analysis utilised as a guide to answering the research 
questions, is loosely based on the New Institutionalism approach, as 
adapted from Bruneau (2006, pp.6-7). This is in preparation for the later 
analysis of data to determine how the DOD structures power relationships 
and maintains the balance between the Minister, Def Sec and SANDF. 
The analysis focuses primarily on the Def Sec to understand how it 
functions as an institution. This includes considering the role and functions 
of the SANDF (as far as is relevant to the study) before analysing the 
respective influences on one another. Finally to evaluate the means by 
which the executive authority exercises civil control of SANDF and the 
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SANDF’s concomitant effectiveness in fulfilling the roles and missions 
assigned to it. 
 
For practical reasons a chronological approach was followed in presenting 
the data to take the reader logically through the study. Regular analysis of 
facts and deductions and a final chapter conclusion will bring together the 
main themes and highlight key issues.  The chapter commences with a 
brief historical review of civil-military relations under apartheid which left 
an enduring legacy, and then moves on to the transitional phase up to 
1994 followed by the post-1994 transformation of the DOD and integration 
of multi-party forces’ up to 2002.  This is necessary in order to determine 
the influence that the conditions under which the DOD was created, the 
interests of the stakeholders involved in creating the institutions, and the 
impact of pre-existing institutional models, had on the transformation of the 
DOD (Bruneau, 2006, pp. 6-7). This includes the crucial decisions, taken 
during the pre-1994 negotiations and in the period thereafter as the 
transitional democracy sought to consolidate its control over the armed 
services. Decisions in particular – concerning the choice of political-
administrative and political-military arrangements for the higher defence 
organisation design for the DOD – which had a number of unintended 
consequences.   
 
3.2 Civil Control under Apartheid Rule 
 
In 1948 the National party was elected and soon afterwards it began the 
process of institutionalising Apartheid policy. Events began to rapidly 
overtake South Africa, and the years 1960 – 63 were to prove decisive. 
The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan’s “wind of change” speech to 
Members of the South African Parliament on 03 February 1960, is widely 
recognised for portending the changes taking place on the continent as 
black majorities increasingly sought the right to rule themselves, and for 
drawing a curtain on the era of British colonialism in Africa (BBC News, 
1960).   
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By 1960 the two main resistance movements, the African National 
Congress (ANC) and rival Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) had both 
embarked on anti-pass law campaigns to protest against the passbook, 
used since the early 1920’s to control the movement of black South 
Africans and restricted where they lived and could work. The heavy-
handed SA Police response to the campaign set the scene for the 
Sharpeville massacre that took place on the 21 March 1960, and the 
international repercussions that followed (TRC South Africa, 1998). 
Foremost amongst the expressions of global outrage, was the issuing of 
United Nations Resolution 134 which effectively condemned the 
government’s actions and called upon South Africa to “initiate measures 
aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality…and to 
abandon its policies of apartheid…” (UN SC/RES/134 (1960), 1960, p.3).   
 
The government responded by enacting the Unlawful Organisations Act on 
07 April 1960 that provided for organisations that threatened public order 
to be declared unlawful (Republic of South Africa, 1960). The state applied 
the Act against the ANC and the PAC which in turn forced both 
organisations underground and upped the ante on violent confrontation 
(Hamann, 2001).   Ironically, the Apartheid regime’s actions only served to 
further galvanise popular resistance against this injustice and led to the 
intensification of the mass mobilisation campaign (TRC South Africa, 
1998). This proved to be a turning point for South Africa, and the country 
was to become increasingly isolated from the international community.  
 
In 1961 South Africa declared itself a Republic, due in part to widespread 
condemnation of its domestic policies, and withdrew itself from the 
Commonwealth of Nations. In the direct aftermath, South Africa was to 
enter an extremely challenging period of its history, and not the least of 
which was the strain this decision placed on the nascent Department of 
Defence (DOD), given that “the primary task of the Defence Force… [is] to 
ensure national security” (Malan, 2006, p.144). 
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In the beginning, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was not directly 
involved in the security operations to supress dissidence. This was seen 
rather more as a policing action with the SADF on standby to provide 
assistance in the event that the South African Police required it. Given 
these circumstance, the immediate exigency to be overcome was that for 
the first time the SADF had to think and operate as an entity independent 
from the Commonwealth (Malan, 2006, p.145). South Africa was now 
entirely responsible for meeting its own national security needs and for its 
survival without the luxury of the embedded institutional support previously 
provided to the SADF, by Britain (Malan, 2006, p.145).  One of the 
noteworthy consequences was the decision in 1966, by the MOD under 
P.W. Botha, to absorb the office of the Secretary of Defence post into the 
SADF (due in part to a breakdown in relationships between the Sec Def 
and Chief of Defence Force) and vest the accounting officer functions in 
the Commandant-General (Fourie, 1996). This status quo was set to 
remain until the new DOD design was unveiled in 1994 and fully 
implemented by April 1997. 
    
This period also laid the foundation for the militant student movement that 
burst forth in the watershed 1976 Soweto student uprising and the 
widespread police repression that ensued in an attempt to curb the spread 
of resistance and civil disobedience to the rest of the country.  The ANC 
were quick to capitalise and recruited large numbers of disaffected black 
students, many of whom left the country to join MK and undergo military 
training (Hamann, 2001, p.49).  To put the widespread internal resistance 
in context, it must be viewed  against the backdrop of the SADF’s 1975-88 
war in Namibia and Angola and the ensuing broader destabilisation of 
Southern Africa by the various national security agencies.  
 
That the apartheid era was characterised by a system of weak civil-military 
relations is undeniable. Security structures were increasingly politicised 
and decision making became more and more centralised under the State 
Security system (Stott, 2002). The military also made entries into the 
political arena, spearheaded by the appointment of the former Chief 
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SADF, General Magnus Malan, as Minister of Defence in 1980 (Malan, 
2006).  At the time the government was convinced it faced a total 
onslaught directed by Moscow, across the diplomatic, informational, 
military and economic (DIME) domains and only a ‘total strategy’ could 
defeat it (Gutteridge, 1996; Stott, 2002).  
Under P.W. Botha’s leadership, South Africa’s military achieved 
unparalleled political influence. In this task, Malan as Defence Minister, 
ably supported him. The ‘Total Strategy’ was soon to take centre stage 
and was to form the basis for the SADF’s mounting influence on the 
drafting of state policy (Stott, 2002). The State Security Council (SSC) 
which was formed in 1972 as a statutory Cabinet committee, ostensibly to 
advise government on the formulation and implementation of a wide range 
of national security related policies, effectively entrenched the 
‘securocrats’, positioning the military at the centre point of decision making 
and state power (Stott, 2002).  The extension of the SSC in 1978 to 
oversee the National Security Management System (tasked with 
integrating all the various components of the broader security system) 
played a key role in South Africa’s expansive security strategy (D'A 
Henderson, 1995; Nathan, 1996; Shaw, 1995). In the words of General 
Meiring, “…for a time it actually was a government within a government” 
(as quoted in Hamann, 2001, p.59). 
The very strong influence and control exercised by the SSC and in 
contrast the effective side-lining of Parliamentary oversight was pervasive. 
This period is also characterised by the fact that there was no formal 
Department of Defence, and the Chief SADF (who since 1966 was also 
the head of department and accounting officer) reported directly to the 
Minister who in turn reported to the SSC. The Chief SADF was also a 
member of the SSC by virtue of his appointment (Malan, 2006). It is also 
marked that the combat services each had their own operational capability 
which they exercised under the direct command of the Chief SADF. The 
civil-military structure under PW Botha is presented in a diagram overleaf 
(Figure 1). 
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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS CIRCA 1980s 
 
 
Figure 1: Civil-Military Relations under President P.W. Botha 
 (Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
 
As can be observed in figure 1, the SCC was politically very strong and 
essentially controlled the Ministry of Defence and the SADF to the 
exclusion of Parliament. Parliament had as a result virtually no oversight 
role.  Under such conditions it is easy to imagine a Chief of the armed 
services pledging his allegiance and that of his command, not to 
Parliament but rather to the SSC and President.   
 
The organisational structure of the SADF between 1980 and 1990 detailed 
overleaf (Figure 2) provides an indication of the comprehensive command 
and control (unfettered command line directly to his forces) and thus total 
power vested in the Chief SADF.  It will also be observed that the role of 
the ‘Ministerial Secretariat’ was merely to serve as an adjunct to the 
Ministry. 
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Figure 2: SADF Organisational structures circa 1990.  
(Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
 
Domestically the security situation continued to deteriorate. Following the 
1984 nationwide uprising under the banner of the United Democratic Front 
(Gutteridge, 1996, p. 4), the state declared rolling States of Emergency 
between 1986 and 1989 that were characterised by increased military 
involvement in policy and the national security strategy. Notwithstanding 
some successes on the part of the anti-apartheid movement, the 
consensus by the late 1980s was that Apartheid rule would be ended by 
negotiations and not by revolution (Cawthra, 2003; Nathan, 1994; Shaw, 
1994).  The watershed moment for the end of the apartheid era came in 
1989 with F.W. de Klerk’s replacement of P.W. Botha as president – the 
significance of the timing which needs to be viewed against the 
background of the changing geopolitical situation, including Namibia’s 
independence and shortly thereafter the fall of the Soviet Union 
(Cruywagen, 2014, pp. 118-119).   
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3.3. The Transition 1990 – 1994 
 
On the 2 February 1990 President F.W. de Klerk took the quite 
unexpected step of announcing the unbanning of liberation movements14, 
by all accounts a move that blindsided the SADF (Cruywagen, 2014, p. 
119; Gutteridge, 1996, p.3). Cruwagen (2014, p.119) does, however, 
explain that the SADF’s anger was more particularly directed at FW de 
Klerk “for acting unilaterally and without a mandate” rather than any 
unwavering belief in a military solution over a political one.  This position 
was also variously claimed by Generals Meiring, Viljoen, Thirion and 
Malan (Cruwagen, 2014; Hamann, 2001; Malan, 2006). Given the facts it 
does seem to confirm the SADF’s assertion, that although it did not 
advocate a military solution, it did wish to retain the state’s strong military 
advantage so as to negotiate from a position of strength (Gen Meiring as 
quoted in Hamann, 2001).  
 
The successful transition to democracy and lack of any extrajudicial 
military intervention supports the contention that the issue at the time was 
more about the timing of the national elections and preparing the SADF for 
transformation, and not an attempt to delay the inevitability of multi-party 
democracy. Gutteridge (1996) and Cruywagen (2014) both presented 
retired SADF General Constand Viljoen’s reluctance to incite violence or 
unconstitutional actions to further the Afrikaner’s claim to a self-
determining ‘Volkstaat’, as proof of this.   
 
The final assessment suggests that the SADF military command were 
dismayed with FW de Klerk for his ‘indecent haste’ in capitulating too 
readily on the dominant position held by the SADF and consequently the 
strong bargaining chip to use judiciously to strengthen the governments 
hand at the negotiating table. That F.W. de Klerk’s actions caused a major 
breach of trust between the governing party and the SADF cannot be 
                                                          
14
 FW de Klerk, in an interview with Dennis Cruywagen (2014), admitted intelligence 
reports that the Soviets had advised the ANC that they could no longer support them, 
was a major consideration in decisions made by government and particularly the 
‘unilateral’ steps de Klerk took in unbanning the ANC. 
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denied. This did not bode well for civil-military relations in the lead-up to 
the transformation of the SADF. Whatever their differences, in 1990 
negotiations finally began in earnest. 
 
The current civil oversight and control regimes particularly targeting the 
post-transitional South African National Defence Force (SANDF) as the 
military arm, had its birth in the lead-up to the 1994 democratic elections 
and the Interim Constitution becoming law (Republic of South Africa, 
1993).  There were obviously good reasons for re-imposing Parliamentary 
oversight – a decision that grew out of exhaustive, although not always 
unanimous, negotiations conducted between the main political parties, that 
proved to be key to the success of South Africa’s first democratic elections 
(Gutteridge, 1996; Mollo, 2000; Nathan, 1994; Shaw, 1995).   
 
Discussions on the shape of a new system of political-administrative and 
political-military arrangements for the transformed DOD in a democratic 
South Africa, commenced formally in 1990 with a conference on the future 
of the military in South Africa, held in Lusaka, Zambia (Kenkel, 2006). The 
next essential step was the signing of the Pretoria Minute, in August 1991, 
which secured the critical agreement on a ceasefire between the National 
Party government and the ANC (Shaw, 1995, p. 10).  More importantly, 
this agreement was to later underpin the signing of the National Peace 
Accord in September 1991, to end the political violence spiralling out of 
control. This laid the groundwork for the convening of the multiparty forum, 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991, 
attended by 19 political parties (Shaw, 1995, p. 11). Whilst the CODESA 
discussions, as pointed out by Williams (2000), did not contribute directly 
to the decisions on the future force design and structure of the future 
Defence Force, they did provide a critical platform for the diverse political 
and liberation bodies to broach their particular views on security 
management and defence.   
 
A vital output of these early initiatives, was the creation of the Transitional 
Executive Council (TEC) in 1993 (Republic of South Africa, 1993) and, of 
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direct relevance to this study, the establishment of the sub-council on 
defence (SCD).  Notwithstanding the critical function performed by the 
SCD, in providing strategic guidance and oversight of the armed services 
in the lead-up to the elections – it was the establishment of the multiparty 
military workgroup, the Joint Military Coordination Council (JMCC)15 that 
was instrumental in kick-starting the negotiations for the design of a ‘new’ 
DOD (Document No. 1,1996).  It was here that the idea began to find 
acceptance, across the political divide, that civil oversight of the armed 
services’ in the future South Africa was both necessary and desirable.  
The importance of this epiphany at this early stage of the negotiations 
cannot be underestimated.  This is all the more impressive given that the 
participating military forces represented at the JMCC were all, to various 
degrees, aligned to political parties and “…none of them was designed to 
serve a democracy and none of them had an impressive record of respect 
for human rights and international law…” (Nathan, 1996, p. 88). 
 
In their deliberations Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), the ANC’s armed wing, 
were heavily influence by their experiences of civil-military relations within 
their own internal structures (Mollo, 2000). According to Mollo (2000) from 
the beginning they were indoctrinated into a system of subordination by 
the military wing to the political leadership.  It was no mistake that the 16th 
June 1961, founding manifesto of Umkhonto We Sizwe, underlined this 
relationship, stating “…our members…place themselves under the overall 
political guidance…” (as quoted in Mollo, 2000, p.5) and in the MK Military 
Code as “…The political leadership has primacy over the military…” (ANC, 
1985). Williams (2000, p.103) further contends that, in common with other 
revolutionary movements, the ANC also actively maintained control over 
MK – thereby securing their allegiance to the movement - by 
“…interpenetration of the MK leadership…” with ANC political leaders.  
 
                                                          
15
 The JMCC was the military workgroup of the sub-council on defence, chaired 
alternatively by General Meiring, representing the SADF, and Siphiwe Nyanda, at the 
time MK Chief of Staff.   
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The ANC’s fear that “…[t]he apartheid security forces posed a major threat 
to destabilize the democratic transition…” (Mollo, 2000, p.1), given the  
National Party government’s track record and the positioning of the SADF 
at the centre point of decision-making and state power (Stott, 2002), also 
weighed heavily in favour of choosing a strategy that locked the Defence 
Force into a binding democratic civil control arrangement.  
 
The ANC and its backers soon came to realise during the earlier rounds of 
negotiations that they lacked adequate expertise on defence policy and 
particularly the specialised knowledge required to produce competitive 
policy options (Cawthra, 1997; Williams, 2002). As a result the Military 
Research Group (MRG) was established as an adjunct to the organisation 
to help the ANC and MK alleviate the capacity gap (Kenkel, 2006, p. 9). 
The MRG had a personnel core of approximately 10-12 people, boasting 
credentials from across the spectrum, from established academics, to 
antimilitary activists and ANC/MK operatives (Kenkel, 2006, p. 11). Rocky 
Williams, former MK operative and later Colonel in the new SANDF, was 
the group’s first coordinator, later succeeded by Prof Gavin Cawthra of the 
University of the Witwatersrand (Kenkel, 2006, p. 11).  
 
By all accounts, the group which met for the first time on 25 November 
1991 was extremely successful during the transition, in providing “…a 
forum whereby researchers, academics and policy analysts could network 
with one another…” (Minutes of the MRG meeting, 25 November 1991) 
and in particular produced numerous research reports, coordinated 
training workshops and facilitated dialogue (Williams, 2002). Ultimately, as 
Kenkel (2006, pp.13-15) posited, the success of the MRG and its efforts is 
measured by the dominant role played by two of its core members; Laurie 
Nathan, lead drafter of the South African White Paper on Defence and 
Rocky Williams who was a key figure in the drafting of the South African 
Defence Review 1998.  
 
At the practical level, however, it is evident that it took a while for the 
MRG’s influence to filter through and make an impact on the JMCC 
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negotiations, particularly in raising the standard of MK’s contributions.  MK 
negotiators received very little technical support, further hampered by 
resource constrains within the nascent ANC command and control 
structures and an even vaguer political mandate (Motumi, 1995). The 
effect was that the manifestly poor preparation and a general lack of 
planning capability made it difficult for the ANC to effectively challenge the 
SADF’s dominant defence policy positions16 (Mollo, 2000; Williams, 1998; 
Williams, 2004).  The one thing MK brought to the table, however, that 
could not be ignored, was the wide legitimacy the ANC enjoyed amongst 
the South African public (Kenkel, 2006; Nathan, 1994; Mollo, 2000; 
Williams, 1998). This was a significant bargaining chip, the power of which 
should not be underestimated.  
 
Given these facts it is not surprising that the former MK officers were able 
to dominate the process to establish the civilian ministry of defence, 
notwithstanding being found wanting in other areas.  Williams (2000) sums 
it up, when he argues that the MK officers were able to do so because, in 
terms of civil military relations, they had a far better political understanding 
of the requirement for civilian oversight in the new South Africa than did 
their Defence Force counterparts. Paradoxically the ruling party 
demonstrated a strong stake in maintaining the military dominance of the 
SADF right up to the end, in an attempt to ensure that they negotiated a 
favourable concession from a position of strength, rather than simply 
capitulating to a majority decision at the 27 April elections (Cruywagen, 
2014; Gutteridge, 1996; Nathan, 1994; Shaw, 1995).  For its part the ANC 
were equally successful in arguing for the exclusion of MK from the 
restriction on private armies, in terms of the 1991 DF Malan Accord, to 
similarly strengthen their own hand (in providing a fall-back position should 
negotiations irretrievably breakdown) (Shaw, 1995).   
 
                                                          
16 MK were at a distinct disadvantage compared to the SADF due to weak command and control structures within SA, at 
the time of the negotiations, and the lack of an organisational infrastructure to support them in the preparation of position 
papers and the complex force planning processes (William, 2002). Cawthra (1997) argued that although the ANC’s 
‘Marxist liberation ideology’ was well developed the organisation had failed to properly adapt the framework to the 
demands of holding power and equally importantly they lacked expertise in defence management.  
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Aside from the posturing, both parties had common agreement and 
demonstrated a willingness to secure firm constitutional guarantees that 
the armed services would, after the elections, subject itself to the civil 
authority, notwithstanding which political party led government.  It seems 
that both parties early on realised that a compromise decision on the new 
structure of the SANDF was necessary to conclude the negotiations in 
time to meet the 27 April election deadline.   
 
The selection of the ‘balance’ approach to the new DOD design had its 
origins in the resolution by the TEC Sub-council on Defence (SCD) and 
the JMCC, that strengthening civil control and civil oversight of the armed 
services would be the sine qua non of defence transformation in the new 
democratic South Africa (Document No. 1, 1996).  It must be appreciated 
that  
“…in 1994 the perception that the SADF presented a threat 
dominated discussions. The SADF was a purely military 
institution with very few civilians and little in the way of 
mixed civil-military skills. It was considered to be extremely 
powerful, had a large budget that they only superficially had 
to account for and for all intents and purposes reported 
directly through to the President” (S. Rabkin, interview, 
February 15, 2016).   
 
The JMCC took the decision on 11 February 1994, after considering the 
SCD appointed workgroup’s17 proposal for the establishment of a new 
MOD. The proposal was based on an earlier study of civil control 
structures and approaches in operation across a number of democracies 
(Document No. 3, 1996).  The Research focused on three levels; firstly 
civilian/political control; secondly MOD design; and thirdly MOD structure. 
The overriding message was that most emerging democracies, and 
certainly all mature democracies, were subject to some form of civilian 
(civil) control and oversight (Document No. 1, 1996).   
                                                          
17
 SCD appointed multi-party workgroup of military officers and researchers from a 
number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including the MRG. 
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Juxtaposed with the comparably more moderate approaches taken by the 
other specialist committees appointed to consider transformation of the 
rest of the Departments of State, the JMCC took a particular keen interest 
in enhancing control of the DOD. This was of course necessary to 
harnessed the potentially destructive power in the hands of the military 
and bring it under the sanction of Parliament. This is the classic ‘civil-
military problematique’, described by Feaver (1999) and variously by 
others (Cawthra, 2003; Chuter, 2011; Edmonds, 1998; Huntington, 1957; 
Nathan, 1994, Williams, 2004). The paradox that a nation requires an 
armed service that is powerful enough to deter aggression and protect the 
state and its citizens yet not be so powerful that it threatens the state.   
Given the earlier argument that MK possessed a superior political 
understanding of civilian oversight than did their SADF counterparts, it was 
not surprising that they took such a firm stand. This position must, of 
course, be viewed against the SADF’s reputation as the bulwark of the 
Apartheid regime’s security apparatus, the real fear that the SADF 
presented a threat (S. Rabkin, 2016) and the general lack of civil and 
public oversight practiced during the Apartheid years (Cawthra, 2003). 
 
It is beneficial, as a background to the JMCC discussions, to briefly review 
the unparalleled historical development of the South African higher 
defence organisation, with respect to key functionaries and the 
administrative and military command arrangements. In terms of Brueau’s 
(2006, p.6) framework of analysis there is a cogent argument that the pre-
existing institutional SADF model, and the conditions under which the 
DOD was transformed heavily influenced the JMCC decisions. This review 
is loosely based on articles by Fourie (201218) and Stratford (1968) and 
various internal DOD documents. 
 
  
                                                          
18
 Prof Deon Fourie later published the article in Scientia Militaria. The original document 
sourced from the DOD private archive is an unpublished paper submitted at the request 
of the JMCC in March 1994, on a proposal for the re-establishment of the MOD with a 
civilian Secretariat. Submitted under the title of, Decline and Fall: The Death of the South 
African Civilian Secretariat in 1966. Fourie undertook various research assignments for 
the JMCC during 1993 under the umbrella of the Institute for Security Studies and IDASA.  
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Historical Development 
 
The South African higher defence organisation’s key functionaries evolved 
over time, as follows: 
 
 Commander-in Chief. Before the country became a Republic in 1961, 
the Commander-in-Chief was the civilian Governor-General. After 
becoming a Republic, the civilian State president became the 
Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 Minister of Defence. The Minister of Defence has been from 1912 to 
date an elected executive authority. However the MODs have not 
always been civilians and from 1910 to 1933 and 1939 to 1948, 1980 
to 1990 and from 1994 to 1998, military officers have served in this 
capacity. 
 
 Head of Department of Defence. The Under-Secretary for Defence 
headed the Union Defence Force from 1915 to 1967 except for the 
periods 1922 to 1933 and 1966 to 1967 when the head of department 
position was filled by the military Chief of the General Staff 
(incorporating the Sec Def) during the first period, and military 
Commandant General (incorporating the Sec Def) during the second 
period. In 1967 the State abolished the post of Sec Def and the military 
Chief of Defence Force was the head of department up until 1997. The 
Sec Def’s have not, perhaps unsurprisingly, always been civilians. For 
instance from 1933 to 1937, 1939 to 1945 and from 1994 to 1998, ex-
military officers have filled the post.  
   
 Department Accounting Officer.  The departmental accounting officer 
function has from 1912 to date been performed by the Head of 
Department except for the period, 1922 to 1930 when the Financial 
Under-Secretary was the accounting officer of the Union Defence 
Department, separately from the military Chief of the General Staff as 
Head of Department. The Chief of the Defence Force, in his additional 
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capacity as Head of Department from 1966 to 1997, was also the 
department accounting officer.   
 
Administrative Arrangements 
 
The administrative arrangements developed as follows: 
 
 Separate Ministry of Defence set hierarchically over the department of 
defence from 1912 to date. 
 
 Department of Defence from 1912 incorporating a civilian Secretariat, a 
General Staff and Administrative sections. From 1912 to 1966 military 
functionaries considered the Sec Def as a staff-to-line authority. 
However if viewed from a ministerial perspective, the Sec Def was the 
departmental line authority for the performance of the department of 
state functions. 
 
 The SADF incorporating the DOD from 1967 to 1995. The 
Commandant General/Chief of the Defence Force was the head of 
department, accounting officer and commander of the Defence 
Force.  
 
 The Public Service Act re-established the Department in 1995, (Public 
Service Act, 1994, Schedule 1). The DOD, as it now stands, 
incorporates the Def Sec and SANDF (both at the same hierarchical 
level). 
 
What the analysis reveals is that no other liberal constitutional 
democracies have an administrative arrangement in which the armed 
services incorporate the unified combat arms as well as the department of 
defence. The Defence Force incorporating the DOD did not provide for the 
separation of policy and programme (including the budget) determination 
from the execution thereof or for the separation of those control measures 
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required to ensure transparency and accountability for the 19economic, 
efficient and effective utilisation of resources.  It can be safely assumed 
that the intrinsically  flawed institutional SADF model (pre-existing) was a 
major factor in the decision by the JMCC and TEC to re-establish a new 
DOD that incorporated the SANDF, as subsequently implemented in 1995 
(Public Service Act, 1994, Schedule 1). 
 
The Military Command Arrangements  
 
The military command arrangements (loosely based on articles by Fourie 
(2012) and Stratford (1968) and various internal DOD documents) 
developed as follows: 
 
 Staff-to-line arrangement from 1912 to 1922 filled by Staff Officer for 
General Staff Duties, and later under various other titles to wit; Chief 
Staff Officer; General Staff Duties and Adjutant General; and Chief of 
the General Staff and Adjutant General. 
 
 Command-to-line arrangement from 1922, filled by the Chief of the 
General Staff and Adjutant General, and later under various other titles 
to wit; General Officer Commanding Union Defence Force; 
Commandant General of the Union Defence Force (later South African 
Defence Force); then Chief of the South African Defence Force (later 
National Defence Force). 
 
 In 1966 the Chiefs of Staff of the Combat Services (Army, Navy and Air 
Force) were reconfigured as Chief of the Service (e.g. Chief SA Army), 
each with their own Chiefs of Staff.  All Service Chiefs fell under 
command of the Chief of the Defence Force.  
 
The current command-in-line arrangement was originally set in Section 
225 of the Interim Constitution, 1993, in that the Chief “…exercise[d] 
                                                          
19
 PFMA, 2010, Sec 38 (b) 
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executive command…” This position was, however, later modified as set 
out in the Constitution, 1996 (Section 202) as further detailed in Section 13 
and 14 of the Defence Act 2002, Act No. 42 of 2002 as Amended 
(Republic of South Africa, 2002). The new wording makes the choice of 
optional command arrangements by the Commander-in-Chief possible.  
This significant legal prerogative is explored in a later section detailing the 
analysis of the realignment of defence functions and the transformation of 
the higher defence organisation.    
 
The historical development of the South African higher defence 
organisation, with respect to key functionaries and the armed services’ 
experiences with administrative and military command arrangements in 
past years is key to understanding how pre-existing institutional models 
predisposed the stakeholders in structuring power relations and 
maintaining the balance between the Def Sec and SANDF. As detailed 
hereunder the influence on the JMCC deliberations was ubiquitous. 
 
JMCC Deliberations and Choice of ‘Model’ for the Transformed 
Department of Defence 
 
The JMCC deliberations included consideration of a range of civil control 
concepts and models. These ranged from having a civilian appointed in 
the top post to facilitate pre-expenditure budgetary and financial control 
over the military; to one which was a form of post factum or historical 
accounting which exercised control by means of a combination of civilian-
headed internal and external verification and audit (Document No. 1, 
1996).  In essence these options were either found to be too radical, in the 
case of a civilian as head of the defence department, or too limited in the 
case of post factum control (Document No. 1, 1996). Essentially what the 
parties desired was a solution that provided adequate assurance of 
around-the-clock civil control whilst simultaneously ensuring that the 
SANDF, as a military force, remain under executive military command.      
In the words of Nathan (1994, p.1) “...the manner in which power is 
exercised and controlled is as crucial as the question of who holds it.”  
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In the end the JMCC reached agreement on a number of key overarching 
civil control concepts. Firstly that civil control is an essential element of 
democratic government; secondly that a measure of civil control is the 
extent to which power resorts with the civil authority (civilians); and thirdly 
that civil control must guarantee the subordination of the armed services to 
the civil power (Document No. 2, 1995).  In other words that the armed 
services will operate at all times in accordance with the constitution and 
the dictates of parliament, to serve as the primary means (as the 
legitimate national armed services), by which the civil authority can defend 
the country. Over time the idea that civil oversight of the Defence Force 
was both necessary and desirable and the primary roles of Parliament and 
the Executive in exercising control through the creation of a robust 
Secretariat headed by the Secretary for Defence (Sec Def), began to find 
acceptance.  
 
A further significant determinant was the agreement reached on the key 
relationships, power and control within the balance model, as set out in the 
DOD minutes (Document No. 1, 1996). Essentially that: 
 
 The Minister has political control over the DOD and is to execute 
directing power. 
 
 The Chief SANDF has exclusive control and command of the 
armed services. 
 
 The Sec Def is the chief executive officer of the civilian component 
of the MOD and exercises civil control over the entire department 
(including the armed services).  
 
Also worth mentioning is that the JMCC approved20 four key principles for 
governance of democratic civil control and civil-military relations, namely 
the separation of powers, legality (legitimacy), accountability and 
transparency (Document No. 1, 1996).  How these principles were applied 
                                                          
20
 Joint SCD and JMCC meeting on 30 March 1994. 
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in practice, through various mechanisms, to support the proposed balance 
model, is subject to thorough analysis in a later section. These principles 
were later internalised by the DOD (Document No. 2, 1995) along the 
following lines: 
 
 Separation of powers.  (Sometimes also referred to, in various internal 
DOD publications, as ‘segregation of powers’). Essentially 
acknowledging the division between the civil and military institutions 
and that the armed services should refrain from involvement in politics. 
Equally that the civil polity should not interfere with the military chain of 
command and military discipline.   
 
 Legality.  The powers, structures and functions of the armed services 
are to be prescribed by law, chiefly the Constitution and Defence Act, 
and the SANDF is expected to conduct its activities within these 
constraints. One of the implications, post-1996, is that officers are only 
authorised to issue orders, and soldiers are only obliged to obey 
orders, within the framework of the law. In times of war they are bound 
by the international law of armed conflict.  
 
 Accountability.  There is an inherent requirement applicable to all 
national departments in a democracy, in that departments are 
accountable to the elected civil authority for the utilisation of resources 
and their actions. To prescribe the requirements alone, particularly in 
relation to the armed services, is not sufficient as parliament requires 
assurance that effective civil control is being maintained and that the 
armed services’ potential for coercive power is properly harnessed. 
This is dealt with in a number of ways, typically through the oversight 
function of a parliamentary defence committee and through the political 
authority exercised by the Minister.  The minister and government are 
in turn accountable to parliament and the electorate for the 
disbursement of public funds.  
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 Transparency.  It is essential to hold the armed services accountable 
and this requires sufficient transparency to allow external and internal 
verification bodies and the electorate to readily determine that the 
armed services are not acting unilaterally and that they are, at all 
times, operating within the limits placed upon them by law. It can, 
therefore, be deduced that there is an inherent requirement to ensure 
that sufficient information is made available (notwithstanding the 
necessity for a degree of secrecy to protect national interests and on-
going military operations for instance) to the verification bodies, in 
order for them to execute their duty. In executing this function the 
crucial role of the Auditor-General South Africa cannot be 
overemphasised. 
 
The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) at the end of what was, by all 
accounts, extensive deliberations ratified the Minister’s approval of the 
Balance Model Ministry of Defence21 on the 4 May 1994 (Document No.3, 
1996). The ‘balance relationship’ proposal was accepted by the JMCC 
because it made sense that it positioned the Minister to balance the 
independent defence policy advice and civil control by the Sec Def with 
the military advice and execution by the Chief SANDF.  The SADF 
delegation for its part was “content to support the proposal because the 
addition of the Def Sec to make up the new DOD, left the SADF force 
structure largely intact” (Personal Interview, S. Rabkin, 15 February 2016). 
The choice as to the actual mechanisms for restructuring the old SADF to 
accommodate the balance model, and the political decisions regarding the 
establishment of the new Secretariat, was left to the incoming Government 
of National Unity (GNU) and Minister to decide22 (Document No.3, 1996). 
 
                                                          
21
 “The Minister of Defence has decided on the so-called balanced (sic) option for the 
implementation of the Department of Defence”, proposed on 26 April by Sub-council on 
Defence Workgroup and approved by the Minister of Defence (JMCC/DSM/501/6 and 
Addendum finally dated 4 May 1994), as ratified by JMCC meeting dated 26 May 1994. 
22
 JMCC meeting on 22 April 1994, Presiding Chairman confirmed, “…the structure 
should be further developed in order to give the decisionmaker (sic) who will be the 
Minister of Defence and the Cabinet, the ability to choose the best option…” 
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According to various scholars (Shaw, 1995; Mollo, 2000), the SADF 
negotiators, led by General Meiring, miscalculated in supporting the 
decision to allow the Minister to wait until after the elections before 
finalising the creation of the civilian secretariat, in the hope of striking a 
better deal.  Against their expectations the National Party did not retain the 
defence portfolio in the GNU.  President Nelson Mandela, in a surprise 
move, appointed an ANC Member of Parliament, the late Mr Joe Modise, 
to the portfolio. Although there is no evidence of any serious attempt by 
the SANDF to resistance transformation, it is clear the decision irked 
General Meiring and later underscored his numerous, reportedly heated, 
clashes with the Ministry amid accusations that the SANDF was 
attempting to dictate “the political and strategic agenda” (Williams , 2002, 
p. 21). 
 
The TEC sub-council on defence’s decision on the balance model and in 
particular the proposal that the Sec Def should be the Accounting Officer 
of the DOD (Document No. 1, 1996) had, for those reasons, far-reaching 
consequences. It was later to become a key feature of the government’s 
drive to strengthen civil control and effect defence transformation. What 
was not so easily resolved, however, was agreement on the integration 
process, vesting of the departmental accounting functions with the Sec 
Def and the specific timelines for completion.  In the end, notwithstanding 
the arguable defects, the new South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) was finally unveiled and officially came into being at midnight on 
the 26/27 April 1994.  As Nathan (1994) and Shaw (1995) cautioned, 
however, the transition was far from complete. Very few of the 
stakeholders, it would appear at that stage, were under any illusion that 
only time would tell how enduring the nascent SANDF design would be. 
This lacuna is further debated in the next section. 
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3.4 Defence in Transformation: Minister Joe Modise 
 
3.4.1 Civil Control Constitutional Framework 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 200 of 1993 (as 
substituted by Act 108 of 1996) heralded the establishment of a new 
democratic constitutional state. All State institutions were at the time 
adapting to the requirements of the new regime (Nathan, 1994). The 
Defence Force had, in turn, an important role to play as an instrument of 
state policy in contributing towards the realisation of democratic South 
Africa’s new goals, and the priorities of Government.   
 
Equally national security is subject to the authority of parliament and the 
national executive (Republic of South Africa, 1996) and it flows therefrom 
that defence is subject to civil oversight by parliament and civil control by 
cabinet. The hierarchy of authority is prescribed in the Constitution23, 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996), specifically that between the Executive, 
Parliament and the armed services. Civil control and oversight is governed 
by the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law; 
and compliance to international and domestic law (Department of 
Defence, 2015c).  
 
Given the SANDF’s ‘monopoly on violence’, the promulgation of the 
Constitution24 alone was not sufficient to assuage the public at large that 
the armed services would be bound by the doctrine of civil supremacy. It 
was thus necessary for the elected civil authority to demonstrate its control 
of the armed services in some meaningful way. It did so by instituting 
additional oversight and control mechanisms at both a parliamentary and 
executive level, and critically via programmes within the armed services 
itself to inculcate military professionalism and respect for civil control 
amongst members (Chuter, 2011; Edmonds, 1998; Nathan, 1994).  
                                                          
23 Refer to Sections 198(d), 199(8), 200(2), 201(2) & (3), 202(1) & (2), 203(1) & 
(3) & 204. 
24 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 200 of 1993. 
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The supremacy of the Constitution, the authority of Parliament 
(Legislature) and Cabinet (National Executive) accordingly underpin the 
concept of civil control (as so too the Defence Act (Act No. 42 of 2002), 
the Public Finance Management Act (Act No. 1 of 1999) and the Public 
Service Act (Act No. 103 of 1994)). Within this concept the President is the 
Commander-in-Chief and appoints the Chief SANDF and the military 
command. The Cabinet appoints one of its members to be responsible for 
defence  (Republic of South Africa, 1996), designated the ‘executive 
authority’ for defence by the PFMA and Public Service Act. This is a purely 
political function and the Minister provides direction to the DOD and is 
accountable to Parliament for the DOD, as a department of State. 
 
Section 228(1) indicates that the Minister shall be “…accountable…” to 
parliament for the SANDF (Republic of South Africa, 1993). This may not 
be significant in determining actual accountability as contemplated in the 
Exchequer Act as the former is political accountability whilst the latter 
implies financial accountability. However it does indicate the intention of 
the legislature to establish responsibility for Defence in a formal structure.  
 
Section 14 (b) of the Defence Act states that the Chief SANDF “…must 
comply with any direction issued by the Minister under the authority of the 
President as contemplated in section 202 (2) of the Constitution” (Republic 
of South Africa, 2002). From this it can be deduced that the Minister 
constitutionally has the power to provide certain directions to the Chief in 
the exercise of his military executive command.  
 
The key deductions are that: 
• The Minister of Defence is the member of the executive principally 
responsible for civil control and political direction (including directions 
to the Chief in the exercise of his military executive command) and 
must, hence, be capacitated to perform these duties. 
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• Parliament is primarily responsible for civil oversight through its 
legislative authority, by scrutinising and overseeing executive action 
and by holding national organs of state accountable to it. Parliament is 
consequently required to institute Defence-specific arrangements to 
facilitate such oversight (Parliamentary Committees for instance). 
Parliament is also the highest authority for approval of defence 
legislation, the budget and policy. 
• The Line of Command is clear, succinct and unfettered between the 
President, Minister, the Chief SANDF, and the military command. No 
other Office should stand in this line. 
• Civil (political) control, in this context (as practiced by the DOD) has 
three components – steering control (directing effort by setting the 
purpose and limits for subordinate action); screening control 
(authorising subordinate actions according to predetermined policies, 
programmes and resource allocations); and performance control 
(checking the performance is in accordance with policies and 
programmes and resource allocations). In terms of civil control 
mechanisms, three are of interest to this study, namely oversight by 
Parliamentary committees, adherence to domestic and international 
law and the establishment of a civilian defence secretariat (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996). The mechanisms are briefly expanded upon 
below: 
Oversight 
The various Parliamentary mechanisms that support the civil oversight 
process reflect the key principles of transparency and accountability, 
including: 
 Parliamentary Committees  
 Joint Standing Committee on Defence  
 Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCD&MV) 
 The Minister of Defence  
 The Secretary for Defence  
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 The Chief of the SANDF  
 
The respective roles and responsibilities of the Minister, Sec Def and Chief 
SANDF will be described in detail later, for now it is sufficient to confirm 
that the PCD&MV (as one example) is a National Assembly Committee of 
Parliament, with the primary function to oversee and monitor the work and 
budget of the DOD and hold it accountable. The PCD&MV are mandated 
through Rule 201(1) to: 
 
Monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations 
concerning any such executive organ of state…including the 
legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, 
functioning, organisation, structure, staff and policies of such 
organ of state… (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 
2015). 
 
Domestic and international law 
 
Defence policy-making is central to the DOD’s obligation to adhere to 
domestic and international law. Policy-making during the apartheid era 
was greatly militarised, in the sense that defence policy formulation was 
carried out in a closed and secretive environment in which little public or 
political consultation took place (Nathan, 1994, Shaw, 1995).  
 
The GNU25 instituted a major policy revision in 1996, drawing up a new 
White Paper on Defence (Department of Defence, 1996). The primary aim 
of the White Paper was to align defence policy with the new South African 
democracy. It also described the national strategy for defence, protection 
of the state and its people, its commitment to adhere to domestic and 
international law as well as the new force structure and defensive posture. 
A key aspect of which was, against expectation, the perhaps myopic 
decision not to pursue a military role on the continent. This position was 
                                                          
25
 Government of National Unity 
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later adjusted somewhat, however South Africa continues to act with 
restraint (Department of Defence, 1996, Chapter 5, par. 19-25).  
 
Defence Secretariat 
 
The establishment of a civilian Defence Secretariat (Def Sec), headed by 
the Sec Def was identified as the sine qua non for the exercising of sound 
civil control and thus defence transformation26. The Def Sec is established 
in terms of Section 204 of the Constitution (Act 103 of 1996) which 
provides that “A civilian secretariat for defence must be established by 
national legislation to function under the direction of the cabinet member 
responsible for defence”. This was given effect by the Defence 
Amendment Act, 1995 (Republic of South Africa, 1995). The scope of the 
Sec Def, within the DOD structure, has evolved and grown substantially 
over the years and from humble beginnings it now includes a number of 
key statutory roles and functions, of which enhanced civil control of 
defence remains the core strategic output of the Secretariat and its raison 
d’état (Department of Defence, 2015b).  
The establishment, structure, operation and performance of the Def Sec 
features prominently in this research paper and is indeed central to the 
research purpose and answering of the research questions.  It is, 
accordingly, given detailed attention in the sections and chapters to follow. 
The discussions are conducted chronologically to provide the reader with 
a sense of how the development of the Def Sec and restructuring of the 
DOD unfolded over time.  
 
Key to Civil Control 
 
The key to civil control as exercised in the DOD, according to a senior 
official, lies firstly in the control of defence policy, programmes and budget. 
Secondly in the control of defence activities and the employment of 
resources according to the authorised programme and budget; and thirdly 
                                                          
26
 JMCC meeting dated 26 May 1994. 
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in strict control of the employment of forces/conduct of operations 
(Respondent 01, Interview, April 22, 2015). The official argues that such 
controls are necessary if the Minister is to give effect to the supremacy of 
the elected civil authority over the armed services, and to account to 
Parliament and the President for the DOD’s performance (Respondent 01, 
Interview, April 22, 2015).  
 
The Minister therefore exercised his prerogative when he ordered the 
restructuring of the Defence functions, by selecting, legalising (through 
parliamentary sanction) and implementing a higher order defence 
organisational design as the foundation of the defence establishment. In 
view of the inadequacy of the administrative and command arrangement 
of the old SADF27 for effective civil control, the restructuring of the defence 
function to include a civilian Secretariat within the transformed DOD was 
paramount. This was a critical step in establishing a new democratic civil-
military relations regime that Nathan (1994, p. 60) argues “…lies at the 
heart of the transformation of the defence force…”, and was to consume 
much of the DOD’s energy in the decades after 1994. 
  
The overarching challenge was that the planning for the transformation of 
the DOD – incorporating the SANDF and a Secretariat – did not explicitly 
provide for the separation of policy and programme (including the budget) 
determination from the execution thereof. Neither for the separation of 
those control measures required to ensure transparency and 
accountability for the effectiveness, efficiency and economical utilisation of 
resources (Republic of South Africa, 1999, Sec 38 (b)). It has to be kept in 
mind that the SANDF, since 1967, incorporated the DOD and whereby the 
Chief SANDF was the Head of Department, accounting officer and 
commander of the armed services. A new approach was therefore 
required, one that strengthened civil control of the SANDF whilst 
simultaneously separating the formulation of departmental policy and 
                                                          
27
 Pre-1994 South African Defence Force (SADF) 
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programme from the preparation of forces, and the conduct of operations 
in execution of that policy.  
 
The Minister’s support for the JMCC/TEC approved ‘balance model’ as 
being the most appropriate organisational infrastructure through which to 
direct and control the performance of the defence function, had a 
fundamental impact on the manner and direction of the transformation 
process. The debate had moved on from the choice of model to how best 
to implement the selected approach to achieve the desired outcomes. The 
structural transformation to establish a new DOD that incorporated the 
SANDF and civilian Secretariat commenced in earnest as the 
transformation project gathered momentum. 
 
3.4.2 Department of Defence Transformation Project 
 
A brief word on terminology is necessary before proceeding. The use of 
the term ‘Ministry of Defence’ randomly interchanged with ‘Department of 
Defence’ was cause for confusion when analysing various DOD 
documentation. For instance in the Cabinet Minutes dated 01 March 
199528, the committee described the Ministry of Defence as “...consisting 
of the offices of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence, the Defence 
Secretary and staff…and the Chief [SANDF] …and staff” (quoted in 
Document No. 2, 1995). Later, in Chapter 2 of the Defence Amendment 
Act, 1995 and in the White Paper the reorganised Department of Defence 
is described as comprising “the SANDF and a civilian Defence Secretariat” 
(Department of Defence, 1996, Sec 19).  
 
For clarity (and to align with current DOD usage) all future references in 
this paper, to the ‘Ministry of Defence’ will be limited to mean only the 
office of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence, and ‘Department of 
Defence’ or DOD, means the Department of State as envisaged in the 
                                                          
28
 Cabinet Minutes 01 March 1995: Refers to Cabinet memorandum 10 of 1995 dated 17 
February 1995, file number MS/S/501/10/342222, DOD. Refer to Item 5.1 of the minutes 
of Cabinet dated 18 January 1995. 
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Public Service Act, 1994, Schedule 1 (Republic of South Africa, 2007), 
incorporating the Def Sec and SANDF. The question of whether or not the 
transformation of the Ministry of Defence was adequately addressed, in 
relation to the overarching transformation of the DOD, and if not whether 
the failure was in the planning or execution, is reviewed later as part of the 
broader study into the implementation of the balance DOD design.  
 
There was further a lack of consistency in describing the ‘balance model’. 
There are numerous examples where the ‘model’ was variously referred to 
as the ‘balance model Department of Defence’; ‘balance model for 
defence management’; ‘balance model Ministry of Defence’ or otherwise 
simply the ‘balance model’ (Document No. 2, 1995; Document No. 1, 
1996; Document No. 3, 1996). To prevent confusion and to comply with 
later accepted usage, the term ‘balance Department of Defence design’ 
and particularly the abbreviation ‘balance DOD design’ is used 
throughout the rest of this paper, unless specifically described otherwise. 
 
Minister of Defence Workgroup for the Balance DOD Design 
 
As detailed earlier, the balance DOD design was approved by the TEC on 
the understanding that the actual mechanisms for restructuring the DOD to 
accommodate the new design and the political decisions regarding the 
establishment of the new Secretariat was left to the incoming government. 
This task fell to the newly appointed Minister of Defence, the late Joe 
Modise.   The Minister appointed a MOD workgroup, in June 1994, to 
undertake the structural transformation to establish a new Department 
incorporating the SANDF and to create an additional civilian Secretariat 
taking the proposed balance DOD design advanced by the JMCC on 26 
May 1994 as the accepted model (Ministerial Planning Directive dated 9 
June 1994; Document No.4, 1994).  
 
The Minister was soon under pressure to resist the efforts by Chief 
SANDF, General Meiring, (still smarting from the loss of the Defence 
Ministry cabinet post to the ANC in the GNU) to dictate the “political and 
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strategic agenda” for the restructuring of the SANDF (Williams, 2002, 
p.21). As a result there were reportedly heated exchanges within the 
Council on Defence (chaired by the Minister and on which the Sec Def and 
Chief SANDF served) that raised political tensions between the Ministry 
and the office of the Chief SANDF (Williams, 2002), and did little to 
smooth the process.   
 
In terms of Chapter 1, Section 15(3) of the Exchequer Act, No. 66 of 1975, 
the Chief SANDF, as commander of the armed services, is appointed as 
the accounting officer and as otherwise directed by the Treasury as the 
Head of Department. The Public Service Act later confirmed this position  
(Republic of South Africa, 1994).  The analysis suggests that the accepted 
view was that the Chief SANDF would continue as head of department. To 
make the balance design work, notwithstanding any political imperatives, 
required as a minimum the separation of the accounting officer functions 
(Exchequer Act, 1975) from the Chief as head of department and vesting 
in the Sec Def (Department of Defence, 1996). This strategy was later 
discovered to be legally flawed and the proposed balance DOD design 
would require extensive reworking before it could be finally implemented 
(State Law Adviser’s Letter 1/1/13 dated 1 June 1995, to be read together 
with State Law Adviser’s Letter 110/95 dated 16 May 1995 and the final 
opinion – State Law Adviser’s Letter CSLA/160961 dated 17 October 
1996) (Documents No. 21, 1995; Document No. 22, 1996).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Essentially, the DOD transformation imperative had three key objectives 
(Document No. 3, 1996) namely: 
 
 Transformation of the current political-administrative arrangement in 
place since 1966, in which the Defence Force incorporated the DOD 
(including the ‘absorbed’ Secretariat), to a new model in which the 
DOD incorporates the SANDF. 
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 Retention of the political-military arrangement whereby the Chief 
SANDF has a direct command line to the Commander-in-Chief (State 
President), and has military executive command of the SANDF. 
 
 Redistribution of the statutory roles, functions, and responsibilities, and 
ultimately the balance of power within the DOD, between the Minister 
as executing authority (political head who directs and controls the 
defence function), the Chief SANDF as head of department and 
commander of the SANDF, and the Sec Def as accounting officer.  
 
The design logic advocated that the Sec Def, thus empowered, was better 
enabled to effect civil control of the SANDF.   This presented a challenge 
in that even though the JMCC proposed balance DOD design identified 
the respective roles to be executed by the Sec Def and Chief SANDF, it 
only listed the main and sub-functions to be performed by the Secretariat. 
Nor were these functions arranged into a structural hierarchy, according to 
the method used by the Public Service Commission, to justify 
organisational structures, posts and ranks (see Republic of South Africa, 
1997).  
 
Another noteworthy issue was the restriction imposed by the Interim 
Constitution, in that the “Chief of the National Defence Force who shall 
exercise military executive command of the National Defence Force 
subject to the direction of the Minister…” (Republic of South Africa, 1993, 
Sect 225) and the implicit direct command line the Chief SANDF has to 
the State President. This political-military structure, which serves as the 
foundation for civil oversight and control by the Executive Authority, is 
prescriptive. It is thus interesting that this position was later modified, as 
set out in The Constitution, 1996 (Section 202) as further detailed in 
Sections 13 and 14 of the Defence Act 2002, Act No. 42 of 2002 as 
Amended (Republic of South Africa, 2002). It now reads “Command of the 
defence force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the 
Cabinet member responsible for defence…” and it leaves out the “…shall 
exercise military executive command…” portion.  The new wording makes 
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the choice of an optional command arrangement by the Commander-in-
Chief possible. Quite what motivated the changes is a matter for further 
enquiry. 
 
What is evident from the analysis of earlier literature is that the MOD work 
group, at the time, settled on a command-in-line authority (Chief of the 
armed services) arrangement for the DOD (Document No. 3, 1996). An 
arrangement in which the mandate of military executive command29 
includes both force preparation (combat readiness) and force employment 
(conduct of military operations), and appeared to preclude a fuller 
investigation of the alternative staff-to-line Chief of Defence Staff authority 
arrangement. This decision, was later modified; it would seem as part of 
the overall more progressive mind-set change that took place within the 
DOD.  
 
In the staff-to-line arrangement, the Chief of Defence Staff is the principle 
military staff officer of the Minister and President and conveys ministerial 
orders and directives to the subordinate commanders, tasking them for a 
specific force employment engagement, on behalf of the Minister (or 
commander-in-chief in time of war). The thrust of this arrangement is that 
the force development and preparation (staff function) is clearly distinct 
and separated from force employment/conduct of operations (line 
function). This is a common approach as practiced in a number of liberal 
democracies such as the United Kingdom and United States of America 
(United Kingdom, 2009).   
 
It does appear short-sighted not to have opened up this line of 
investigation at this opportunity.  However, the setting and general sense 
of unease prevailing at the time needs to be appreciated and accordingly 
the heightened importance placed on stabilising the armed services, 
                                                          
29
 Command and control means the exercise of authority and direction over allocated 
forces to accomplish a mission by an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
telecommunications, communications, facilities and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, coordinating and controlling forces and operations (DODI 
00054/2001:DOD Language Policy: Terminology)  
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particularly during the integration and transformation phase 
(Gutteridge,1996; Williams, 2002). It was probably appropriate, given the 
circumstances, to vest the Chief SANDF, General Meiring, with the explicit 
command authority to swiftly implement the organisational restructuring 
necessary to give to effect to Parliamentary and Executive authority over 
the Defence Force and to lead the SANDF through the difficult 
transformation process (Fourie, 1996, p. 19).  
 
Although not as obvious, by reducing the Chief SANDF’s authority 
incrementally over time, instead of immediately after the elections, helped 
assuage the concerns of many in the armed services that they would be 
marginalised (Mollo, 2000). Later on there is evidence of a shift in DOD 
dogma resulting in the cultivation of a hybridised approach that paid 
homage to the main features of staff-to-line authority (Respondent 01, 
Personal Interview, 22 April 2015). Quite why the DOD took the decision it 
did, at the time, and understanding the impact this may have had on the 
evolvement of the DOD organisational structure and alignment of functions 
between the main controllers is subject to later analysis.   
 
Defining the Framework for the Division of Defence Functions 
 
Returning to the MOD workgroup, for its part it was under instruction to 
treat the JMCC/TEC proposal as the approved ‘framework’ for the division 
of functions between the to-be-established Def Sec and the SANDF, within 
a new integrated defence headquarters. The framework of course still had 
to be further developed and refined. The following Ministerial planning 
guidelines (Document No. 3, 1996) remain useful today in assessing the 
baseline functioning of the Def Sec: 
 The creation of the DOD must be enshrined in appropriate Legislation. 
 Ensure the continuity of Defence capabilities and functioning. 
 No duplications of functions were permissible in the final structure. 
 Build civil-military collaboration into the management of the national 
Defence function – Def Sec should reflect an appropriate civilian-
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military mix. 
 Establish a DOD culture of civil control and military professionalism.  
 Ensure a lean and clean structure and design for the proposed DOD. It 
should be cost effective. 
 Staff the DOD with competent leadership and personnel.  
  
 The workgroup in applying the guidelines to developing and refining the 
design framework, constructed a range of four possible options (Document 
No. 3, 1996). It is worthwhile revisiting the options considered by the 
workgroup in order to provide the reader with a better insight into the   
reasoning behind the selection of the chosen option: 
 
Option 1 – Retain the current Status Quo as practiced by the SADF (SADF 
incorporates the MOD). 
 
Option 2 – The Chief SANDF reports via the Sec Def to the Minister (i.e. 
the United Kingdom/United States of America model). 
 
Option 3 – The Sec Def forms part of the outer office of the Minister of 
Defence. 
Option 4 – Both the Sec Def and the Chief SANDF are appointed at Level 
16 (Director-General level) and each has control over their own areas of 
responsibility (i.e. the balance DOD design/compromise model). 
 
Option 1 – Retain Status Quo 
 
This option was quickly dismissed as being impractical (Respondent 01, 
Personal Interview, 22 April 2015) on the following basis: 
 
• Emotive – in terms of South Africa’s history it was deemed difficult to 
justify. 
•  It was not politically acceptable. 
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•  Did not cater for non-statutory force (NSF) integration. 
•  Lacked provision for essential civil oversight capability. 
•  Did not make provision for the creation of a civilian Secretariat. 
 
Option 2 – C SANDF reports via the Sec Def to the Minister 
 
It is unfortunate that no old records were unearthed which could throw light 
on the debate around this particular option.  However, anecdotal evidence 
supports the contention that the option was not popular with the military 
representatives on the workgroup30 (having a civilian head of the 
DOD/SANDF was considered too radical) and was not vigorously pursued. 
A graphic illustration of the option (Figure 3) below highlights the main 
feature, in this case the ‘subordination’ of the Chief SANDF to the ‘civilian’ 
Sec Def (Respondent 01, Personal Interview, 22 April 2015).   
 
 
GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF OPTION 2 
 
 
Figure 3: Option 2: C SANDF reports via the Sec Def to the Minister 
                      (Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
  
                                                          
30
 Interestingly although there is references to this option having been discussed at the 
JMCC, it was not proposed as a serious alternative – the committee choosing rather the 
safer (compromise) balance model (option 4), as ratified by JMCC meeting 26 May 1994. 
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Option 3 – The Sec Def forms part of the outer office 
 
This option was based on the proposal that the Sec Def forms part of the 
outer office of the Minister of Defence (Respondent 01, Personal 
Interview, 22 April 2015), as illustrated below (Figure 4).  
 
GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF OPTION 3 
 
 
Figure 4: Sec Def forms part of the outer office 
(Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
 
The main features of this proposal are: 
 
 The Def Sec, as a separate designated department with its own 
budget, is an entity on its own charged with duties required by the 
Minister. This is similar to the transformation initiative underway with 
the civilian Secretariat for SA Police Service (see Republic of South 
Africa, 2011). These duties would relate to assisting the Minister to 
exercise oversight over the armed services.  The Def Sec will also 
provide various additional support services to the Minister.  
 
 The budget for this new entity is to be appropriated from Parliament 
apart from the budget vote for the SANDF.   
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 No formal DOD – the SANDF will incorporate the DOD. The Chief 
SANDF will be the commander of the SANDF and the Accounting 
Officer and Head of Department for the Defence Force. 
 
 The Sec Def will be the Head of Department and Accounting Officer for 
the Secretariat and the Office of the Minister (DG in the office of 
Minister). Section 8(a) and (e) of the Defence Act would have to be 
deleted. 
 
 Separate legislation would have to be developed to establish the 
repositioned Def Sec, and the Defence Act would solely pronounce 
itself on military matters.  
 
What is remarkable is that it is evident that the workgroup put considerable 
effort into developing this option. As will be obvious to the reader there are 
strong similarities between this proposal and the status quo, whereby the 
SANDF incorporates the DOD and the Chief SANDF is the Head of 
Department, accounting officer and commander of the armed services. 
What is further apparent is that this option did not provide for either the 
strengthening of civil control of the SANDF or the separation of the 
formulation of departmental policy and programme from the preparation of 
forces, and the conduct of operations in execution of that policy. Although 
the DOD did not ultimately pursue the option at the time, the analysis 
suggests that the DOD did indeed revisit this as a possible solution as 
recently as 2011. Ms S. Rabkin, in a later interview, offered the following 
insight:  
 
… the main challenge is that the outer office model makes 
the Ministry too powerful (estimated at approximately 200 
staff), more so than any other Department of State. This 
proposal would not be acceptable to cabinet. Any attempt to 
strengthen the MOD or SANDF would not be supported 
politically. Cabinet has made it clear that the National 
Executive support is for a strong Def Sec, functioning under 
the Executive Authority (Minister), to exercise proper civil 
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oversight and control of the SANDF (Interview, February 
15, 2015).  
 
This line of investigation opens up intriguing possibilities regarding the 
direction that the DOD plans to take in its attempt to resolve the central 
civil-military conundrum, particularly the drive to realign the functions and 
composition of the Def Sec with the changing defence mandate and 
Minister’s specific support requirements. No matter what the ultimate 
solution proves to be, this option simply cannot be ignored.   
 
Option 4 – One Department with two heads both appointed DG level 
 
The JMCC/TEC proposed balance DOD design (Balanced (sic) and/or 
Compromise model) is graphically illustrated in Figure 5 below, and 
highlights the concept of ‘one department with two heads’ and the main 
division of defence functions with the focus of the Def Sec on direction and 
governance and that of the SANDF on execution.  
 
GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF OPTION 4 
 
 
Figure 5: Balance/Compromise Model       
(Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
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The establishment of the Def Sec with adequate capacity to perform its 
statutory functions was identified as the prerequisite for the 
implementation of the balance DOD design and it follows therefrom, 
effecting Parliamentary, Executive and Ministerial authority and control 
over the SANDF. Satisfying this objective consequently featured 
prominently during the workgroup’s early deliberations into transforming 
the DOD. It is not surprising then that the workgroup strongly identified 
with option four – the balance DOD design. This model was a product of 
political compromise, with the Sec Def and the Chief SANDF remaining at 
the same rank level but possessing different responsibilities in terms of 
their constitutional and organisational mandates. The Minister went on to 
recommend the balance DOD design for approval by Cabinet on the 01 
March 199531 (Document No. 2, 1995).  
 
Ironically, perhaps, it was at this same Cabinet meeting that the first 
indications of concern regarding the practicality of splitting the accounting 
officer functions in a diarchal scheme were aired. Cabinet went so far as to 
task the Minister to consider, in consultation with the Minister of Finance, 
retaining only one head of department (vested with the accounting officer 
functions) for the department and to deliberate on the legislative 
implications32 (Document No. 03, 1996). Quite whether the actual 
manifestation of the approved design was to live up to everyone’s 
expectations, however, remains moot.  
 
Basic Design Concepts - The Diarchy 
The basic concept of the balance DOD design is that there are two distinct 
components within the DOD and that each component has exclusive 
duties, responsibilities and powers (Document No. 1, 1996). The balance 
DOD design is essentially a diarchal arrangement of authority, and is a 
                                                          
31
 Item 2.5: Establishment of a Civilian Defence Secretariat. (Reference is made to 
Cabinet Memorandum 10 of 1995 dated 17 February 1995, File number 
MS/S/501/10/342222, Department of Defence). “…(a) the Cabinet approved in principle 
that the Department of Defence be restructured; (b) the Ministry of Defence be 
restructured according to the requirements of a balanced  (sic) model…”   
32
 Ibid, par. 4.1.3. 
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major departure from the post-1966 DOD structure. The diarchy 33 is a 
system or process (rather than simply a structure) in which the senior 
public service (civilian) and military leaders share administrative 
responsibilities for the DOD. The diarchy is a concept widely applicable in 
the Commonwealth public service. It reflects the amalgamation of what 
were previously discrete entities into one Department, the Australian 
version of the diarchy being a good example. In this case the Secretary of 
Defence and the Chief of Defence Force are jointly responsible for the 
management of the Defence Organisation in an integrated manner. The 
Chief of Defence Force is primarily responsible for military operations, 
force preparation, and military personnel issues whilst the Secretary is 
responsible for resource management and civilian personnel (Australian 
Department of Defence, 2009). 
The distinct features of the diarchy, which are drawn from the Australian 
example (Australian Department of Defence, 2009) are: 
 The joint leadership of the department by both the Sec Def 
and the Chief Armed Services. 
 That the command responsibilities of the armed services 
are not shared, but clearly defined by a chain of command 
between the Chief Armed Services and the Commander-in-
Chief (President). 
 The Chief Armed Services is the principle military adviser, 
whilst the Sec Def is the principal civilian advisor, to the 
Minister. 
 The Sec Def is responsible for the financial accountability of 
the department. 
 The Defence Act or other related legislation usually 
imposes civil control of the armed services by placing both 
the command and administrative responsibilities under the 
                                                          
33
 Government by two independent authorities (especially in India 1919 – 35): Oxford 
English Dictionary 
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direction of the Minister (Australian Department of Defence, 
2009). 
This is however where the similarities between the Australian and South 
Africa DOD approach begin to diverge. With the DOD the intention was 
that the division of the powers and allocation thereof to each post are such 
that both the Sec Def and Chief SANDF have the ability to make a 
meaningful contribution to the attainment of the DOD goals. The power, in 
this design, must be balanced to ensure that neither can dominate the 
other. Essentially this segregation of power must warrant that there can be 
no unilateral or unauthorised actions by either party. The powers vested in 
the Sec Def and the Chief SANDF are regulated by Section 4 of the 
Defence Act, and are exercised under the direction of the Minister, subject 
to sections 202 (2) and 204 of the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 
2002). The principles, structures, responsibilities and relationships which 
are necessary to secure sound democratic civil-military relations between 
the Executive, Parliament and the SANDF, are further outlined in the 
Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
  
Establishing and building relationships between the key defence 
controllers, of course, requires choices to be made. Whilst the relationship 
between the State President and Minister of Defence are similarly 
structured in most liberal democracies, there is wide divergence in 
approach regarding the relationship between the Minister and Sec Def; 
and Minister and Chief Armed Services, and ultimately between the Sec 
Def and Chief. In the earlier pre-democratic South Africa, the major 
shortcoming of the highly securitised political-administrative arrangement 
in place between Parliament and the DOD was that the Minister’s position 
was that of a nominal leader. The analysis indicates that this was largely 
due to; firstly the Defence Force having incorporated the DOD, instead of 
the DOD incorporating the Defence Force; secondly the Minister’s 
dependence at the time, on the Chief SADF for both defence policy advice 
and execution; and thirdly the proclivity for the Chief to involve himself in 
defence political issues.  
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Given these conditions and the nature of the post-1994 defence 
transformation process, it is understandable that the Minister readily 
accepted the balanced relationship proposal because it places him in a 
position to balance the independent sources of defence policy advice and 
administrative control by the Sec Def with the military advice and 
execution by the Chief SANDF. The management of defence in a 
democracy necessitates the appropriate distribution of power and control 
between the civil and military components with checks and balances. The 
decision to civilianise the DOD and pursue political/civil-military integration 
placed the locus of control for defence administration and military 
operations in the Secretariat and military institutions respectively. This 
relationship structure does at least promote civil control. Certain 
administrative tasks (that require no military expertise) can be handled 
more cost-effectively within the Def Sec, and the Sec Def can deal with the 
inter-departmental political issues thus freeing-up the Chief to focus on 
executing defence policy, developing the military strategy, preparing 
forces, and conducting operations.  
 
Options for the Design of Ministries of Defence 
 
Chuter (2011, p.97) describes three main types of organisational 
structures normally applied to the design of ministries of defence, namely:  
 
Parallel Structure – the defence functions are divided into a: 
 
– Defence headquarters which deals with technical 
military issues. 
– Defence ministry, largely staffed by civilians which 
handles political and financial issues and supports 
the minister. 
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Parallel Hierarchy – defence functions are divided into a: 
 
– Defence HQ which is responsible only for 
implementation of policy. 
– Ministry of defence in which there are separate 
military and civilian organisations arranged by 
functional areas. 
  
Integrated Hierarchy – defence functions are divided into a: 
 
– Defence HQ which is responsible only for 
implementation of policy. 
– Ministry of defence in which there are mixed military 
and civilian organisations, arranged by functional 
areas (Chuter, 2011, p.97). 
 
Elements from both the Parallel and Integrated Hierarchy structures are 
reflected in the organisation of the DOD (granted that it is unrealistic to 
expect an exact fit), however, what is implicit in the balance DOD design is 
that there is greater administrative integration between the Def Sec and 
SANDF (in a single defence HQ). This is by design so that defence 
functions are performed in interaction with each other, or in what the DOD 
internally refers to as a ‘collaborative relationship’, in an apparent nod to 
Schiff’s (1995, p.7) theory of concordance. The locus of control for policy 
is based on collaboration that is the armed services collaborate in the 
responsibility by the Secretariat to formulate defence policy, programmes 
and budgets. The caveat of course is that civilian personnel shall not 
intervene with the military chain of command, the armed services should 
not usurp the civil responsibility to form policy; and the development of two 
centres of power must be guarded against (Chuter, 2011).  
 
A distinct feature of the DOD that differs from Chuter’s (2011) structures is 
that the Ministry is separated, one strategic decision-making level above 
the DOD (comprising the office of the Minister and Deputy Minister). The 
83 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
DOD as a Department of State incorporates both the SANDF and Def Sec 
in a single integrated defence headquarters (Department of Defence, 
1996) “in which there are separate military and civilian organisations 
arranged by functional areas” (Chuter, 2011, p.97).   
 
Chuter’s (2011, p.97) Integrated Hierarchy is the most advanced option 
and for it to work would require a high level of organisational maturity. 
Although the analysis does suggest that efforts were made to reap the 
benefits from “mixed military and civilian organisations, arranged by 
functional area” (Chuter, 2011, p.97) it is safe to say that at the time the 
DOD was not yet able to achieve the required level of civil-military 
cooperation. The creative civil-military tensions between the two key 
defence controllers required more robust management, in the absence of 
which the strained co-existence, power relations and working procedures 
would continue to negate defence effectiveness and the benefits of an 
integrated hierarchical approach would continue to elude the DOD.  
 
It remains interesting, given that models are only intended to simplify the 
explanation of what are usually highly complex designs, that the DOD 
selected approach to restructuring presents as a hybridised version 
adopting elements from both models.  What is missing, however, when 
assessed against Chuter’s (2011, p.97) definition of a parallel hierarchical 
structure, is that in the balance DOD design, there is no single source of 
advice to the Minister that reflects both the civilian and armed services 
views34. In terms of statutory precepts the DOD has deviated from this 
principle by specifically structuring for two independent streams of advice 
– one civilian and the other military.  
 
                                                          
34
 Although this is a fact, the readers should take cognisance that the statutory Council on 
Defence (chaired by the Minister and on which both the Sec Def and Chief SANDF sit) 
was later established to resolve joint DOD issues. In addition, the Defence Staff Council, 
co-chaired by Sec Def and Chief SANDF is the vehicle for securing ‘joint’ agreement and 
to a degree acts as a ‘unified’ voice on advice to the Minister. Further in terms of statutory 
reporting there is a high degree of cooperation between the SANDF and Def Sec and 
some overarching integration by the office of the Sec Def. 
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What the integrated DOD head office does attempt to achieve is to make 
use of a combination of mixed military and civilian organisations (primarily 
within the Def Sec) and the rest as distinctly separate military and civilian 
structures, arranged by functional areas. The analysis suggests that the 
actual success with such an arrangement is highly dependent on the 
degree of collaborative effort that both institutions commit to. In the case of 
the DOD, good progress has at least been made with the establishment of 
various joint committees. Committees such as the Defence Staff Council; 
Defence Planning Board; and Defence Planning, Budget and Expenditure 
Committee;  which are co-chaired by the Def Sec and Chief SANDF (or 
their subordinates at the lower levels) and which operate as ‘joint’ 
decision-making bodies to achieve ‘collaborative’ decisions.  
 
Balance DOD Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Balance DOD Design 
 
The balance design as depicted in Figure 6 has the following 
characteristics, as broadly drawn from the Constitution, 1996 and Defence 
Amendment Act, 1995: 
 
State President 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY 
                                                                                                    
Minister of Defence 
 
 
 
Secretary for Defence          Chief SANDF 
 
 
 
 
 Administration  Military  
Operations 
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 State President. The State President as head of state, head of 
executive and Commander-in-Chief has a purely political function. The 
President appoints the military command and Sec Def, and may 
authorise the employment of the Defence Force in certain instances. 
The President, in consultation with cabinet, determines the National 
Policy on Defence. 
 
 Minister of Defence. Subordinate to the President is a member of the 
cabinet responsible for Defence. The Minister provides direction to the 
DOD. This is a purely political function and the Minister is accountable 
to Parliament for the overall DOD, as a department of state. 
 
 Military and Secretariat components. Under the Minister, on the same 
hierarchal level, is a military and secretariat component. The intention 
is that the Minister balances administrative and military interests under 
the authority of the President: 
 
o Chief SANDF. The Chief SANDF is the military adviser to the 
Minister and has executive command over the armed services. 
Although the Chief SANDF is subordinate to the Minister who is in 
turn subordinate to the President, neither the Minister nor the 
President exercise military command.  Military command is 
restricted constitutionally to the level of Chief SANDF as head of 
department. 
 
o Secretary for Defence. The Sec Def is the civilian adviser to the 
Minister and manages a range of non-military administrative 
functions such as finance and procurement as well as defence 
policy, strategy and planning.  
 
If this design, selected by the DOD as being the most conducive to the 
exercising of civil control and military professionalism, had one weakness 
it was the lack of clear delineation of the civil/political and military 
functions. On paper at least, the theory was sound. In that by means of 
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segregation of the broad defence functions, the other balances each 
party’s power, and the net effect is that the relationship between the two 
will always revert to a state of equilibrium, or put differently the 
collaborative achievement of the defence outcomes. As no party is able to 
unilaterally execute decisions in this diarchal arrangement, the intended 
result was that a consultative or negotiated decision-making process 
would emerge supreme.  
 
The downside to this line of reasoning was that the Sec Def had no 
overarching accounting or military authority and was thus limited to the 
attainment of agreed DOD goals. In essence the balance DOD design 
began to look more and more like a system designed by the military to 
retain the status quo (Chief exercises unfettered military command over 
the armed services) by curbing the authority of the Def Sec.  Quite how 
the Sec Def was expected to exercise civil control over the SANDF, which 
was led by the Chief as Head of Department on the same hierarchal level 
as that of the Sec Def, was not particularly clear at this early stage.   
 
One of the four principles for governance of democratic civil control and 
civil-military relations, approved at the joint meeting of the sub-council on 
defence and JMCC on 30 March 1994, and adopted by the DOD, was 
separation of powers. This position was also broadly set out in the 
Constitution, section 199 (7) where involvement in party politics and 
furthering or prejudicing the interests of political parties was prohibited 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996); and later included in the “Code of 
Conduct for Uniformed Members…”35   This principle essentially argues, 
as captured in the 1996 MOD report on the balance DOD design, that 
there is a “…fundamental division between the military and the civil 
spheres…” and that the armed services “…should refrain from 
involvement in politics other than through constitutionally approved 
channels…” and even then limited to the attainment of military goals set by 
                                                          
35
 Code of Conduct for Uniformed Members of the South African National Defence Force: 
“…I respect the democratic political process and civil control of the SANDF; I will not 
advance or harm the interests of any political party or organisation…” 
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the government (Document No. 3, 1996; Samuel Finer quoted in Nathan, 
1996, p.90). Equally that the civil authorities (civilians) should recognise 
the armed services’ autonomous military professionalism and not interfere 
with the military chain of command and military discipline.   
 
On the face of it there is compelling evidence that the DOD originally 
embraced Huntington’s (1957) ‘institutional-separation’ model and that the 
armed services were encouraged to eschew politics and concentrate their 
energies on developing and applying their functional military expertise. 
The 1996 MOD Report goes even further in emphasising the “…clear 
structural distinction between the powers of the government and the 
armed forces…” and that “…neither party should venture beyond these 
boundaries…” or else the foundations of the “…democratic political 
system…” would be threatened (Document No. 3, 1996; Nathan, 1996, p. 
98).  From the above it is clear that Laurie Nathan had strong influence on 
the MOD’s position on the development of the principles underpinning 
civilian control, to the degree that sections from Nathan (1996) are 
inserted verbatim throughout the MOD report.   
Given Nathan’s (1996) influence, it is understandable that some balance 
was provided, and the MOD report does attempt to qualifying the position 
regarding the strict separation of powers in that it states that this does not 
imply that the SANDF are necessarily just neutral participants in the 
relationship and that their task is to simply execute policy.  Professional 
military officers should be encouraged to contribute, together with the 
civilian Def Sec personnel, to the formulation of defence policy and 
strategy. The caveat was that the manner in which the contribution was 
made should not undermine the civilian decision-makers (Document No. 3, 
1996; Nathan, 1996, pp.90-91). The significant point that the MOD and 
Nathan (1996) were making, is that the pursuit of sound civil-military 
relations requires much more than simply separating the military and civil 
institutions. It was rather about collaborative achievement of the defence 
outcomes that is reminiscent of Schiff’s (1995) theory of concordance. 
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That the existing DOD design did not consider an alternative military 
command arrangement was also readily apparent.  This was evident in the 
fact that the Chief SANDF was – according to the Constitution, Act 108 of 
1996, Exchequer Act, 1975 and Schedule 1 of the Public Service Act, 
1994 – the Head of Department, Accounting Officer and executive 
commander of the integrated SANDF. The challenge was that to function 
properly, the proposed balanced design required as a minimum the 
separation of the accounting officer function, in terms of the Exchequer 
Act, 1975, from the head of department function, in terms of Schedule 1 of 
the Public Service Act, 1994.  A start was made with the promulgation of 
the Defence Amendment Act in October 1995, which established the 
Defence Secretariat36 (Republic of South Africa, 1995,) and made 
provision for the appointment of the Sec Def as Accounting Officer37 
(Republic of South Africa, 1995). What was not clear, at this time, was 
whether the intention was that the military component would be 
subordinate to the civilian secretariat in the diarchic scheme, or somehow 
on an equal footing in a collaborative arrangement? It is this lacuna, it is 
argued, that has had an enduring impact on civil control in general and 
defence management in particular, and is subject to analysis hereunder. 
 
3.4.3 Implementing the Balance Department of Defence Design  
 
The early trials with transformation did little to dissuade the DOD from 
pursuing the balance design option in the face of numerous conflicting 
interests which served to further complicate what was essentially the 
major restructuring of a highly complex state department. With the added 
pressure of not being able to interrupt normal operations of an 
‘organisation in motion’ and that was responsible for providing effective 
defence (Respondent 01, interview, April 22, 2015). The civil authority’s 
resolve to exercise effective control and align the stakeholders to this end 
was consequently severely tested during the early years of the 
transformation. 
                                                          
36
 Section 7A (1) (a) 
37
 Section 7C (e) 
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It was in this period that the new Sec Def, Pierre Steyn took up office in 
April 1995. Steyn was a former Lieutenant General and SADF Chief of 
Defence Force Staff before retiring in 1993 and being appointed by 
Cabinet as the Sec Def designate in August 1994 (Fourie, 1996).  This 
goes against the normal view on civil control in that ex-serving uniformed 
members38 are not usually considered for appointment. The special 
circumstances in this case, however, need to be considered, particularly 
the dearth of expertise and the critical need to quickly establish the 
Secretariat and structure and staff the organisation (Fourie, 1996).  As 
argued by S. Rabkin (interview, February 15, 2016)  
 
“…the JMCC wanted to transfer policy, finance and 
planning from the SANDF to the new Def Sec. When the 
Def Sec was established, taking control of defence policy 
was fairly straight forward, from almost the beginning. 
Transferring finance took a while longer but was ultimately 
successful. The challenge was with defence planning 
because of the strong military component and lack of 
suitably qualified civilians in the Secretariat to manage the 
function.”  
 
The Minister was also being pressured to demonstrate more tangible 
progress with transforming the department. Failure to do so could have 
threatened the hard fought gains already made with the reorganisation of 
a number of defence functions. A key feature of transformation was the 
integration of the former members of the old South African Defence Force 
(SADF), Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
(APLA) and the armed services of the TBVC states’ (Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei), to create the post-apartheid SANDF. 
Lack of space precludes a more substantial treatment of the integration 
issue; however it is necessary to provide a brief overview to position the 
                                                          
38
 Defence Act 42 of 2002, as amended by Act 22 of 2010, Section 7 (3) states that the 
Sec Def may not be a serving member of the Defence Force, but is silent on ex-serving 
members. 
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integration process within the context of the broader transformation 
project.  
 
It was in 1995 that the next major wave of transformation39 commenced 
under the direction of the Minister (de Vries40, 2006). The Minister took 
personal charge and appointed a dedicated transformation management 
team, headed by Maj Gen Roland de Vries as Director Transformation, to 
manage the process. To provide support for the transformation effort the 
DOD appointed a management consultancy firm, Deloitte and Touché as 
the official consultants and a British military advisory training team to 
provide bridging training and to adjudicate in personnel ranking and 
staffing (de Vries, 2006).  The Minister was very particular in directing that 
the DOD leadership take responsibility for transformation and that the role 
of the consultants be limited to aiding in the process.  Initially the prime 
decision making authority in the department was the Minister, assisted by 
the statutory Council on Defence41. Later responsibility for managing the 
transformation and process re-engineering was to shift to the newly 
created Defence Staff Council, co-chaired by the Sec Def and Chief 
SANDF (de Vries, 2006).  
 
The DOD set about achieving a number of early transformation targets, 
particularly preparing the DOD for change, integration of the old SADF, 
TBVC and non-statutory force members in the new SANDF, development 
of the core defence processes and the restructuring of the defence 
functions. Given the challenges and air of mistrust between the 
predominantly civilian secretariat personnel and the SANDF. It is perhaps 
ironic that the key to the success of the transformation process, later 
                                                          
39 The first wave of transformation commenced in January to April 1994, prior to the 
national elections, when the forces commenced with integration and planning activities 
started under the JMCC. 
40 Major General (retired) Roland de Vries served in the post of director transformation in 
the South African Department of Defence in the period 1995–1997 and then, until April 
1999, as deputy chief of the South African Army, where he was responsible for the 
implementation of the army’s transformation process. 
41
 Council on Defence is the highest DOD decision-making body – chaired by the Minister 
and on which the Deputy Minister, Chief SANDF, Sec Def and the Chairman of 
ARMSCOR sit. 
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proved to have rested on a small team of trusted civilian personnel, both 
former MK and civilianised ex-SADF, and liberal SANDF officers, 
appointed by the Minister to oversee and facilitate this process (S. Rabkin, 
interview, February 15, 2016).  
 
The newly established Def Sec, in replicating this success, took centre 
stage between 1996 and 1998, and managed, on behalf of the Minister, 
the successful Defence White Paper and Defence Review processes.  
This achievement was significant for the fact that it empowered the 
Minister in his dealing with Chief SANDF. Williams (2002) identified two 
reasons for this. Firstly the Defence White Paper and Review processes 
produced the blueprint for the DOD’s transformation plan (the Secretariat 
played a dominant role in the planning, supported by Laurie Nathan and 
Rocky Williams of the MRG) for the next 10 years. Secondly the Joint 
Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) had taken a keen interest and 
participated, in support of the Secretariat, in developing and approving the 
transformation plan. This had the effect of shifting the “locus of decision 
making” away from the Chief SANDF and his staff to the Ministry and 
Parliament (Williams, 2002, p. 21).  
  
Vesting the Sec Def with the Accounting Officer Functions 
 
The detailed investigation into the process and legislative amendments 
required for separating the accounting officer function from the head of 
department (Chief SANDF) and vesting with the Sec Def took place 
simultaneously with the enactment of national legislation to appoint and 
empower both the Chief SANDF and Sec Def. This was in accordance 
with the approved balance DOD design (Republic of South Africa, 1995).  
 
Public Service Act section 3(3) empowers the Public Service Commission 
to make recommendations “(a)…regarding the …transfer of functions from 
one department to…any other body…; (b) regarding the 
establishment…of…offices or institutions; (c) regarding the control …of 
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departments…offices or institutions”.  At the time it was determined that 
the establishment of the office of the Def Sec as a component part of the 
DOD would call for the transfer of functions, amongst other requirements, 
and that it could be accommodated within this section, should the Public 
Service Commissioner approve (Republic of South Africa, 2007)42.  
 
The challenge was with section 7, “Function of the Head of Department”. 
Schedule one of the Act designated the National Defence Force as the 
Department of State. It also indicated that the Chief SANDF was the head 
of department (Republic of South Africa, 2007). Whilst section 7 does not 
prohibit the appointment of a functionary at the same level as the head of 
department, it does imply that the ultimate authority (to make such a 
determination) rests with the head of department. 
 
Section 7 (3) (b) specifies the responsibilities of the head of department, 
but does not make provision for the intended role of the Sec Def, as this  is 
not described anywhere in this sub-section (Republic of South Africa, 
2007). Any attempt to establish the office of the Def Sec would therefore 
have required as a minimum an amendment to the Act to legalise the 
appointment of the Sec Def and to delineate his responsibility and 
accountability to the Minister.   
Section 7 (5) provided for Schedule one to be changed by proclamation by 
the President (Republic of South Africa, 2007). This provided a means of 
changing schedule one to accommodate the appointment of the Sec Def, 
however, it is not sufficient to address the issue of the functions of the 
Head of Department and the division of the responsibilities. 
The legal opinion  provide by the State Law Adviser regarding section 7, 
was that the functions indicated are the immutable responsibility of a 
single functionary and that the structure of the Act is such that section 7 
cannot accommodate the Sec Def as a functionary, in addition to the head 
                                                          
42
 Public Service Amendment Act, No. 86 of 1998 and Government Notice R.589 in 
Government Gazette 21266 of 15 June 2000 later clarified and refined the powers of the 
Minister to bring the Act in line with The Constitution.  The broad powers as described 
remain, however, applicable to the DOD. 
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of department (Document No. 21, 1995).  This section of the Act was 
therefore the key piece of legislation restricting the appointment of the Sec 
Def and restructuring the DOD to accommodate a Secretariat. The 
analysis suggests that that the modern requirements for the management 
of the armed services in a democracy were not perhaps suitably catered 
for in legislation and that no provision had been made for accommodating 
a department of state with two heads (one as head of department and the 
other as accounting officer).  
 
There was a dissenting legal opinion provide in respect of Chapter 1, 
sections 15 (3) and 15A (1) of the Exchequer Act, 1975, (Act No. 66 of 
1975) by the State Law Adviser in October 1996, that seemed to offer 
hope that it was possible to split the accounting officer and head of 
department functions between the Chief SANDF and Sec Def (Document 
No. 22, 1996). The decision of the Joint Standing Committee for Public 
Accounts (JSCPA) in November 1996 finally put an end to the pursuit of a 
compromise solution (Respondent 01, interview, April 22, 2015). Acting on 
the advice of the Auditor-General and Director-General of State 
Expenditure, the JSCPA recommended to Parliament, that the functions of 
head of department and that of accounting officer not be separated. This 
was a severe blow to the transformation workgroup which had already 
reported to the Minister in mid-1996 that everything was in place to 
transfer the accounting officer function within 60 days of approval being 
granted by the JSCPA (Respondent 01, interview, April 22, 2015).  
 
It later came to light that there was a concerted effort behind the scenes to 
argue for the Chief SANDF retaining accounting officer status for a portion 
of the DOD, the SANDF under his executive command43 (in the event that 
the Sec Def was appointed as head of department). However, government 
would not be swayed and insisted that the head of department for the 
DOD would also be the accounting officer like every other Department of 
State (Ms S. Rabkin, interview, February 15, 2016). The immediate 
                                                          
43
 It was argued that the Chief should retain responsibility for a portion of the Defence 
Vote in terms of sec 15A (1) of the Exchequer Act, 1975.  
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implication of the JSCPA decision was that the Sec Def had to first be 
appointed as the head of department as a precondition for his becoming 
the accounting officer.   
 
This raised several problems. Firstly, the Sec Def could only assume 
these responsibilities if legislation was in place to give effect to this 
decision and the functional staff capacities (as head of department) 
reported to him. Secondly the planning had already been completed for 
the transfer of the accounting officer functions to Sec Def together with the 
requisite staff capacity. No specific planning was in place at the time of the 
JSCPA decision for providing the Sec Def with the essential functional 
staff capacities to assume the head of department responsibilities 
(Respondent 01, interview, April 22, 2015). This meant that the Sec Def 
had no dedicated staff at his disposal to support him with the critical 
planning for his assumption of the responsibilities relating to head of 
department and accounting officer functions and for performing his 
statutory duties. As a rule the Sec Def was entitled to expect the same 
level of functional staff capacity which had served the Chief SANDF in his 
capacity as head of department and accounting officer.  
 
Unveiling the ‘New’ Ministry of Defence – 1997  
 
On the 11 February 1997, the Minister briefed the Portfolio Committee on 
Defence on his decision to completely restructure and reorganise the DOD 
to give effect to the Cabinet resolution to implement the balance DOD 
design (subsequent to the JSCPA November 1996 decision). This was to 
finally effect civil oversight (Parliamentary and Executive) and control 
(Minister and Sec Def) over the SANDF (Document No. 12, 1997). This 
entailed major restructuring of the defence function starting with the 
transfer of the head of department role and accounting officer functions 
from the Chief SANDF to the Sec Def, and the creation of a new 
integrated head office for the DOD (Department of Defence, 1996).   
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The Constitution provided the oversight mandate and authorisation for the 
new DOD with section 200, 201, 202 and 204 being particularly relevant 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996).  Section 204 makes provision for the 
establishment of a civilian secretariat for defence “…to function under the 
direction of the Cabinet member responsible for defence”, in this case the 
Minister of Defence (Republic of South Africa, 1996).  The Defence 
Amendment Act of 1995 then established the Defence Secretariat and 
designated the Sec Def as the accounting officer of the DOD, in 
compliance with section 204 (Republic of South Africa, 1995).  
 
Later in 1997 an amendment to Section 4 of the Defence Act, 1995, 
clarified the structural relationships between the main defence controllers  
(Republic of South Africa, 1997). Section 7 (c) was also amended, 
confirming the Sec Def as head of department as contemplated in the 
Public Service Act, 199444 and thus it followed also accounting officer of 
the DOD (Republic of South Africa, 1997).  This, nevertheless, was only 
the beginning as it obliged the DOD to refocus its efforts to align the highly 
complex and technically challenging transformation programme with the 
new statutory requirements.  
 
The transformation programme comprised various sub-programmes of 
which the White Paper and Defence Review efforts and the re-engineering 
project are of particular significance to this study. Key to transformation is 
of course the re-engineering of current business processes of the DOD to 
ensure that the Department delivered the required outputs effectively, 
efficiently and sustainably, within budget and other policy constraints.  As 
a result in 1997 various teams were established and met in isolation to 
begin with re-engineering of the DOD business processes.  A design 
workshop was then set up during October/November 1997 to integrate 
these new processes and build structures to execute the processes 
(Document No. 13, 1998).  
 
                                                          
44
 Proclamation No. 103 of 1994. 
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The DOD published the DOD Transformation Design and Migration Plan 
(Transformation Plan), on 09 February 1998, as a record of the 
workshop’s output (Document No. 13, 1998).  Agreement was reached on 
design principles, technical design guidelines, the preferred design 
practices and importantly the transformation force design. This was based 
on the 1998 Defence Review force design, but with a more judicious 
outlook to align with the realities of a reduced budget. It therefore differed 
principally in the reduction of some conventional capabilities and also in 
the capabilities for routine support of the SA Police in maintenance of law 
and order (Document No. 13, 1998).  
 
It is not necessary to discuss all the technical outputs, however, there are 
a number of critical decisions that were taken, that had a fundamental 
bearing on the restructuring of the DOD subordinate management 
structures, and therefore on this study (Respondent 01, personal 
interview, April 22, 2015).  The following decisions are drawn liberally from 
the Transformation Plan and interviews with two mid-level DOD officials 
working in the environment (Document No. 13, 1998; Respondent 02, 
interview, November 06, 2015; Respondent 07, interview, February 23, 
2016): 
 
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) was established as an integrated 
organisation comprising all the elements that together form the 
departmental head office and military headquarters (Department of 
Defence, 1998). All the elements of the MOD were, over time, migrated 
and are now co-located in a single building complex, ARMSCOR building, 
Pretoria. The DOD also underwent restructuring. A number of defence 
functions which were previously executed at Defence Headquarters (level 
one) and duplicated at level two, in the respective Arms of Service, were 
amalgamated into one top level administrative function at SANDF 
Headquarters. The plan was that this, together with the creation of the 
Secretariat would end the duplication of functions and associated added 
costs.  
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Essentially what the DOD had created was a new top level structure 
(Integrated Departmental Head Office) comprising the Secretariat and 
defence headquarters in an integrated organisational structure 
(Department of Defence, 1998). The intention was that the integrated head 
office (sometimes also referred to as ‘integrated headquarters’) would 
jointly manage the department administration and its armed services in an 
‘integrated’ manner. Alternatively, put another way both the military and 
civilian personnel would be required to cooperate jointly in respect to the 
key Def Sec function of determining the defence policy and strategy. 
Likewise the civilian members would work closely together with the military 
in determining accountability and scrutinising the proper utilisation of state 
resources (Department of Defence, 1996).  
 
The structure (defence functions) was rearranged into 18 reorganised 
divisions (Figure   7)  – split so that some are the primary responsibility of 
the Def Sec and others the responsibility of the Chief SANDF – with 
certain divisions, such as Defence Intelligence and Joint Training, being 
shared between the two as a joint responsibility. 
 
Additionally planning was initiated to create a Joint Operations Centre 
(19th Division) to enable the conducting of military operations.  The role of 
the four Services (Army, Navy, Air Force and SA Medical Services) then 
reverted to that of preparing and providing combat ready forces (staff 
function) for employment by Joint Operations (line function) (MOD 
Guideline: MS/R/302/6/36183 dd 13 Dec 96), as in the example of 
Australia and the UK.  
  
The fundamentally reorganised DOD macro design, as illustrated overleaf 
(Figure 7) had three main objectives, namely consolidation of civil control 
over defence, the attainment of broad representivity, and the delivery of 
accountable and affordable defence for South Africa. 
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Figure 7: Macro Design – 1998  
(Source: Adapted from SA Defence Review 1998) 
 
Notwithstanding some apprehension on the part of the armed services, the 
changes were, at the time, generally well received (Respondent 07, 
personal interview, 23 February 2016). Conceptually, at least, there 
appeared to be a general understanding of the need for the Sec Def to 
play the role of both the head of department and accounting officer in a 
new diarchal form of accountability/leadership. Also accepted was the 
functional separation of the Ministry (positioned at national decision-
making level 0) from the DOD (positioned at level 1) which now 
incorporated the Def Sec and SANDF in an integrated head office. The 
DOD head office is now effectively both the Departmental headquarters 
and the military headquarters. It is the interface between the national 
strategic level and the operational level. What was not so clear was the 
precise determination of reporting functions and lines of control between 
the Chief SANDF and Sec Def operating in an integrated head office.  
 
This ambiguity was acknowledged by the DOD at the time, in the 1996 
Defence White Paper, where it was clearly stated that additional studies 
were required to clarify the primary lines of responsibility and 
accountability and to determine which of the posts in the integrated 
99 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
headquarters are military and which civilian (Department of Defence, 
1996). The most contentious of course being the question of who ‘controls’ 
logistics.  
 
That the Minister, Sec Def and transformation team were under pressure 
to show results was never in doubt. According to one official the 
unfortunate consequences of the rush to satisfy political expediency was 
that “…the principle of ‘structure follows process follows strategy’ was not 
adhered to…”45 (Respondent 02, interview, November 02, 2015).  The 
official further argued that  
 
…objectives are the starting point for developing structures. 
In terms of the Public Service Act and Regulations the 
Minister can only approve a new structure if the structure is 
aligned to objectives.  The failure to conduct a proper 
analysis meant that the separation of the Def Sec and 
SANDF was not properly thought through before the 
restructuring commenced…with the result that there is a 
lack of proper boundary management between the Def Sec 
and SANDF.  
 
As a result one of the manifestations is that  
 
…there is a lack of policy support in the DOD…the SANDF 
argues that the Def Sec is responsible to develop all 
Defence policies …one result of which  is the chaotic state 
of affairs experienced in the logistics environment.  Very 
                                                          
45
 The correct method, according to the respondent, for the development of the 1998 
Macro Design was that [abridged process overview]: …firstly a systems approach should 
be applied during the organisational development intervention to ensure that all the sub-
systems are integrated in such a manner that total congruency is obtained. The sub-
systems must work in a congruent manner to ensure successful delivery of the required 
outputs, as the outputs delivered from the original entity to another will influence the 
quality of the corresponding outputs.  Thereafter the process architecture of all the sub-
systems in the domain needs to be developed to guide the responsibility analysis to 
determine the specific deliverables for both the Sec Def and Chief SANDF. The 
responsibility analysis then guides the development of the proposed functional and 
organisational structures (Respondent 02, interview, November 02, 2015). 
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few log pamphlets/policies/standard operating procedures 
are still available, and those that are, are from two decades 
back…very little new has been done (Respondent 02, 
interview, November 02, 2015).   
 
A full analysis of the organisational and functional strategy process lies 
outside of the scope of this study. It is evident though that the three main 
objectives for the fundamentally reorganised DOD macro design, namely 
consolidation of civil control over defence, the attainment of broad 
representivity, and the delivery of accountable and affordable defence for 
South Africa, had yet to be fully achieved. Unfortunately, as happens with 
the best of plans, the expectations were not entirely met at the time, and in 
hindsight proved rather ambitious. 
 
Challenges with the 1998 Structure  
 
This post-1998 integrated head office structure was put to the test during 
Operation BOLEAS46, and whilst much of the operational details remain 
embargoed by the DOD, what is known is that this operation highlighted 
the unwieldiness of the DOD’s structural configuration.  Notwithstanding 
Chief SANDF, General Nyanda’s assurance that the military objectives 
had been achieved (Nyanda, 1999), the SANDF’s performance was 
heavily criticised in the media and by a number of military pundits 
variously as a ‘bungled intervention’ (Neethling, 1999).  
 
The DOD briefed the Parliamentary defence oversight committee (and 
others in a joint meeting) in November 1998, in which it highlighted a 
                                                          
46
 22 September 1998 South African (SADC) military intervention into Lesotho, at the 
request of the Prime Minister, to stabilise the country. For an excellent general analysis 
see Theo Neethling (1999). Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation 
Boleas and Beyond, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2.2, May 
1999. Readers are also referred to the Report on Situation in Lesotho (1998), Minutes of 
the Joint Meeting of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence; Foreign Affairs Portfolio 
Committee; Security & Justice Select Committee conducted on 2 November 1998, 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 
 
 
101 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
number of failings made manifest by Operation BOLEAS. These 
shortcomings, drawn extensively from that report (Joint Standing 
Committee on Defence, 1998) and also on general context provided by 
Neethling (1999) and (Respondent 01, interview, April 22, 2015; 
Respondent 07, personal interview, February 23, 2016), are of particular 
interest to this study as they point to a number of possible structural 
problems in the balance DOD design, namely: 
 
 South Africa had no clear national security policy and thus the order for 
a military intervention came as a surprise to many at the highest levels 
within the DOD. This position was further exacerbated by concomitant 
critical failings, specifically the lack of co-operation (and 
communication) with the Department of Foreign Affairs at departmental 
level – during the early days of the crisis and build-up to the decision to 
intervene militarily. This resulted in too little time for conducting a 
proper military planning cycle, in the absence of a contingency plan 
(National Security Strategy). This shortcoming was exacerbated by the 
failure of the Def Sec Council, Military Command Council and Council 
on Defence to convene and conduct a brief before the operation. The 
fact that the Chief SANDF, Chief SA Army and Chief Intelligence were 
all relatively new to their posts, having only been appointed in March, 
after the ‘Meiring Report’47 debacle led to the forced resignation of the 
previous incumbents (Williams, 2002), clearly did not assist matters. 
This command failure by the DOD integrated headquarters led to all of 
the pressure and responsibility being placed upon the nascent Joint 
Operations Division (recently established for employment of forces). 
 
 The Joint Operations Division was understaffed for an operation of this 
kind and unable to respond effectively in such a short time. Many of the 
                                                          
47
 Chief SANDF, General Meiring, in early 1998, submitted an uncorroborated 
‘intelligence report’ directly to President Mandela, without following statutory intelligence 
channels.  The report made serious allegations against a number of prominent politicians, 
military officers and others and contained allegations of a baffling plot to seize 
power/execute a military coup d’ etad. The report later proved false resulting in the 
irretrievable breakdown of trust between the Commander-in-Chief (President) and his 
military command (Williams, 2002). 
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experts had received all the training but lacked critical experience in 
such operations. The nature of the operation was also problematic. 
This was planned and executed as a military intervention, and not a 
peace-support operation. As it turned out this was a huge 
misunderstanding.  
 
 No time for force preparation. It was generally recognised that there 
had been too little time for planning and preparation of the forces. 
There was too little time for deployment drills (generally the DOD works 
on the proviso that at least seven days are needed to prepare for a 
conventional operation and 8 weeks for a peace support operation).  
As a result the participating units were not combat ready (and 
consequently neither mission ready); it was discovered that stock 
levels of operational reserves were inadequate; and consequently the 
SA Army rapidly depleted its war reserves. 
 
 The poor quality of intelligence (the responsibility of the DOD 
integrated headquarters) was a particular operational weakness. This 
manifested itself in the limited extent of intelligence liaison conducted 
with the Botswana Defence Force; and a minimal flow of both 
operational and strategic intelligence to support the operational force 
on the ground and the concomitant inadequate tactical/operational 
intelligence feedback to Defence Headquarters (to ensure they 
remained alert to and could react to the rapidly changing intelligence 
picture). 
  
The key lessons taken from Operation BOLEAS (Joint Standing 
Committee on Defence, 1998), of interest to this study were that:  
 The logistical function did not support rapid deployment of forces.  
 
 Contingency planning on the strategic level must include stockpiling of 
operational reserves.  
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 Finance for logistics must be made available. 
 
 In general there was too little time for planning and preparation of 
forces.  
 
 The media war was lost earlier on and never recovered from (which 
was detrimental to the operation). The right people at the right level 
were not informed of intentions in time. There was also a lack of 
effective external communications – the citizens of Lesotho did not 
know the intentions of the SANDF/SADC intervention (were not 
adequately made aware of via communication/publicity campaigns).  
 
Post-1999 Reorganisation 
 
The one single inclusive lesson that stood out, that summed up the 
operational failures, was that the Chief SANDF had to be empowered to 
effect command and control over his forces, particularly regarding military 
logistics, financial systems support, operational planning and, preparing 
and employing forces. Also what was not widely reported at the time was 
the Chief SANDF’s almost total exclusion of the Sec Def and his 
Secretariat staff from the planning of the operation. By all accounts the 
Sec Def was oblivious to the details of the operation, including the 
timelines for its execution, and was as astounded as the rest of South 
Africa when the news of the ‘intervention’ broke (Respondent 07, personal 
interview, February 16, 2016).   
 
The obvious solution required the transformation team to revisit the 
transformation design and migration plan and make a new study of the 
business processes to clarify the primary lines of responsibility and 
accountability between the Sec Def and Chief SANDF (Respondent 04, 
personal interview, 23/12/15). Similarly it was critical to determine the 
allocation of the posts in the integrated headquarters according to 
primarily military or civilian functions. The DOD appointed  an 
implementation project team to execute the task, authorised by DOD 
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Administrative Instruction: Reorganisation of the DOD’s Top Structure, 
DS/PP/503/1 dated 27 October 1999. 
 
One of the first decisions taken, as a ‘quick fix’ to empower the Chief 
SANDF, was to create the Joint Support Division where all support 
elements were ‘centralised’ and put under the command of the SANDF 
(Figure 8) (Respondent 04, personal interview, 23/12/15). The reorganised 
structure was an attempt to ameliorate the obvious deficiencies in 
operational command and control highlighted by the Operation BOLEAS 
intervention, particularly as it related to the different roles and 
responsibilities of the Def Sec and SANDF in an integrated defence 
headquarters. The year 1999 was also noteworthy for marking the end of 
Joe Modise’s term, as the first Minister of Defence in the democratic South 
Africa, and ushering in the Honourable Mosiuoa Lekota as Minister on the 
24 September of that year.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: DOD Macro Design 2001 to 2004 
 (Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
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The high level support divisions, formations and agency that were created 
and/or reorganised, after 1999, and then group together under Joint 
Support Division, were Human Resource Support, Command and 
Management Information, Joint Training, Military Police, Service Corps 
and Logistics, are reflected below (Figure 9). The macro design was 
effective between 2001 and 2004. 
 
DOD (JOINT SUPORT DIVISION) MACRO DESIGN 2001 - 2004 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Joint Support Macro Structure 2001 to 2004 
 (Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
 
Secretary for Defence Summoned to Appear Before the Defence Joint 
Standing Committee 
 
The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), chaired by Mr J.N. 
Mashimbye, summoned the Sec Def to appear before the committee on 
the 4 June 2001, to report on the progress with the establishment of the 
Secretariat since 1994 (Joint Standing Committee on Defence, 2001). By 
all accounts the minutes reflect a hostile reception. It appears evident that 
there was trepidation regarding the lack of communication on the part of 
the Secretariat, and consequently the committee expressed deep concern 
that the Secretariat was failing in its statutory duty to fulfil its oversight role 
(Joint Standing Committee on Defence, 2001). The Chairperson 
concluded, at the end of the thorough grilling, that he finally felt 
comfortable (after having received assurances from Sec Def and his 
delegation) standing-up in Parliament and stating “…that the Secretariat is 
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not asleep at the wheel, but is driving the car” (Joint Standing Committee 
on Defence, 2001, p. 6).   It was apparent that the intervening seven years 
since 1994 had not been plain sailing for the establishment of the Def Sec 
and transformation of the SANDF, and ultimately the DOD. 
   
Although the JSCD did not make specific reference to the Joint Meeting of 
the JSCD, held on the 2 November 1998, to receive the Operation 
BOLEAS report, many of the criticism levelled related to various  civil-
military relations challenges and civil control impediments experienced at 
the time, by the integrated defence headquarters and subsequent 
attempts at re-engineering. Evidently not all the challenges had been 
resolved. The JSCD critique centred on the following core issues (Joint 
Standing Committee on Defence, 2001), of interest to the study: 
 
 Poor, and in some instances a total lack of, communication on the part 
of the Sec Def that bordered on disrespect for the JSCD and the 
Parliamentary oversight role that it performed over defence. 
 
 Relating to the above was the Sec Def’s failure to consult the JSCD on 
planned structural changes to the DOD organisation and to keep it 
abreast of progress.  The Chair went so far as to instruct the Sec Def 
that in the event that envisaged changes to structure affect policy, it 
must be brought to the JSCD for review48.  In this specific example, it 
was evident that the new organisational structure that had been tabled 
by the DOD was not aligned with the realities of the available budget 
(and thus unapproved).   
 
 Concern that the hard fought for civil control of the SANDF was being 
eroded. As an example the Sec Def was heavily criticised for 
appointing a uniformed member of the SANDF as his deputy, during 
his recent absence abroad. This was seen as an encroachment on the 
                                                          
48
 In terms of Rule 201 (1): Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. (2015). Rules of 
the National Assembly, Chapter 12: Committee System   
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independence of the Def Sec in the exercising of statutory civil 
oversight of the SANDF, under the direction of the Minister. 
 
 Concern that the restructuring of the logistics functions, post the 1999 
reorganisation, back under the Chief SANDF had effectively 
emasculated the Def Sec and encroached upon the expected key role 
it was to perform in achieving civil control over the SANDF. 
 
 That the JSCD was of the view that a new Defence Review was 
required as the circumstances had changed somewhat since 1997/98. 
 
 The lack of capacity within the Def Sec was raised as a matter of 
concern. Although cognisance was taken of the efforts of Sec Def to 
‘civilianise’ the Def Sec there were still a number of key senior posts 
that remained vacant, several years down the line.  
 
The Sec Def accepted responsibility for the poor communication with the 
JSCD and consequent failure to keep the committee abreast of planned 
structural reorganisation within the DOD and submission of such plans to 
the JSCD for review and approval (Joint Standing Committee on Defence, 
2001). The lack of proper communication both externally and within the 
DOD integrated head office was later to become a less than stellar feature 
of the transformation project that ultimately bedevilled efforts to transform 
the DOD and institute healthy civil-military relations and effective civil 
control.  The stumbling block was summed up by Ms S. Rabkin as “…a 
Sec Def that wanted to ‘control’ instead of enabling the SANDF, and a 
Chief SANDF that feared losing power and influence if some of his 
divisions where transferred to the Def Sec” (Interview, February 15, 2016). 
 
The response to the Def Sec briefing was not all negative and there was 
recognition of some of the successes achieved since 1994. In particular 
the establishment of the Secretariat, the successful promulgation of the 
Defence White Paper and 1998 Defence Review, transfer of the finance 
function from the SANDF to Def Sec concurrently with the demilitarisation 
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of the finance functionaries, transfer of the Acquisition Directorates from 
the Services to Def Sec (Acquisition Division), transfer of the procurement 
function from SANDF (Chief Logistics) to Def Sec (Acquisition Division) 
and civilianisation of the Internal Audit functionaries amongst others and 
the drawing to a conclusion of the integration programme (Joint Standing 
Committee on Defence, 2001). The enduring challenges, however, 
threatened to overshadow the modest successes. The primary issue at the 
centre of the failure to make adequate progress was lack of capacity in the 
Def Sec and the need to recruit and staff the Secretariat with competent 
people (including the appointment of a CFO).  Without increasing capacity 
the Def Sec would continue to fail to deliver on its statutory duty to effect 
civil control of defence.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reveals an organisation in 2001, as the decade of post-
democratic integration of forces drew to a conclusion, struggling with the 
concept of ‘civil control of the armed services’ with all its various 
implications. The analysis suggests that these shortcomings continued to 
impede not only the exercising of civil oversight by Parliament and civil 
control by the National Executive and Minister of Defence but, also the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the SANDF in meeting its ordered 
commitments. The extent to which the DOD will be able to overcome the 
civil-military relations and civil control challenges during the next phase of 
transformation, and achieve the modest transformation objectives is the 
subject of further debate in the chapters to follow. 
 
One must, however, be cautious of over-simplifying the challenges 
confronting the DOD. Transformation from a pre-1994 military organisation 
to a civil-military institution is not simply about civilianisation of military 
posts and introducing a few structural changes in DOD. As this chapter 
demonstrated the DOD transformation had to confront with changing a 
military organisation that previously had been positioned at the centre 
point of decision-making and state power (Stott, 2002), a situation that 
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effectively side-lined Parliamentary oversight. During the earlier 
transitional period, the Minister also had to resist the efforts by Chief 
SANDF to dictate the SANDF restructuring agenda which did little to 
smooth the process.  In addition the plan to separate the accounting 
officer functions from the Chief as head of department and vesting in the 
Sec Def was ruled to have been legally flawed and the proposed balance 
DOD design would require extensive reworking before it could be finally 
implemented.   It cannot be denied that this decision created a litany of 
unintended consequences and on its own, was responsible for altering the 
conceptual basis (if not the genesis) of the original balance DOD design.                   
 
The dilemma with the balance DOD design, as the model of choice, is that 
for successfully implementation it is almost entirely dependent on the 
proper structuring of power relationships within the DOD and maintaining 
the balance between the defence controllers. The Minister as executing 
authority, the Chief SANDF as commander of the SANDF, and the Sec 
Def as head of department and accounting officer. If this design had one 
other major weakness, then it was the lack of clear delineation of the civil 
(political) and military functions.  
 
On paper at least, the theory was sound in that by means of segregation 
of the broad defence functions, no party is able to unilaterally execute 
decisions in this diarchal arrangement. It is safe to say that the DOD had 
not at this stage achieved the required level of civil-military cooperation to 
make the system work and the underlying civil-military tensions between  
at least two of the defence controllers continued to hamper the co-
existence, power relations and working procedures between the Def Sec 
and the SANDF. As pointed out by one senior officer,  
 
“…the number of divisions in the DOD is finite. The only 
way for the balance DOD design to work is for the Sec Def 
and Chief SANDF to give and take.  Most importantly it is 
critical that parallel structures [duplicated] are not created in 
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the Def Sec that mirrors the SANDF” (Respondent 05, 
interview, February 11, 2016).  
 
One argument put forward is that the problem is more fundamental, in that 
it is the balance DOD design which is conceptually flawed (Ms S. Rabkin, 
interview, February 15, 2016).  Many of the problems being experience 
with the breakdown in relations may well have to do with the design of the 
DOD organisationally structured around the integrated headquarters in 
which mixed military and civilian institutions operate in a collaborative 
arrangement. Ms Rabkin further ventured that “…the Constitution may 
have gone too far in the requirement for civilianisation of the DOD” 
(Interview, February 15, 2016).  
 
These are all critical issues and whether or not the balance DOD design 
remains appropriate as the higher order organisational structure for the 
transformation of the DOD going forward, is a matter for further debate in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL POST INTEGRATION 
 
“The requirement to divide things into piles labelled ‘political’ and ‘military’ seems to me to be a 
mistake, and not to conform very much to reality. It might be better to put the question as follows: in 
any question that arises about the formulation or implementation of defence policy, there are some 
aspects where the skills of the military are needed, and some where the skills of civilians are 
needed.” (David Chuter, 2011, p. 82). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A major milestone had been reached in 2002 with the completion of the 
formal integration of the seven different forces (five non-statutory and two 
statutory) on 31 March. Integration was thus no longer a factor in the 
continuing transformation planning, as announced by Chief Human 
Resources, Lt Gen T.T. Matanzima in April 2002 (Document No. 17, 
2002). The relatively slow pace of transformation of the DOD, 
nevertheless, remained a problem. This mainly related to race, particularly 
in the middle management structures of the SANDF (Major – Colonel) 
which sat at 77.5% white personnel against Defence Review 1998 
guideline of 24.5%. Overall the percentage of white personnel (as a 
percentage of the total personnel) was close to the guideline, at 25.4%. 
This was largely as a result of the large influx of personnel of colour during 
the integration period and the predominately Black African youth who 
attested in the SANDF in the years since 1994 (Document No. 17, 2002). 
 
A review of the DOD in 2002 showed an organisation still struggling with 
civil-military tensions that threatened to split the DOD along civil and 
military lines. If this was not problems enough, there was the added threat 
that the armed services would be unable to fulfil the roles and missions 
assigned to it. The reasons are many and complex. Essentially, however, 
the issues centred on the balance DOD design and the exercising of civil 
control in a collaborative defence arrangement. On the one hand there 
were accusations that the Sec Def was assuming powers that he was not 
entitled to, particularly targeting defence resources (finance and logistics) 
in an apparent effort to emasculate the SANDF (Respondent 05, interview, 
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February 11, 2016). Moreover, on the other that the Chief SANDF was 
fighting to retain control over what they considered essential resources to 
enable the SANDF to execute operations (Ms S. Rabkin, interview, 
February 15, 2016). This proved to be an extremely testing and volatile 
period for the office of the Sec Def and its relationship with the SANDF. It 
was marked by deeply entrenched and patently divergent positions that, 
left unresolved, threatened to reverse the hard-fought labours to civilianise 
and transform the DOD.  
 
4.2 Ministerial Task Team Report on the Restructuring of the Office of 
the Secretary for Defence 
 
The Sec Def triggered the next major episode in the transformation 
programme on 27 June 2003, with the submission of a restructuring 
proposal to the Council on Defence. This initiative formed part of the 
Secretariat’s commitment to the Minister and JSCD to increase capacity to 
enable it to deliver on its statutory responsibility for civil control of defence 
(Document No. 16, 2003). Whether or not it formed part of the formal joint 
processes taking place at the time between the various Def Sec and 
SANDF work groups, remains a matter for speculation. The report detailed 
the restructuring (reorganising) of the office of the Sec Def, ostensibly to 
provide capacity and improve efficiency and effectiveness across the 
defence headquarters (Respondent 04, interview, December 23, 2015).  
Regrettably the thrust of the proposal – excluding for now the new posts to 
be created in the Def Sec – targeted the core of the divisions for transfer 
over to the Def Sec (from the SANDF) that were largely part of the 
contentious post-1999 structural reorganisation. It must be kept in mind 
that the DOD had been explicitly reorganised to empower Chief SANDF, 
to execute command and control over his forces, by giving him direct 
command of his support divisions.   
 
Tabling the proposal in June 2003, directly with the Council on Defence for 
approval by the Minister, after apparently having been rebutted by the 
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Chief SANDF at the earlier meeting of the Defence Staff Council49, was at 
best a contentious strategy. At worst in was indicative of a total breakdown 
in the tense civil control arrangements and oversight regime. It appears 
that Chief SANDF was taken aback by the Sec Def’s tactic and for 
reasons best known to the Chief; he did not challenge the Sec Def at the 
Council on Defence meeting. According to the Minister’s office, the 
Council on Defence sanctioned the Sec Def’s restructuring proposal 
followed by the Minister’s approval on 16 July 2003, for immediate 
implementation (Document No. 18, 2003).  
 
The Minister’s perceived ‘unilateral’ decision unleashed a storm including 
a vitriolic response from Chief SANDF. The media took up the story of the 
apparent dispute between Chief SANDF and Sec Def stemming from what 
was reported as “…[Minister] Lekota’s endorsement of Masilela’s [Sec 
Def] proposal to strip Nyanda [Chief SANDF] of some of his powers in 
favour of Masilela, who heads the civilian section of the defence 
department…” (Wisani wa ka Ngobeni, Riaan Wolmarans & Sapa, 2003). 
The source of the private corrspondence between the Chief SANDF, Sec 
Def and the Minister, made available to the media, can only be speculated 
on.  
 
It is not necessary to go into all of the details sufficient to confirm that the 
Mail and Guardian article (Wisani wa ka Ngobeni et al., 2003) provided a 
provocative window  into the central civil-military tensions playing out in 
the DOD (based upon private communications between the parties). This 
is in effect a microcosm of the broader efforts by the state to consolidate 
control over the armed services and reflects the “…ongoing (sic) conflict, 
negotiations, and compromises between those who hold power by virtue 
of free and fair elections and the organizations to which society has 
granted a monopoly on the means of violence…” (Pion-Berlin, 2006, p. 
xii).  
                                                          
49
 Defence Staff Council co-chaired by the Sec Def and Chief SANDF and used to 
resolve Secretariat/SANDF matters and formulate joint advice to the Executive Authority 
(Minister).  
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At stake was the Sec Def’s plan to transfer the key Human Resource and 
Logistics divisions to the Def Sec (the divisions would have to account to 
Sec Def) to “ensure internal control efficiency, compliance monitoring, 
evaluation, advice and reporting…” (Mr JB Masilela quoted in Wisani wa 
ka Ngobeni et al., 2003, p.1). Whilst on the other hand Chief SANDF 
argued that the decision “…would hamper him in discharging many of his 
statutory responsibilities – and would diminish the SANDF’s capacity to 
defend the country…” (General Nyanda quoted in Wisani wa ka Ngobeni 
et al., 2003, p.1). The standoff effective pitted the Secretariat and the 
SANDF against each other, with the Minister, Mr Lekota, suffering the 
indignity of having to play referee.   
 
The dispute playing out in public reached new depths when Chief SANDF 
threatened to resign if the decision was not reversed (General Nyanda 
quoted in Wisani wa ka Ngobeni et al., 2003, p.1).  Certainly not a 
particularly commendable endorsement of the balance DOD design and it 
is likely that Minister Lekota had not anticipated the collapse in 
cooperative relations and vitriol. More importantly it revealed cracks in the 
civil control and oversight regime that spoke to a lack of understanding of 
the genesis of the balance DOD design and the role and function of the 
Secretariat. It you consider Ratchev’s (2011, p.26) thesis the introduction 
of civilians in the DOD is supposed to have served as a “…powerful 
instrument to eliminate possible [civil-military] tensions, to speed up the 
consolidation of the defence organisation, and to strengthen a country’s 
civil society.”  In the case of the DOD there was little evidence of any 
measureable progress in the intervening years since the crisis of 1998 in 
resolving a number of debilitating civil-military relations challenges. The 
DOD was a long way off internalising the modern defence paradigm based 
on the civil-relations trinity of civil control, military effectiveness and 
defence efficiency (Ratchev, 2011, p. 4) 
 
The Minister, in consideration of the very public dressing-down playing out 
in media and Chief SANDF’s cogent counter-arguments, accepted, it must 
be assumed, that a review of his decision on the restructuring of the Def 
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Sec was unavoidable.  During late August 2003 the Minister constituted an 
independent Ministerial Task Team (MTT) to assist him in providing advice 
on the best available options. The mandate of the MTT was to study the 
Sec Def submission regarding the restructuring of the Def Sec, to make 
proposals and recommendations based on the findings, and to submit a 
report (Document No. 16, 2003). It is not possible to see into the mind of 
the Minister at the time and discern his motivation for seeking an 
‘independent’ opinion. Other than having reference to the brief note in the 
MTT report which indicated, in reference to the MTT’s mandate, that “…he 
[the Minister] needed an independent assessment of the problem to chart 
the way forward” (Document No. 16, 2003, p.1).  
 
Although the ‘independence’ of the MTT is moot what cannot be disputed 
was that the Minister appointed the chairperson and all the members from 
outside of the DOD50. This decision did later; afford grounds to challenge 
some of the more controversial findings based on the members’ palpable 
lack of defence insight and key knowledge regarding the application of 
legislative and statutory precepts to the DOD and its structures, roles and 
functions.  Notwithstanding the presence of a few disputed conclusions, 
the MTT report is a substantial document extending over 64 pages 
(Document No. 16, 2003).    
 
The MTT tabled its findings and observations with the Minister on the 28 
October 2003. Lack of space and the limited scope of this study precludes 
the detailed examination of the complete report. What the analysis did 
identify was that there is a real need for further detailed empirical research 
into the whole question of defence reform and organisational 
transformation, which was only just touched on in the report. Having said 
that it remained essential to draw out a select few findings and key issues 
                                                          
50
 MTT members: Chairperson Ms OR Ramsingh, Deputy Director-General Office of the 
Public Service Commission; Members: Mr C Haak, Head of Defence Desk at National 
Treasury; Dr I Phillips, Special Adviser to the Minister of Public Enterprises; Mr J Ngculu, 
ANC MP and chairperson of the Portfoilio Committee on Health; Advocate K Myburgh, 
State Law Adviser, Department of Justice. 
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which have specific significance to this study and more particularly the 
reassessment of civil control of the SANDF. 
 
 Limitations 
 
No investigation is perfect, and given the tight deadlines and resource 
constraints the MTT performed an admirable task. The significant 
limitation to their study was that the MTT was unable to conduct a more 
thorough “…research into the complex nature of the roles and 
responsibilities of the Sec Def and C SANDF…more time would have 
given…a better insight into the problem” (2003, p.6). Ultimately it was 
limited to document review and analysis of the oral presentations. This is 
unfortunate, given the opportunity they had and the privilege of open 
access granted by the Minister. It would have been useful had they fully 
exploiting their mandate in interrogating the evidence and all the key 
stakeholders, to have seen what more they could have uncovered. As it 
was the MTT only managed to scratch the surface of the civil-military 
relations and civil control challenges and never really exposed the root 
causes.  From the Sec Def’s personal notes51, he was of the opinion that 
“it is clear they [MTT] have a limited view, knowledge and insight of how 
the DOD should operate” (Document No. 16, 2003). 
 
Generally the MTT report was not particularly complimentary regarding the 
Sec Def’s proposal. It did seem to overly focus on the ‘personality clash’ 
between the two main controllers and failed to delve into the deeper civil 
control and balance DOD design issues. By way of example the tone used 
in the report was not what you would expect from such an eminent group. 
For instance it was stated that “…the Secretary wanted his proposals to be 
rubberstamped at all costs…; …the haste in which he [Sec Def] used his 
powers and responsibilities to push the implementation of his proposals…” 
and “…It was also observed that the SecDef (sic) tended to 
overemphasize (sic) his portfolio as Head of Department…” (2003, pp.20-
                                                          
51
 Sec Def’s personal notes include in the margins and as an addendum to his personal 
copy of the MTT report on file. 
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28). Quite how such personal affronts directed at the Sec Def, were 
designed to facilitate reconciliation between the main civil control 
functionaries (Executive Authority, Sec Def and Chief SANDF) is unclear.  
 
To be fair to the Sec Def and to provide some balance to the report, it is 
evident from a full appraisal of the content and the Sec Def’s notations that 
his critique of the MTT report was incisive. He highlighted numerous 
weaknesses in the analysis and interpretations presented by the MTT, that 
whilst there is no evidence of any unprincipled intent, are reflective of a 
lack of specialised knowledge, on the part of the team, of the roles and 
functions of key functionaries and the individual institutions that collectively 
define the DOD. As a whole the value of the information gleamed from the 
MTT study is unpersuasive. Nevertheless, there are a few inputs regarding 
the balance DOD design and the role of the Sec Def in exercising ‘civil 
control’ in a ‘complimentary relationship’ with the Chief SANDF that were 
worth exploring further.  
 
Balance DOD Design and Secretary for Defence’s Duties 
  
The MTT identified the application of the Balance DOD design as 
problematic.  Although they were unable to fully investigate the design 
(given their narrow mandate) they did confirm that there were potentially 
crippling challenges with the application/implementation of the balance 
DOD design and recommended that the genesis of the approved design 
be revisited. Generally what they found was that while the existence of the 
Sec Def is fully accepted, acceptance of the complimentary role to be 
played in an integrated headquarters 52 was not articulated in the actions 
and conduct within the Department (Document No. 16, 2003, pp.23-30). It 
is a pity, given the earlier argument, that their findings lacks critical 
analytical engagement with the balance design. What is apparent though 
is that the conduct of the DOD personnel speaks to the lack of 
                                                          
52
 Civilian and military personnel required to cooperate jointly in determining the defence 
policy and strategy, accountability and scrutinising the proper utilisation of state 
resources, for example. 
118 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
understanding of the raison d'etre of the Secretariat and reveals a 
breakdown in Ratchev’s (2011) trinity of civil-military relations53.   
 
The MTT also recognised that better utilisation of comprehensive 
instructions and delegations were needed to create greater clarity on the 
roles of the Sec Def and Chief. It was recommended that where 
appropriate, legislation should be amended to provide for powers of further 
delegation to the ‘delegatee’ (Document No. 16, 2003, pp.23-30). Effective 
utilisation of delegations is a linchpin function that has crosscutting and 
transversal impacts across the entire integrated head office organisation. 
This issue is therefore returned to and analysed in detail in chapter five. 
 
The MTT draws an interesting conclusion regarding the Sec Def’s duties 
as Head of Department. In reference to Section 8(d) of the Defence Act, 
2002, which refers to the duty of the Sec Def to “enhance civil control” by 
the Minister and Parliament, they state as follows:   
 
The translation of the constitutional imperative into the 
Defence Act, 2002 …might have resulted in a simplistic 
view by some members within the Secretariat that SecDef 
(sic) is in control. It appears that the words to enhance civil 
control are interpreted beyond the intention of the role of a 
civilian secretariat as derived constitutionally (2003, p.17).  
 
Further on they conclude: 
 
The SecDef (sic) derives his or her functions of civil control 
via the Minister, and in this regard as head of the 
                                                          
53
  The paradigm of democratic defence is based on the trinity of modern civil-military 
relations and the need to balance the tensions within the trinity (Ratchev,2011, p.4): 
 Civil control – performed by the National Executive  
 Military effectiveness – in achieving ordered commitments 
 Defence efficiency – sound resource management.  
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Secretariat (sic) he or she does not have direct authority 
over the Department and the C SANDF (2003, p.18).     
 
These conclusions are problematic given the acceptance of the balance 
DOD design and the legislative prescripts contained in the Constitution, 
Defence Act, PFMA and Public Service Act, which taken as a whole 
confirm that the Sec Def is head of department and the accounting officer 
for the DOD which ‘includes’ the SANDF, and clearly not just ‘the 
Secretariat’. In terms of his appointment the Sec Def does indeed have 
‘direct authority’ over the Department and C SANDF54. This is more 
specifically set out in the Defence Act (which will be analysed in detail in 
chapter five) which places a legal duty on the Sec Def to do so. It is rather 
the extent of this ‘direct authority’ and how it is applied via various 
delegations and reporting conventions that is the contested issue (in a 
balance DOD design and collaborative defence arrangement), and not the 
statutory appointment of the Sec Def per se.  
 
Given these facts, it is a pity then that the MTT did not elaborate on their 
dissenting opinion.  This would have provide the reader with better insight 
as to why they deviated so far from the accepted position on the statutory 
appointment of the Sec Def.  What their position does highlight is that 
even senior government officials and parliamentarians can get it wrong in 
that they failed to grasp the intricacies of the balance DOD design and 
comprehend the genesis of the Secretariat.  
 
The MTT report concluded that the civil-military relations within the DOD 
were at a low point. Specifically that as a general observation that the 
                                                          
54 Public Service Act, 1994: Section 7 (3)(a):  Each department shall have a head who shall be the incumbent of the 
post on the establishment bearing the designation mentioned in column 2 of Schedule 1, 2 or 3 opposite the name of the 
relevant department or component, or the employee who is acting in that post. Section 7 (3)(b):  Subject to the provisions 
of paragraphs (c) and (d), a head of department shall be responsible for the efficient management and 
administration of his or her department, including the effective utilisation and training of staff, the maintenance 
of discipline, the promotion of sound labour relations and the proper use and care of State property, and he or 
she shall perform the functions that may be prescribed. (Author’s emphasis). 
 
Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1): Section 36:  Appointment as the Accounting Officer.   
Furthermore, among other things, the Accounting Officer is to ensure the provision and maintenance of effective, efficient 
and transparent systems of financial and risk management and internal control in accordance with Sections 13; 29 2 
(a)(b); 38; 39; 40; 41; 42; 43; 44; 45; 46; 47(1)(a); 63; 64; 65; 81 and 89. (Author’s emphasis). 
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prevailing climate in the DOD was not conducive to a strategic, 
coordinated and planned approach to restructuring. Overall concern was 
expressed that the factors identified were detracting from the institution 
building and further fragmenting an already complex and difficult situation.  
 
The MTT went on to list a number of concerns that were earlier identified 
by this study; particularly the poor communication, inadequate consultation 
and lack of a collaborative approach between the Def Sec and SANDF 
and the effect this had on the working relationship between the two 
institutions. This censure is significant for the fact that it questions the very 
foundation of the balance DOD design, the structuring of power relations 
and maintenance of the balance between the Def Sec and SANDF. The 
Minister was further advised that the Sec Def and Chief ought to commit 
themselves to enhancing autonomy (while being mindful of the need for 
civilian and military personnel to function collaboratively in an integrated 
head office) and a complimentary working relationship (Document No. 16, 
2003, pp.23-30). 
 
Work Session Following the Ministerial Task Team Report  
 
The Minister on 21 November responded in writing to the report, notably to 
firstly rescind his 16 July approval to the Sec Def, and secondly to approve 
the MTT recommendations (Document No. 18, 2003). The DOD gathered 
to address the report at a departmental work session on the 23 and 24 
November 2003, attended by the Sec Def and Chief SANDF together with 
the Service Chiefs and most of the military command as well as the Def 
Sec top structure.   
 
Given that the DOD was in a budget crisis in 2003, having to deal with 
rising operational commitments and runaway spending, the session 
focused on the unaffordability of the current Force Design/Force Structure.   
Of particular concern was that the SANDF had become a ‘blunt end 
organisation’ and needed to be turned around to a ‘sharp end 
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organisation’55.  The session did nevertheless make time to discuss the 
‘elephant in the room’ being the civil-military tensions between the office of 
the Def Sec and the SANDF. A number of the issues raised could not be 
addressed immediately and were placed on the agenda of the next work 
session scheduled for early 2004. The core issues raised, of interest to 
this study, were that: 
 
The working relationship between the Chief SANDF and the 
Sec Def needs to be clarified as in the current form it leads 
to misunderstanding and tension. There needs to an 
understanding of what the equilibrium between the SANDF 
and Sec Def should be? 
 
[In view of the current crisis] …our responsibility is to 
prepare and deploy. The Balanced Model (sic) has been 
thrown out and Command and Control is being used… 
(Document No. 18, 2003, pp. 2-5). 
 
The members agreed that it was necessary that the Sec Def, Chief 
SANDF and Minister provide direction to the DOD in respect to: 
 
Defining the roles of CSANDF and Sec Def by 
understanding the roles and implementation thereof.  It 
must be determined whether the Balanced model (sic) or 
Command and Control are applicable… (Document No. 18, 
2003, p. 6). 
 
The members agreed that the Sec Def and Chief SANDF would engage 
collaboratively in reviewing the issues raised and in preparing formal 
direction to the DOD, in response thereto, to be presented at the next 
strategic work session to be conducted early in 2004. The admission by 
                                                          
55
 In a blunt end organisation the majority of the budget is consumed by personnel related 
expenses and numerous support functions leaving little over for employment of forces 
(sharp end) and it follows achieving the SANDF’s defence mandate for protection and 
defence of the Republic and other ordered commitments.   
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the military personnel that they had discarded the ‘balance model’ in 
favour of command and control was a surprising admission.  
Understandably it was expressed more in a figurative sense as there are 
numerous institutional safeguards in place to prevent unilateral action by 
the SANDF. However, if anything it did confirmed the deep-seated mistrust 
that had crept in, effectively inhibiting sound civil-military relations and 
unquestionably, also the effectiveness of military operations.  
 
In reviewing the minutes with a senior DOD official, he again reiterated 
that the central issue to be resolved was the perception by the SANDF 
that Sec Def had gone too far in assuming powers that he was not entitled 
to. His actions were indicative of a desire to provide all the ‘direction’, 
leaving the SANDF to only ‘execute’ (Respondent 05, interview, February 
11, 2016).  The military still had a mission to fulfil and in exasperation with 
what they perceived as stalling by the Sec Def, appeared determined to 
work around the civil control issues, falling back on their internal military 
command and control structures to get the job done. Ms S. Rabkin 
concurs in so far as that the Sec Def was focusing on ‘controlling’ instead 
of enabling the SANDF (Interview, February 15, 2016).  
 
An interesting anecdote is that by all accounts the Chief SANDF was more 
than prepared to rid himself of the burden of the role of accounting officer 
for the complete DOD. What he did desire, was to retain only that portion 
of the accountability for the resources directly under his command and 
control, those that are operationally necessary for conducting military 
operations (Respondent 05, interview, February 11, 2016). Given this fact 
it is indeed plausible that the civil-military conflict was more about 
‘process’ than it was about focusing on ‘outputs’ and ultimately enabling 
military effectiveness in a collaborative arrangement. 
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4.3 Parys Resolutions 2004 
 
The next DOD work session was held from 16 to 19 March 2004, attended 
by the Sec Def and Chief SANDF, Service Chiefs, the military command 
as well as the Def Sec top structure.  The resolutions emanating from this 
meeting became known as the ‘Parys Resolutions’ and were intended as 
the ‘blueprint’ to spearhead the restructuring of the DOD macro structure 
(Document No. 14, 2004). 
 
The DOD, as directed by the Minister and subject to sanction by the 
JSCD, had to find a way to reach agreement with all internal and external 
stakeholders on a new DOD macro structure and thereafter to form and 
execute a cogent strategy. The solution had to be aligned to the approved 
balance DOD design (the genesis of which was at the time not open to 
reconsideration) whilst affirming the Sec Def’s accountability for the entire 
department and statutory civil control of the SANDF, without encroaching 
on the Chief SANDF’s chain of command and the SANDF’s operational 
effectiveness.  
 
The Sec Def and Chief SANDF duly delivered the promised direction to 
the DOD, followed by extensive deliberation. There were seven 
resolutions in total and the following three having been selected for further 
analysis (drawing from the work session minutes Document No. 14, 2004 
and other supporting documents reviewed):  
 
• Resolution One. Review the Defence White Paper of 1996.  
 
• Resolution Two. Review the Defence Review of 1998. 
 
• Resolution Four. The DOD structural arrangements must be revisited 
to enable optimal efficiency and effectiveness including the appropriate 
capacity for the Sec Def and the Chief SANDF. 
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The work session prioritised Resolution Four, followed by the review of 
both the White Paper and Defence Review. It had been apparent for a 
number of years, that the White Paper on Defence and the Defence 
Review 1998 were out-dated and required to be reviewed (Joint Standing 
Committee on Defence, 2001; Document No. 14, 2004). Fundamentally 
the problem was that the SANDF structure was not aligned to the Force 
Design and, as argued earlier, there were compelling reasons for 
reviewing the integrated DOD head office’s civil-military arrangements (as 
established by Chapter 9, Defence Review, 1998). What must be 
appreciated is that both documents were designed and written in a 
different political climate and before the concept of deployments in support 
of peace operations in Africa was considered.    
 
The lead writer of the White Paper, Laurie Nathan (Kenkel, 2006) was an 
admitted anti-militarist, and in the early years post-1994, the political 
climate still favoured tightening control over the armed services and a 
smaller force over a larger one. There was also the overarching desire by 
government to demonstrate, in a meaningful manner, that state resources 
were being reallocated to support the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. The changes in the strategic arena and the governments 
increasing commitment to extend the umbrella of peace and security 
across the continent rendered the 1998 force design not only unaffordable 
but also irrelevant.  
 
The further discussions centred on the organisation development and 
restructuring of the DOD (Document No. 14, 2004). The upshot was 
agreement on a ‘concept ‘of a single staff compartment to serve both the 
Sec Def and Chief SANDF based upon a requirement for an ‘integrated 
DOD with a deployable SANDF (Document No. 14, 2004). This concept 
would have to be further developed by the to-be-appointed task teams and 
the Chief SANDF cautioned that the test will be when it comes to 
implementing the resolutions. Tough decisions would need to be taken 
and it would be impossible to satisfy everybody. Above all government’s 
expectations should be met as far as was practical (Document No. 14, 
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2004). Sec Def supported the main decisions and added that the ‘Parys 
Resolutions’ would fundamentally change the direction of the Department 
and that implementation would be a severe “…test of leadership…” 
(Document No. 14, 2004).  
 
Ministerial Instruction 13/04: Establishing the Joint DOD Workgroup 
 
The Minister instructed the DOD to form the joint Department of Defence 
Workgroup (DODW), to give impetus to the ‘Parys resolutions’, made up of 
staff from both the office of the Sec Def (civilian) and Chief SANDF 
(Document No. 15, 2004).  The main thrust of the instruction was that the 
DOD must enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and the economic 
utilisation of resources56 without compromising the ability of both the Sec 
Def and Chief SANDF to account for their respective statutory obligations. 
This is a clear indication that the DOD was beginning to embrace 
Ratchev’s (2011) trinity of civil-military relations.  The ranking order for 
completion, was confirmed as being first the DOD structural arrangements 
followed later by the review of the White Paper on Defence and the 
Defence Review (Document No. 14, 2004).   
 
The Minister followed up this instruction by issuing a number of very 
specific directives (to the DOD) on 25 April 2004, to clarity the outputs 
required in addressing the DOD structural arrangements: 
 
• Directive 1. Sec Def, as Head of Department and Accounting Officer, 
should delegate specific powers to the Chief SANDF with regard to 
financial accountability. 
 
• Directive 2. Chief SANDF must account directly to the Sec Def for all 
the resources at the disposal of the SANDF. 
 
                                                          
56
 PFMA, 2010, Sec 38 (b) 
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• Directive 3. Chief SANDF must command and control the SANDF, 
including essential resources required for operational efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
• Directive 4. Sec Def should not interfere in the direct command and 
control of the SANDF. 
 
• Directive 5. Organisational restructuring in the DOD should reflect and 
reinforce the distinct roles of the Sec Def and the Chief SANDF 
respectively, as prescribed in law.   
 
• Directive 6. Sec Def and Chief SANDF must work together to foster 
unity and cohesion in the DOD. 
(Respondent 04, Interview, December 23, 2015) 
 
The Minister (as executive authority) finally demonstrated sound political 
leadership in issuing clear and specific direction that set the tone for the 
investigations to follow and the expected results.  What is striking is that 
this was the only example on record, of the Minister clarifying, in terms of 
civil control precepts, what he personally envisaged the specific individual 
roles of the Sec Def and Chief SANDF to be, in the higher defence 
organisational design for the DOD. It also finally integrated the MTT 
recommendations with the DOD planning and staved off any lingering 
misconception about the role of the Sec Def as head of department and 
accounting officer and the nature of the concomitant collaborative 
arrangement with the Chief SANDF. 
 
The DOD Workgroup went on to design and present the new macro level 
structures in 2005 (Figure 10). This new structure was a direct output of 
the DODW investigations and their attempt to align with the Minister’s 
directives; clarifying the specific individual roles of the Sec Def and Chief 
SANDF in the higher defence organisational design for the DOD. At this 
stage the Minister had only approved the creation of the new Internal Audit 
Division reporting in to the Sec Def. The macro placement of the Defence 
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Inspectorate (planned to provide inspection services to the SANDF) still 
required approval. It is for this reason that it is reflected on the Central 
Staff setup together with Human Resources, Legal Services and Defence 
Foreign Relations Divisions reporting to ‘both’ the Sec Def and Chief 
SANDF. In this new macro design Sec Def would have Defence Materiel 
(Acquisition portion of the Logistics function) reporting to him whilst the 
Chief SANDF would have the Logistics Division under his direct command, 
even though it is part of the ‘joint services’ that provides support across 
the entire DOD.  
 
Department of Defence Macro Design Post-DODW 
 
Figure 10: DOD Macro Design Post-DODW 
(Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
 
The DOD proceeded at the same time to conduct a thorough review of the 
requirements for restructuring the policy, strategy and planning domain. 
The Directorate Integrated Management Systems (DIMS) led this initiative 
with the main objective to resolve the relationship between the Sec Def 
and Chief SANDF regarding the process of providing relevant Defence 
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policy, strategy and planning on the one hand and Military policy, strategy 
and planning on the other.  In terms of legislative powers, functions and 
responsibilities, both the Sec Def and Chief SANDF must be capacitated 
with a supporting capability to facilitate the implementation of the strategy 
and plan57. As will be observed in the DOD macro design (Figure 10) there 
is a Defence Policy, Strategy and Planning Division, within the Def Sec 
and duplicated within the SANDF, the Military Policy, Strategy and 
Planning Division. DIMS presented the report on the proposed 
organisational and functional structures for policy, strategy and planning in 
October 2006 (Document No. 23, October, 2006). Both the Def Sec and 
SANDF divisions were later fully implemented, staffed and are currently, at 
the time of writing functional.  
 
Transformation Challenges 
 
What is of great interest to this study is that notwithstanding the obvious 
challenges, the DOD continued to pursue the balance DOD design. It is 
not to suggest that there was a ready alternative, as argued in the earlier 
analysis and literature review. What is intriguing, nonetheless, is that the 
dominant problem experienced by the DOD58, whilst recognising the role 
that the power structures play in creating civil-military tensions, is the fact 
that the DOD has two Level 16 posts operating at the same managerial 
level within the DOD. The classic example of ‘two centres of power’ 
cautioned by Chuter (2011). Both Sec Def and Chief SANDF are staffed at 
Director-General level and the question is even so, it does not explain why 
it is necessary that the Chief SANDF has the same privileges as the HOD 
59 (Document No. 16, 2003, p. 9)? This state of affairs invites conflict and 
relates directly to one of the original design principles, that ‘of 
                                                          
57
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996); Defence Act, 2002 
(Act 42 of 2002); The White Paper on Defence, 1996; The Defence Review, 1998 and the 
White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, October 
1999. 
58
 Identified from various work sessions and workgroups/ministerial task teams that were 
analysed since 1998. 
59
 Sec Def (the late Mr J.B. Masilela) also raised this in his personal notes and as an 
addendum to his personal copy of the MTT report, on file. 
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compromising on keeping both posts at the same level’ adopted by the 
JMCC in May 199460 and ratified by the Minister and Parliament 
(Document No. 3, 1996).  It appears that for reasons that are not readily 
apparent, the Minister, Parliamentary oversight committees and the DOD 
chose not to revisit this particular aspect of the design, during the period 
under review.   
 
Ms S. Rabkin, for her part, whilst accepting that there are challenges with 
the appointment of the two controllers as equals, believes that the balance 
DOD design is not working for other reasons, in that  
 
…if the Sec Def wants to control then he should do so 
through the control of finance and nothing else.  In the 
balance model the Sec Def’s focus is wrong and achieves 
very little. The SANDF is controlled through legislation such 
as the PFMA and other Acts and in particular the Defence 
Act and the Constitution which has numerous checks and 
balances built in to ‘control’ the SANDF and prevent 
unauthorised activities. The Sec Def has a hold on the 
SANDF’s expenditure and the Auditor General South Africa 
plays a critical role in controlling the SANDF (Interview, 
February 15, 2016).  
The analysis suggests that at the time the DOD had difficulty in executing 
the required organisational restructuring to reflect and reinforce the distinct 
roles of the Sec Def and the Chief SANDF, as prescribed in law (the 
Minister’s Directive 5). This is moreover linked to the earlier Parys 
Resolution that the DOD must affirm the Sec Def’s accountability for the 
entire department and statutory civil control of the SANDF, without 
encroaching on the Chief SANDF’s chain of command and the SANDF’s 
operational effectiveness.  Above all else it reflected a failure of the often 
touted ‘collaborative’ decision-making arrangement supposedly in place 
between the Def Sec and SANDF. The situation was further exacerbated 
                                                          
60
 Approved by the Minister of Defence (JMCC/DSM/501/6 and Addendum finally dated 4 
May 1994), as ratified by JMCC meeting dated 26 May 1994. 
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by the Minister’s difficulty, in 2003/4, in getting the Sec Def and Chief 
SANDF to reconcile their personal differences.   
 
There is another less obvious problem and that is the downside of the 
continual restructuring is that it did not allow the organisation to mature.  
The Department was for that reason in a continuous state of instability as 
it moved from one structure to the next. Transforming the DOD under such 
circumstances does not inspire confidence in its members, does little to 
foster unity and cohesion in the DOD, leads to a decline in effectiveness 
and efficiency, undermines civil oversight and control and ultimately 
impedes effective defence.  What the DOD needed was to bring some 
stability to the transformation programme. The best means of achieving 
this in future would be to ensure that the DOD structuring interventions are 
aligned to the requirements of the new Military Strategy to be developed.  
 
The DOD at least made some progress, in this regard, with the release of 
the report on the proposed organisational and functional structures for 
policy, strategy and planning in October 2006 (Document No. 23, October, 
2006). In the next section the period post-2009, under a new Minister, is 
reviewed and the more pertinent accomplishments of the continuing 
transformation project, that have value for this study, were analysed.   
 
4.4  Change of ‘Command’ 2009: Minister Sisulu 
 
The focus of the DOD transformation project in the intervening years, was 
on bedding down the Department of Defence Macro Design. With the 
resignation of Mosiuoa Lekota in September 2008, the Honourable 
Charles Nqakula was shifted across to head the ministry until May 2009 
when the Honourable L.N. Sisulu was formally appointed as Minister and 
immediately breathed new life into the Ministry. The DOD quickly brought 
the Minister up to date on the transformation project and the functioning of 
the DOD including both the Def Sec and the SANDF institutions 
(Document No. 11, 2011). As with the previous period, the persistent 
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concern raised was about the appropriateness of the DOD structures to 
provide for the execution and delivery of the Defence Mandate61  
 
The appointment of a new minister provided an opportunity to refocus on 
the transformation project and refocusing on protecting the positive gains 
the DOD had made up to that time. As described in chapter three, the 
obvious need remained to review and realign defence structures, and to 
clarify functions and lines of command and control. The Minister directed 
the Sec Def (at the time the Acting Sec Def) to initiate a new study and 
make specific recommendations on the structuring and positioning of the 
Defence Secretariat (Document No. 11, 2011).  
 
Changing Defence Mandate and Minister’s Support Requirements 
 
In the Minister’s opinion there was inadequate understanding within the 
Def Sec that the primary function of the Sec Def (and thus Secretariat) 
was to support the Minister (Document No. 11, 2011). The Minister’s 
position appeared to be influenced by her experience in other spheres of 
government and directed that the functions and composition of the Def 
Sec be reviewed to align them with the changing Defence Mandate and 
the Ministers specific support requirements.  
 
In addition the Minister was very specific that the DOD consider the 
following principles. Firstly that the primary function of the Director-
General of the Department (Sec Def) is to support the Minister in carrying 
out her mandatory duties over the Department and related institutions (i.e. 
the entire Defence Portfolio); secondly the interfaces between the Def Sec 
and the SANDF must be clearly and concisely defined to prevent overlap 
and confusion; thirdly that the Secretariat should be streamlined, and all 
functions that are not mandatory within the Def Sec should be relocated or 
removed accordingly; and fourthly the situation must be avoided where the 
                                                          
61 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: Section 200 (2) the primary object of the 
defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in 
accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force. 
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Sec Def becomes legally accountable for resources that are not under 
his/her control (Document No. 11, 2011). 
 
It is necessary to clarify that there had been no change in the 
Constitutional defence mandate, as set out in Section 200 (1) and (2). 
What the Minister and the DOD were recognising, in reference to ‘the 
changing defence mandate’ was that the SANDF’s secondary tasks were 
in the ascendency and for all intents and purposes had become the 
‘primary’ tasks, accounting for the majority of the ordered commitments. 
Briefly these tasks included the SANDF’s contribution to domestic, 
regional and continental stability by deploying military capabilities in 
external peace support operations; executing internal border-line 
safeguarding operations; and providing safety and security related support 
in co-operation with the South African Police Service (SAPS). This 
challenge of ‘mandate creep’ had already been realised by Bradford Jr et 
al. (1973) in the 1970’s, in relation to the US armed services, in that 
secondary ‘military’ tasks had the tendency to evolve and take priority over 
primary defence missions. 
 
The challenge this presented is that whilst it is accepted that the SANDF 
has a Constitutional duty “…to defend and protect the Republic…” and it 
must therefore be structure accordingly to fulfil this mandate, it does not 
leave much left over in the budget for the secondary tasks.  Hence the 
acknowledgement that the Defence Review 1998 force design was not 
only unaffordable but also irrelevant. Structuring the SANDF for the next 
great war, to confront an invading conventional army seems at best a 
luxury and at worst an extreme waste of finite resources.  
 
It is very difficult to get anyone in the DOD to openly challenge the status 
quo and the result is that the DOD spends much of its time in discussions, 
seeking various ad hoc solutions, without actually addressing the core 
issues. Ms S. Rabkin (Interview, February 15, 2016) argued that the 
challenge is one of a fundamental misalignment of the defence mandate 
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and an overemphasis on a threat assessment that is wide of the mark.  
Rabkin (Interview, February 15, 2016) questions the fact that the SANDF 
is still fundamentally structured “…along the lines of a 17th Century army 
designed to face off against an enemy army in the field…we are structured 
for a war that will never come…”  Essentially Rabkin is articulating a 
position shared by many in the DOD who choose to remain within the 
shadows.    
 
In the introduction to this study it was hypothesised that the selected 
model for South Africa’s transformation of the DOD and civil control and 
oversight regimes may well be simply inappropriate or otherwise 
ineffective. What is evident is that not only the choice of civil control model 
that is coming into question, but the entire structuring and mandate of the 
SANDF. Questions are being raised regarding what the actual mandate 
and mission of the SANDF should be, given the prominence of borderline 
safeguarding, support to the SAPS and foreign policy imperatives to 
provide peacekeeping and armed intervention forces for stabilising a 
patently insecure continent. Rabkin asks pointedly why  
 
“…are we structured for a war that will never come whilst 
we have the potential [to redirect our limited defence 
resources and] to play a tremendous role in the safety of 
the people and securing our borders, both land and littoral. 
If anything we should be redoubling our efforts to enable 
the SA Navy to execute its maritime strategy and to protect 
our littoral and Economic Zone…working together with 
other state departments to protect our fragile 
environment…the fish and other vulnerable marine life from 
unlawful exploitation. Not focusing on hiring, training and 
resourcing ground forces for conventional war…” (Interview, 
February 15, 2016).   
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The reality is that the SANDF – in light of the severe restrictions imposed 
on the departmental budget ceiling for the medium term expenditure 
framework (2016 Budget Speech, February 24, 2016) – will have to make 
hard choices regarding the type of operational capabilities it actually 
requires and the nature of ordered commitments it undertakes.  This also 
brings home the need for the SANDF to not only provide an effective 
service but also to do so efficiently. A lot of faith is being placed on the 
Defence Review 2015 for the solution, which may prove, in hindsight, to 
be overly ambitious.  
 
Department of Defence Benchmark analysis of Selected Countries 
 
The investigation by the Sec Def, given the lack of an apparent solution 
from within the DOD, turned to the international practices amongst 
exemplary democracies. Sec Def therefore commissioned a study, the 
results of which were detailed in an unpublished internal Def Sec 2011 
discussion document (Document No. 11, 2011). A review of the original 
study revealed a competent investigation on a selection of countries and 
the different models and approaches used to manage their respective 
Ministries/Departments of Defence. Extensive data sources were collected 
from 45 countries, across the world as part of the pre-selection phase. 
Four specific areas of performance were selected as the baseline criteria 
against which to broadly evaluate each of the selected countries, and 
determine its relevance for further assessment: 
• The Division of Responsibilities (Structure); 
• Budgeting and Financial Control; 
• Policy and Strategy Formulation; 
• The Management of Capital Programs. 
The researchers’ then applied the following selection criteria to determine 
which countries were suitable as candidates for full benchmarking: 
• Political system. It would be of little use in studying a country that has a 
different political system in place than that of the RSA. The political 
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system in use is the primary determinant of the civil-military 
relationship in a country and thus the study was limited to countries 
which possessed a mature liberal-democratic system. 
 
• Culture. The SANDF traces its roots back to the Commonwealth 
system and continues to share significant commonalities with other 
Commonwealth countries, and countries with a post-colonial history. 
 
• Maturity of the Defence Establishment. Countries selected must have a 
defence establishment which has reached an advance level of 
maturity.  
 
Countries were progressively eliminated from the study on the basis that 
their political systems differ completely from the RSA making comparison 
difficult (such as in the case of Chile for example) or that culturally the 
mind-sets differ (as in the case of Japan) or that ultimately, in terms of 
development, South Africa is further ahead (as in the case of Ghana and 
Uganda). This left Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom as the 
final three candidates that were fully analysed (Document No. 11, 2011).   
The methodology applied to the study was scrutinised, particularly the 
baseline criteria and selection criteria (Political systems, culture and 
maturity of defence systems) and the final choice of candidates for 
detailed analysis and could not be faulted.  The researchers applied the 
methodology judiciously and the findings are supported. The study did find 
strong similarities with both the Australian and New Zealand approaches 
with New Zealand in particular presenting a number of interesting 
possibilities worth analysing further.  What is remarkable about the New 
Zealand case is that in 1990 they split the then New Zealand Ministry of 
Defence into two separate legal entities: a Ministry of Defence headed by 
the Sec Def; and the New Zealand Defence Force head by the Chief of 
Defence Force. This effectively ended the diarchy in New Zealand 
(Document No. 11, 2011).   
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The conclusion of the study was that although there were valuable lessons 
that could contribute to the DOD’s own transformation project, it did not 
reveal any Ministry of Defence civil-military models that could be 
translated directly to South Africa with its unique context and history. The 
report proposed various options for further investigation but the project 
was curtailed when the Minister (as the Executive Authority for Defence) 
formal established the Defence Review Committee on the 05 July 2010, in 
terms of Treasury Regulation Chapter 20. Most if not all major 
transformation projects were effectively put on hold awaiting the results of 
the Defence Review.   
From the review of the original benchmarking research, it is apparent that 
what the researchers found daunting, in respect to the case studies, was 
the level of organisational maturity and the relative sophistication of the 
various business processes uncovered, not matched by the South African 
DOD. Although it was not stated as such in the findings, senior officials 
later admitted that the DOD, at the time, was just not organisationally 
mature enough to benchmark against the selected case studies 
(Respondent 05, interview, February 11, 2016; Respondent 07, interview, 
February 23, 2016). Given the passage of time since the original study 
and the new approach and opportunities presented by the release of 
Defence Review 2015, a new investigation is recommended in 2016 that 
could well produce fresh results of particular benefit the DOD’s next 
transformation phase. 
 
4.5 Defence Review 2015 (2014)  
 
In 2012, during a cabinet reshuffle, the Honourable Nosiviwe Mapisa-
Nqakula replaced Ms L.N. Sisulu as Minister. The long awaited report on 
South African Defence Review 2015, initiated by Ms Sisulu was initially 
approved by cabinet on 19 March 2014, and finally passed by the National 
Assembly on 7 June 2015 (Department of Defence, 2015c).   
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Persisting with a civil-military relationship in which the SANDF challenges 
the statutory functions of the Sec Def, with the result that transversal 
departmental efficiencies and effectiveness are severely impacted, is 
untenable in the end.   The analysis suggests that the DOD was cognisant 
of this hiatus and to a lesser degree the threat it presented.  It is also 
evident that the differing parties have put their faith in the promulgation of 
Defence Review 2015, to provide the national strategic level policy 
guidance to direct the development of the future “Defence Strategic 
Trajectory” with which to restore the defence capability over the next 25 
years. The Defence Review proposes three interventions that, on analysis, 
appear to confirm the previous Minister’s original directive that the primary 
function of the Director-General of the Department is to support the 
Minister in carrying out her mandatory duties over the Department and 
related institutions. The Defence Review presents the interventions, as the 
requirement to: 
 
 Reposition the Defence Secretariat to better exercise civil control.   
 Establish a legally sound defence delegation regime. 
 Review and overhaul the current defence organisational structure 
(Department of Defence, 2015c, pp.  9-16 to 9-17). 
 
The Defence Review Chapter four also includes a section on civil control 
and civil oversight and of particular relevance is section 26, Secretary for 
Defence, in which it confirmed that “The Secretary for Defence is the 
primary tool and resource for the Minister to enable him/her to exercise 
civil control (Department of Defence, 2015c, pp. 4.6-4.7). 
 
The Minister, in 2015, also confirmed in her “Minister of Defence and 
Military Veterans Priorities for 2015-2020”, contained in  the DOD 
Strategic Plan for 2015 – 2020, that Organisational Renewal was a 
priority. With particular reference to: 
  
 Repositioning of the Defence Secretariat/Establishing a 
Defence Accountability Concept. 
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 Establishing a Delegation Regime. 
 Establishing an Organisational Structure Regime. 
 (Department of Defence, 2015, p. 18).   
  
The DOD declared that 2015 would be an active year for defence 
transformation (Department of Defence, 2015). In reality this proved to be 
overly ambitious and the Department soon realised that it required more 
time to undertake the military strategic planning process to develop the 
implementation strategy than the tight timelines provided for in the 
Defence Review. Realistically this means that the Department is already a 
year behind schedule to commence with Milestone 1 - Arrest Decline. The 
DOD therefore officially adjusted its planning timeframes and Financial 
Year 2015/16 (ending 31 March 2016) became the planning year to 
prepare for FY2016/17. The DOD Strategic Plan for FY2017/18 must now 
be ready by March 2016 to allow time for engagement with National 
Treasury. The DOD will only succeed in its request for additional funds for 
implementation of milestone one in FY2016/17 if the Department tables a 
convincing case. It remains moot whether the state will be prepared to – or 
for that matter be able to, given the competing national priorities – finance 
the proposed funding mechanism to support the Defence Strategic 
Trajectory, over the next 25 years with an additional budget vote 
(Department of Defence, 2015c, p.  9-16). 
 
In terms of the transformation project, there were few changes to the 2005 
Post-DOD Workgroup Macro Design for the DOD (Figure 10), in 
anticipation of the total reassessment of the DOD undertaken in Defence 
Review 2015.  The few additions to the 2015 DOD Macro Design, mostly 
at Ministerial level (in most cases merely confirming legislative reporting 
lines) were the new establishment of the Defence Force Service 
Commission and SA Military Ombud, and the reconfigured reporting lines 
for the Reserve Force Council, ARMSCOR and Castle Control Board, all 
of whom report directly to the Minister. The DOD Macro Design 2015 
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(Figure 11) below sets out the current organisational structure of the DOD 
and Ministry. 
 
Figure 11: DOD Macro Design 2015 
(Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
 
To close this chapter it is necessary to confirm the 2015 Def Sec strategic  
planning Outcome, which essentially provides the mandate for the Sec 
Def, and that is to “…Enhance civil control of defence…” (Department of 
Defence, 2015). This DOD outcome is achieved through the sub-
processes that involve the formulation of defence policy and strategy, 
defence functional (resource and compliance) policies and strategies, 
defence management and administration, and resource accounting.  It 
includes the planning, budgeting, risk management, control and reporting 
processes (Department of Defence, 2015). The relevance of this DOD 
outcome is debated further in the next chapter. 
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4.6 Conclusion  
 
What does this chapter say about the status of civil control of the SANDF? 
It is marked that between 2002, the end of the integration of former forces 
phase, and 2015 that civil control is still a contested concept in South 
Africa.  The chapter opened with the Sec Def’s attempt to engineer an 
extensive restructuring of the Secretariat, ostensibly, without the express 
support of the Chief SANDF. This was at best a contentious strategy and 
at worst it was indicative of a total breakdown in the normally tense but 
courteous civil-military relations and civil control regime. More particularly 
the Minister (as Executive Authority for Defence) played an active role in 
the breakdown in relations through his rush to approve the restructuring 
without first undertaking a thorough work-study to determine the full 
implications of such a realignment.  Effectively splitting the civilian 
Secretariat and SANDF across civil control and military command lines 
and putting effective defence at risk.  
 
This cycle of conflict, negotiations, and compromises between those who 
hold power and the armed services (Pion-Berlin, 2006), is not unique. 
What is critical is rather the manner in which the routine challenges to 
healthy and stable civil-military relations are handled.  It is in this area, if 
there were to be a criticism, in which the DOD appeared to be failing.  
 
Central to the entire civil control debate has been the balance DOD design  
around which the DOD transformation project is structured and the role of 
the Sec Def in exercising civil control in a ‘collaborative relationship’ with 
the Chief SANDF. What is interesting is that notwithstanding the obvious 
challenges, the DOD continued to pursue the balance DOD design. 
Whether or not there was a ready alternative remains a matter of 
speculation and the subject of further research. The extensive review of 
literature in chapter two and the Sec Def’s 2011 benchmarking study 
demonstrated the difficulty in converting a model from a different country 
and circumstance directly to South Africa, with its own unique context, 
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history and legislation.  Nonetheless what is intriguing is that the analysis 
suggests that the foremost problem is not, as assumed, related to the civil 
control mechanisms (applied in the balance DOD design) per se, but 
rather to the fact that the DOD has two Level 16 posts operating at the 
same managerial level within the DOD (in effect equals). More importantly 
both posts are entitled to the privileges of Head of Department62 (Defence 
Act, 2002). As Chuter (2011) cautioned, the development of two centres of 
power, in an integrated civil-military department of defence arrangement, 
was problematic. Ultimately this structural arrangement has the potential 
for not only being the seat of the problem but also the source of the 
solution.  
 
There is also clear evidence that the genesis of the Secretariat was not 
properly understood across all levels and divisions of the DOD and at 
times the incumbent Sec Def was fixated on trying to exercise ‘control’ 
over the SANDF instead of focusing on ‘enabling’ an effective armed 
services. Ms Rabkin argues that  
 
…if the Sec Def wants to control then he should do so 
through the control of finance and nothing else.  In the 
balance model the Sec Def’s focus is wrong and achieves 
very little… (Interview, February 15, 2016).  
 
In a divisive environment, where there is little by the way of a common 
resolve and collaborative approach between the Secretariat and SANDF, it 
is not entirely surprising that the armed services would hold that “…our 
responsibility is to prepare and deploy …” and so “…[t]he Balance Model 
(sic) has been thrown out and Command and Control is being used…” 
(Document No. 18, 2003, pp. 2-5).  This is indicative of a frustrated armed 
service, attempting to fulfil its assigned operational commitments, as best 
as possible, in the face of a clear lack of enabling support from the Def 
Sec. What is evident that it is not only the choice of civil control model that 
                                                          
62
 Section 7(2) and 13(2) of the Defence Act, 2002 (Act No. 42 of 2002). 
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came into question, but the entire structuring and mandate of the SANDF. 
What the actual mandate and mission of the SANDF should be, given the 
prominence of borderline safeguarding, support to the SAPS and foreign 
policy imperatives to provide peacekeeping and armed intervention forces 
for stabilising a patently insecure continent, remains contentious.  
 
This chapter identified the centrality of the balance DOD design, around 
which the DOD transformation project is structured, to the institutional civil 
control regime and efforts by Sec Def to exercise civil control in a 
‘collaborative relationship’ with the Chief SANDF. Given this fact, it was 
necessary to further engage with and analyse the Sec Def’s statutory roles 
and functions; the exercising of civil control in the DOD; realignment and 
capacitating; and the need for better utilisation of delegations and 
comprehensive instructions within the balance DOD design. This is 
addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REPOSITIONING THE DOD FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENCE 
 
What a society gets in its armed forces is exactly what it asks for, no more no less. What 
it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces, 
it is looking in a mirror; the mirror is a true one and the face that it sees will be its own. 
General Sir John Hackett (Quoted in Ferguson, 1987, p. 9) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter opens with a detailed analysis of the primary civil control 
issues under investigation, particularly the Secretary for Defence’s (Sec 
Def’s) statutory roles and functions, realignment and capacitating the 
Defence Secretariat (Def Sec) to better enable civil control of defence, and 
the need for better utilisation of delegations and comprehensive 
instructions within the balance DOD design. The approach followed in 
chapter’s three and four was to first analyse the individual institutions 
making up the DOD since 1994, focusing on the nascent Def Sec but also 
importantly on the interaction and affect the Sec Def and the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) had on each other. This required 
reviewing the conditions under which the DOD was created, the influence 
of the pre-existing defence organisational model and in particular how the 
DOD structured power relations and maintained the balance between the 
Def Sec and SANDF (Bruneau, 2006, pp.6-7).  
    
In this chapter the focus shifts to identifying and analysing the (current) 
statutory duties and functions of the Sec Def in detail as well as the 
challenges with the present structural arrangement. This includes 
discussions regarding various options for realigning the functions and 
composition of the Def Sec to restructure power relations and achieve the 
optimum balance between the Def Sec and SANDF. This is necessary to 
prepare the groundwork for presenting and analysing the findings in 
chapter six.   
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The examination of the various roles and functions of the Sec Def, as well 
as his or her powers of delegation, suggests that the statutory institutional 
arrangements for structuring power relations and maintaining the balance 
between the Def Sec and SANDF is at the centre of the conflict between 
the two institutions.  As advanced earlier, this is exacerbated by the 
classic civil-military tensions between the civilianised Secretariat and the 
SANDF that affects the co-existence, power relations and working 
procedures. 
 
Prominent amongst the Sec Def’s statutory roles and functions is to 
perform civil control in the DOD (Department of Defence, 2002, Sec 8 (d)).  
In addition the Sec Def has an overarching control function to ensure that 
the SANDF follows the policies and directions of the Minister of Defence 
(Minister).  There are, however, in practice, many challenges to these 
statutory roles and functions.   The prime one being that the Constitution 
also requires that the line of command between the President, Minister 
and the Chief of the Defence Force and the military command, is clear, 
succinct and unfettered (Republic of South Africa, 1996; Republic of South 
Africa, 2002).  For obvious and practical reasons no other office should 
stand in this line.   
 
The adoption of the balance DOD design as the transformation model of 
choice, in which both the Sec Def and Chief SANDF are appointed at 
Level 16 (Director-General level) but possessing different responsibilities 
in terms of their constitutional and organisational mandates (Department 
of Defence, 2015d) is being increasingly challenged.  Both are also 
entitled to the benefits and privileges due to a head of department, Section 
7(2) and 13(2) of the Defence Act, 2002 (Republic of South Africa, 2002).    
It is on this foundation that the nascent DOD civil control regime was built 
– which is the subject of this study – and which it is argued has been 
identified as the underlying cause of many of the deficiencies in the DOD’s 
existing civil-military organisational structures. 
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5.2 Statutory Roles and Functions of the Secretary for Defence 
 
The roles, functions, and responsibilities of the Sec Def, as are contained 
in various pieces of legislation, including the Constitution, the Public 
Service Act, the Public Finance Management Act and the Defence Act, 
and are examined in detail hereunder.  
 
The Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996), Section 204, makes 
provision for the establishment of a civilian secretariat for defence “…to 
function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for 
defence…”, that is the Minister of Defence.  Without question, therefore, it 
is clear that the Sec Def reports directly to the Minister.  
  
The appointment of the Sec Def is also provided for in Section 7 (1) of the 
Defence Act which states that “The President must, subject to the laws 
governing the public service, appoint a person to the post of Secretary for 
Defence as head of the Defence Secretariat.” (Republic of South Africa, 
2002).  Section 7 (2) states that “The Secretary for Defence serves 
…subject to the terms and conditions of service otherwise applicable to 
heads of department….”  (Republic of South Africa, 2002). 
 
The functions of the Sec Def are specified in Section 8 of the Defence Act.  
In terms of this section “…the Secretary for Defence is the Head of the 
Department (HOD) as contemplated in the Public Service Act, 1994 and 
the accounting officer for the Department as contemplated in section 36 of 
the Public Finance Management Act of 1999.”  (Republic of South Africa, 
2002).  Section 38 (Schedule 1) of the Public Service Act, confirms that 
the Sec Def is the head of the department (Public Service Act, 1994).  
According to Section 9 of the Public Service Amendment Act of 2007, only 
heads of national departments may bear the designation of Director 
General (Public Service Amendment Act, 2007). 
   
The implication of this legislation is that according to Section 7 (3) (b) of 
the Public Service Act of 1994, the head of a department is responsible 
146 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
“...for the efficient management and administration of his or her 
department …effective utilisation and training of staff, the maintenance of 
discipline, … and the proper use and care of State property...”.  Further 
section 36 (2) (a) of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), 
removes any uncertainty in that “...the head of a department must be the 
accounting officer…”  This implies that, as an apparent unintended 
consequence, that the Sec Def,  as the accounting officer of the DOD, is 
responsible for all departmental resources as well as financial, risk 
management and internal controls (Section 38 of the PFMA).  As 
accounting officer the Sec Def is further responsible for exercising 
effective budgetary control over the whole of the DOD (Department: 
National Treasury, 2010).    
 
The Sec Def also has a central role with respect to the facilitation of civil 
control.  Section 8 (d) of the Defence Act, requires the Sec Def to perform 
such functions as may be entrusted to the Sec Def by the Minister, that  
enhance civil control over the DOD by, Parliament, the Parliamentary 
oversight committees and the Minister (Republic of South Africa, 2002). 
 
In line with this requirement, according to Section 8 (e) of the Defence Act, 
the Sec Def “…must provide the Chief of the Defence Force with 
comprehensive instructions requiring the Chief of the Defence Force to 
issue orders and directives and to give commands...” (Republic of South 
Africa, 2002).  What this section clarifies is that the law bestows the Sec 
Def with the right to issue instructions to the Chief SANDF.   
 
This is taken a step further in Section 8 (f) of the Act where it states that 
the Sec Def “…must monitor compliance with policies and directions 
issued by the Minister to the Chief of the Defence Force and report 
thereon to the Minister…” The Sec Def is not only legally authorised to 
monitor activities in the SANDF and to report on compliance by the 
SANDF to the Minister’s instructions, but in terms of the Act, is legally 
required to do so.  Finally Section 8 (g) of the Act, makes the Sec Def 
responsible for “… discipline…administrative control…management of 
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employees …their effective utilisation and training” (Republic of South 
Africa, 2002), for the entire DOD.   
 
5.3 Delegation of Powers  
 
The Defence Act in Section 9 (1) provides the Sec Def with wide powers to 
“…delegate any power and assign any duty conferred upon him or her in 
terms of this Act to…” any employee of the Defence Secretariat, the Chief 
SANDF and any other member of the SANDF (Republic of South Africa, 
2002).  Similarly Section 44 of the PFMA provides for the accounting 
officer of a department to delegate any of the powers entrusted or 
delegated to the accounting officer (Department: National Treasury, 2010).  
In all such cases, Section 44 (2) of the PFMA makes it clear that 
exercising such a right of delegation or instruction does “…not divest the 
accounting officer of the responsibility concerning the exercise of the 
delegated power or the performance of the assigned duty” (Department: 
National Treasury, 2010). The challenge this presents is that, for example, 
notwithstanding the written delegation being properly issued to a member 
of the SANDF, the Sec Def remains responsible for both the exercise of 
the delegated power and the performance of the assigned duty. This is 
clearly an untenable situation.    
 
It is best explained, with the aid of a diagram (Figure 12). According to the 
Defence Act it is clear that only the Chief SANDF may issue orders and 
directive and give commands to members of the SANDF. It follows that in 
the military command line the duty/responsibility extends from the Chief 
SANDF down to the lowest levels and that there is a reciprocal 
accountability. Responsibility always remains vested in the highest level, 
but accountability can be shifted to lower levels, providing that the 
delegation is valid. It would follow that the Chief SANDF is responsible for 
all activities in the SANDF and is accountable for the correct delegations 
of authority and accountability to subordinates at lower levels.  
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However, in terms of a financial delegation from the Sec Def, for example, 
the person receiving the delegation may not reassign (transfer) that 
delegation to another. In a practical example then the Sec Def cannot 
delegate, once-off, to the Chief SANDF who in turn then delegates down 
the line of command to his subordinate commanders the exercise of the 
delegated power and the performance of the assigned duty.  The dilemma 
is that the various Acts require that the Sec Def issues a delegation to 
each individual military commander down to the lowest level. By 
implication then the duty and responsibility, and power and authority over 
the military commanders is vested in the Sec Def and in turn the military 
commanders are accountable to Sec Def for the exercise of the delegated 
power and the performance of the assigned duty.  
 
 
Figure 12: Delegation Dilemma 
(Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
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Required Solution 
 
The proposed solution originally put forward by the Minister’s 2011 Def 
Sec workgroup (Document No. 11, 2011), as later set out in Defence 
Review 2015 (Department of Defence, 2015c, p. 9-17) and as confirmed 
by a senior DOD official (Respondent 05, personal interview, February 11, 
2016), is set out below with the aid of a diagram (Figure 13).  Broadly 
speaking the proposal calls for various Acts of Parliament to be amended 
to provide for the DOD as a special case (Department of State). The result 
of which, whereby the Sec Def (duty/responsibility in terms of Defence Act 
and PFMA) can delegate some of his legal responsibility to the Chief 
SANDF (duty/responsibility in terms of the Constitution and Defence Act) 
in the form of performance agreements. In so doing it is important that the 
accounting officer enables the Chief SANDF (person being delegated to), 
to fulfil the delegated responsibilities by also delegating the authority to 
undertake whatever is necessary to meet the responsibilities. 
  
Figure 13: Required Delegation Situation 
(Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
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The Chief must then, in turn, issue the necessary orders and instructions 
to formalise and implement the terms of such performance agreements 
throughout the SANDF. In such an example the integrity of the command 
line would be intact and the duty and responsibility; and power and 
authority would be vested in the Chief SANDF and his subordinate 
commanders down the command line. More importantly, the subordinate 
commanders would be accountable to their own military commanders and 
ultimately Chief SANDF for the exercise of the delegated power and the 
performance of the assigned duty, and not to the Sec Def. 
 
This would require a change to the current institutional arrangement to one 
where the Sec Def (as set out in Figure 13), in terms of delegations, has a 
duty and responsibility and power and authority only in relation to the Chief 
SANDF (as commander of the armed services). It is then only the Chief 
SANDF personally that is accountable to Sec Def. As argued in chapter 
four, the DOD can already be considered a special case as a department 
of State in that it has ‘two heads’ and more importantly both are entitled to 
the benefits and privileges due to a Head of Department, Section 7(2) and 
13(2) (Republic of South Africa, 2002). Given that it is recognised in law as 
a ‘special case’, there should be a strong legal argument for amending the 
applicable legislation to make provision for a ‘special delegation regime’ or 
performance agreements.   
 
5.4 Core Challenges with Statutory Functions: Secretary for Defence 
 
Three additional areas of concern with regard to the statutory functions of 
the Sec Def, were identified during the earlier analysis and followed up by 
interviews with senior DOD officials (Respondent 05, interview, February 
11, 2016; Respondent 07, interview, February 23, 2016).   The first relates 
to accounting status, the second to comprehensive instructions and the 
third to ensuring SANDF compliance to the Minister’s directives.   Each is 
now elaborated on. 
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5.4.1 Accounting Status of the Secretary for Defence 
 
The Public Service Act, as noted above, identifies the Sec Def as the head 
of the department (Public Service Act, 1994, as Amended 2007).  
Therefore according to the Public Finance Management Act, the Sec Def 
(that is the Head of Department) is also the accounting officer for the DOD 
as a whole.   The Sec Def must account for all the DOD’s resources, 
whether or not they are under his or her control (Department of Defence, 
2015c, p. xii).   In the case of the DOD the Chief SANDF controls and 
utilises more than 95% of the resources63.   Contrary to accepted resource 
accounting norms, the Chief SANDF is not accountable for such 
resources, but the Sec Def is. The Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA) reinforces this position by “…insisting that the Sec Def 
appear before them to account for SANDF assets and not the Chief 
SANDF…” (Ms S. Rabkin, interview, February 11, 2016)  
Experience has shown that the Sec Def’s accounting responsibility for the 
DOD’s resources particularly in dealing with the various defence oversight 
committees of Parliament, SCOPA, the Auditor-General South Africa, as 
well as National Treasury – is impractical.   For example, the Sec Def may 
have to explain poor governance over leave administration at a Defence 
Force unit, which does not report to the Sec Def and over which he or she 
has no authoritative control.   
The use of delegations, as set out in the previous section, has not 
succeeded in solving problems with accounting for DOD resources.   This 
practice does not conform to the resource accounting standards of the 
Public Finance Management Act and the analysis suggest that a more 
suitable system of accounting, (a new accounting concept), that is 
compliant, is required. 
 
  
                                                          
63
 Although it is difficult to be exact, it is generally accepted by the DOD that this figure is 
‘representative’ of the fundamental ratio between assets under the direct control of the 
Def Sec (5%) and those under the SANDF (95%).   
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5.4.2 Comprehensive Instructions   
 
The Defence Act, Section 8 (e), confers on the Sec Def powers to issue 
instructions to the Chief SANDF, to issue orders (Republic of South Africa, 
2002).   The meaning of this provision of the Defence Act has been a 
subject of various, and at times contentious, interpretations.  The status of 
the Sec Def’s instructions have, in practice, been challenged in some 
quarters of the SANDF.  It comes down to the question of whether or not 
the Sec Def has the authority to issue instructions to the Chief SANDF.  
This challenge is based on the understanding that the Chief SANDF is 
directly accountable to the Minister of Defence.  If it is a given that the 
Chief SANDF is directly accountable to the Minister, on SANDF matters, 
then it can be deduced that the Chief is not accountable to the Sec Def.  
However in terms of the institutional civil control structures, it has been 
established that this is not the case. What then are the other aspects he or 
she is accountable to the Sec Def for?   
In Section 202 (1), the Constitution states that the “…President as head of 
the national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force, and 
must appoint the Military Command of the defence force”.  In Section 202 
(2) it further states that “…command of the defence force must be 
exercised in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet member 
responsible for defence…” (Republic of South Africa, 1996).  This section 
clarifies that the Military Command of the SANDF (which includes Chief 
SANDF as head) takes directions from and reports to the Minister.   In 
Section 13 (2) of the Defence Act, the Chief SANDF serves “…subject to 
the terms and conditions of service… applicable to heads of department 
…and must receive the benefits and privileges to which such heads of 
department are entitled.”  The Chief SANDF therefore enjoys comparable 
seniority to the head of department, in terms of the Public Service Act, as 
reinforced by the Defence Act, 2002. 
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It appears, therefore, that the Sec Def, who is appointed on the similar 
level as the Chief SANDF (that is they are equals), has no sanction to 
impose on the Chief of the SANDF if there is no compliance with issued 
instructions. Whether by design or default the practical implications are 
that Section 8 (e) confers a legal duty on the Sec Def to issue instructions 
to the Chief SANDF and yet  Section 13 (2) of the same Act, is interpreted 
to mean that the Chief SANDF is not subordinate to the Sec Def.  Due to 
this unresolved dispute over authority, the compromise solution (as 
required by the Chief SANDF) has been to issue Secretariat instructions to 
the SANDF under the joint signature of both the Sec Def and the Chief of 
the SANDF.  This similarly applies to delegations issued by Sec Def, to 
each individual commander64, whereby an arrangement is in place for the 
signed delegations to be handed through to the office of the Chief SANDF 
who in turn ‘consigns’ the delegations to his subordinate commanders 
(Respondent 05, interview, February 11, 2016).  The fact that its primary 
purpose is to serve as a face-saving exercise for the Chief SANDF, is not 
missed on anyone, and more importantly does not alter the Sec Def’s 
statutory powers, duty and accountability for performance in any manner.    
 
5.4.3 SANDF Compliance to the Minister of Defence’s Directives  
 
As argued above, although the Sec Def has a statutory function to ensure 
that the SANDF complies with the Minister’s directives, the lack of any 
sanction makes this function impractical.   Previous attempts to exercise 
this function were frustrated by the command line of the SANDF, as 
investigated and presented in chapter four.  Therefore in practice, the 
SANDF is directly accountable to the Minister of Defence for compliance 
to the Minister’s instructions, which is in conflict with the Defence Act, 
Section 8 (e) & (f), (Republic of South Africa, 2002). 
The Sec Def is also responsible, in Section 8 (g), for the “…discipline of, 
administrative control over and management of employees…” (Republic of 
                                                          
64 As indicated in the previous section, the various Acts oblige the Sec Def to issue a 
delegation to each individual military commander, personally, down to the lowest level.  
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South Africa, 2002).   This section of the Defence Act confers on the Sec 
Def powers that lie in the jurisdictional area of the Chief SANDF. The 
powers of the Sec Def with regard to discipline, administrative control and 
management of the employees are, in practice, limited to the Defence 
Secretariat’s personnel. The discipline and control of all SANDF 
employees lie within the domain of the Chief of the SANDF.  To further 
complicate matters Section 200 (1) of the Constitution directs the State to 
structure and manage the SANDF “…as a disciplined military force”.   
 
Defence Review 2015, in alignment with this imperative, goes further in 
advising the DOD to institute a revised “cohesive military disciplinary 
system” (Department of Defence, 2015c, p. 9-18).  Because of this 
confusion and the need to clarifying the roles and responsibilities for the 
discipline of members of the SANDF, the DOD has proceeded to draft a 
Military Discipline Bill which seeks to provide for the proper administration 
of the Military Justice System in the Defence Force65.  Attaining this 
Constitutional imperative will be no easy task. Given the level of 
disagreement regarding the discipline and management of DOD 
employees, in terms of Section 8 of the Defence Act, it can be expected 
that any proposed legislative changes will be subject to thorough scrutiny, 
in terms of parliamentary oversight processes,  before any amendments 
are passed.     
 
5.5  Alternative Approaches Civil Control of the SANDF 
 
There were several broad problems and deficiencies identified above. 
Firstly that the interfaces between the Secretariat and the SANDF are not 
clearly and concisely defined, which in turn causes confusing overlap of 
functions and responsibilities.  In particular those functions relating to 
accounting status as head of department, issuing of comprehensive 
instructions to the Chief SANDF and ensuring SANDF compliance to the 
                                                          
65
 The Bill was approved by the DOD during FY2012/13 and forwarded to the Office of the 
State Law Adviser (OSLA) for provisional certification. Certification, as a prerequisite to 
the Parliamentary approval process of the Bill, is still awaited from the OSLA. 
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Minister’s directives (Defence Act 42 of 2002, Sec 8 (a);(e);(f);(g)). 
Secondly a situation whereby the Sec Def is legally accountable for the 
utilisation of resources that are controlled under the SANDF is entirely 
undesirable.  Thirdly there seems to be differences of opinion within the 
Def Sec as to whether or not a primary function of the Sec Def, and it 
follows the Secretariat, is to support the Minister in carrying out her 
Mandatory duties over the Department. This being the case, then in this 
function at least, the Def Sec currently falls significantly short of effectively 
supporting the Minister.  The reasons for this include structural, capacity 
and system inadequacies which collectively render the Def Sec unable to 
fulfil this role.   
 
This line of analysis opens up intriguing possibilities regarding the 
direction that the DOD should  take in its attempt to resolve the central 
civil-military conundrum, particularly the drive to realign the functions and 
composition of the Def Sec with the changing defence mandate and 
Minister’s specific support requirements. No matter what the ultimate 
solution proves to be, whatever option is selected will inevitably require a 
rethink of the genesis of the balance DOD design, and necessitate various 
amendments to the Defence Act; the Public Service Act, as Amended 
2007; and the PFMA.   
 
5.5.1 Desired DOD Accountability and Staff Liaison Structure 
 
The question remains, what would the ideal situation look like? In an 
extensive interview with a senior DOD official, who is currently engaged 
with the Defence Review implementation process (Respondent 05, 
interview, February 11, 2016), he shared some of the current thoughts on 
the matter. What must be clarified is that at this stage the deliberations 
taking place within the Department are only conceptual. As pointed out in 
the previous chapter much of the earlier studies into the realignment and 
repositioning of the Def Sec were put on hold, awaiting the approval of 
Defence Review 2015.  
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What the official was able to confirm is that independent (but more 
importantly interdependent) Def Sec and SANDF Workgroups have been 
establish, in terms of the Defence Review Implementation Plan, to 
expedite the organisational renewal (Respondent 05, interview, February 
11, 2016).  At the time of writing in February 2016, the terms of reference 
were still being confirmed.  It was, however, possible to conclude from an 
analysis of Defence Review 2015 that the terms of reference for the Def 
Sec Workgroup will need to broadly cover the guiding research questions, 
established for this study, namely:  
 
 How should the Defence Secretariat be repositioned and capacitated 
to better enable civil control of defence and to perform the duty 
assigned to it? 
 
 How can the organisational structure be modified to clarify the 
responsibilities and realign the functions of the Minister and the 
accounting officer (Sec Def)?   
 
 What is the requirement for a new accountability concept within the 
DOD?  
 
The senior official described the main outcome of the Def Sec Workgroup 
as “…a restructured/ re-engineered/ reorganised DOD Headquarters...” 
(Respondent 05, February 11, 2016). It is suggested that to achieve this 
outcome will require the Def Sec Workgroup to deliver on at least three 
outputs:  
 
• Reposition the Ministry of Defence;  
• Reposition the Def Sec; and  
• Re-engineer and/or otherwise adjust the balance DOD design to reflect 
the reorganised DOD  
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That a new DOD accountability and staff liaison structure is required has 
been thoroughly argued, what is not so clear is how such a structure 
would be organised and operate.  The analysis advocates, given that it is 
not possible to be specific without first conducting detailed work-studies to 
verify and design the necessary business processes to make the system 
work, that a number of key requirements can be identified. The following 
requirements are drawn from the interview with Respondent 05 (Interview, 
February 11, 2016) and the earlier analysis from chapters three and four 
of this study.  These are discussed below with the aid of Figure 14.    
 
DOD Accountability and Staff Liaison Structure 
 
In terms of the proposed framework one of the design principles is to 
retain the balance DOD design (with modifications).  What this means is 
that all the core design principles are adhered to and that the model 
remains aligned to the Constitutional imperatives for parliamentary 
oversight exercised through the political office of the Minister as Executive 
Authority. The DOD would continue to incorporate the SANDF and consist 
of a Secretariat (headed by the Sec Def as head of department and 
accounting officer) and the Chief SANDF as commander of the armed 
services.  
 
The intention is not to go into the detail of the various organisational 
functions and sub-processes. What is necessary to take away from the 
analysis is rather an understanding of the key features.  If there is one 
explicit feature, then it is the unfettered command line. The line of 
command (marked in red) runs from the President, through the Minister (in 
times of war bypassing the Minister directly to the Chief SANDF) to the 
Chief SANDF who, in turn, has unfettered executive command over his 
subordinate services and divisions. Neither the Sec Def nor any other 
civilian official stands in the way of this unbroken command line. 
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Figure 14: Desired DOD Accountability and Staff Liaison Structure  
 
(Source: Adapted from unpublished DOD material) 
 
In terms of accountability (marked in green), the Chief SANDF remains 
directly accountable to the Sec Def, as head of department and 
accounting officer, for all the statutory requirements as set out in the 
various Acts. The difference is that no other member of the SANDF will 
have any direct accountability to the Sec Def.  The Chief SANDF is 
responsible for all activities in the SANDF and is accountable for the 
correct delegation of authority and accountability to subordinate levels. 
The Chief SANDF via his subordinate commanders who in turn will be 
accountable up the chain of command, directly to the Chief, will issue all 
delegations, directives, instructions and tasks assigned. 
 
To provide for the critical staff liaison functions between the Def Sec staff 
and staff of the SANDF (without impinging on the integrity of the chain of 
command), a formal staff line (marked in blue) would need to be 
established within the SANDF.   This is achieved by appointing a Chief of 
Defence Staff who is responsible for all nine of the Staff divisions (J 1-9), 
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reporting to the Chief SANDF.  This structure will free up the Chief SANDF 
to drive execution.  The Chief of Staff  structures will be repeated at every 
level of the SANDF down to unit level and in terms of the model, the 
critical liaison function between the SANDF and the Def Sec would then 
be managed in a joint integrated manner at the highest level. It must be 
kept in mind that Def Sec civilian staff will continue to serve, as part of the 
staff line, integrated with their armed services’ colleagues at the various 
subordinate levels of the DOD and that there is no attempt in the proposed 
structure to exclude them. What is intended though is that they remain 
outside of the military command line.66  There are also, for practical 
reason, still a number of uniformed members of the SANDF who serve in 
posts within the Def Sec. 
 
Collectively then, the proposed staff liaison structures, would, in an 
integrated DOD headquarters, manage all the financial; governance; risk 
and control; human resource; logistics; information and communication 
technology; functions and processes. The Sec Def would remain 
accountable for the entire DOD, exercising civil control, compliance and 
reporting. 
 
5.5.2 Outer Office Model 
 
Various DOD workgroups have deliberated on different options, as 
presented in chapters three and four, for realigning the functions and 
composition of the Def Sec and to structure power relations to achieve and 
maintain the optimum balance between the Def Sec and SANDF. The 
principle that was applied to structuring the power relationship between 
the Def Sec and Chief SANDF was whether subjective, objective or 
collaborative control was to be exercised, using the parameters of 
decision-making levels and the nature and extent of the functions to be 
                                                          
66
 This is of course not an exact science and it is a civil control challenge experienced by 
all the armed services of liberal democracies.  For practical reasons the Defence Act and 
Regulations makes  provision for a disciplinary system that obligates civilians serving in 
military units to obey the instructions of their military superiors and likewise for military 
personnel in the Def Sec to obey the instructions of their civilian superiors in the 
performance of their duty.    
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performed. Ultimately (given that it is neither desirable nor possible to 
totally exclude some degree of objective and subjective civil control) the 
DOD settled on the ‘collaborative relationship’ option as being the most 
appropriate for the South African situation.  
 
In this relationship, the distribution of functions between civil and military 
components recognises the exclusivity of certain functions, that is either 
civil or military or vice versa. It also recognises that certain functions 
resorting under the civil component require military collaboration. For 
example the locus of control for policy is based on a collaborative 
relationship. In this sense the armed services’ collaborate in the Def Sec’s 
civil responsibility to form defence policy, programmes and budgets, whilst 
the armed services in turn develop military doctrine and strategy in 
accordance with defence policy, programmes and budgets. The Minister 
balances this state of creative tension. The locus of control rests with the 
civil (political) component to ensure civil control and to protect military 
professionalism.  
 
In terms of civil-military relations theory, at least, the collaborative 
relationship is widely endorsed. The problem, however, as has been 
argued, lies in the execution. In the case of the DOD it has been seen that 
problems arise when the interfaces between the Def Sec and the SANDF 
are not clearly and concisely defined, which in turn causes ambiguous 
overlap of functions and responsibilities.  In particular with regard to those 
functions relating to accounting status as head of department, issuing of 
comprehensive instructions to the Chief SANDF and ensuring SANDF 
compliance to the Minister’s directives. Probably unique to the DOD is also 
the situation whereby the Sec Def is legally accountable for the utilisation 
of resources that the SANDF controls (the resources reside under the 
SANDF and over which the Sec Def has virtually no control).    
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Outer Office Model 
 
There have been different alternatives to the balance DOD design 
proposed over the years. One particularly enduring alternative was the 
approach or concept/model if you like, generally known as the ‘Outer 
Office Concept’ that was introduced in chapter three (Figure 4). In this 
concept the Sec Def shifts to the Ministry to head the outer office of the 
Minister of Defence, as a separate designated department with its own 
budget. The outer office is charged with the duty to assist the Minister to 
exercise oversight over the armed services and provide various additional 
support services to the Minister (Document No. 11, 2011).   
 
This is a radical departure from the established balance DOD design and it 
has a number of significant features that need to be further described. 
They are: 
 
 The SANDF and DOD become one entity. There is no formal DOD as 
the SANDF will incorporate the DOD. The Chief SANDF will be the 
commander of the SANDF, the accounting officer and head of 
department for the Defence Force (and it follows the incorporated 
DOD). 
 
 The Sec Def will be the head of department and accounting officer for 
the civilian Secretariat and the Office of the Minister (Director-General 
in the office of Minister). Section 8(a) and (e) of the Defence Act would 
have to be deleted. 
 
 All duties that are deemed functional to the execution of military tasks 
and missions assigned, are then migrated to the SANDF, including 
Defence Materiel and Finance. 
 
 Separate legislation would have to be developed to establish the 
repositioned Def Sec as Director-General in the office of Minister, and 
the Defence Act would solely pronounce itself on military matters.  
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 The implications of the above changes are that the applicable 
legislation (including the Defence Act, Public Service Act & PFMA) 
would have to be amended accordingly. Furthermore a rationalisation 
study would need to be conducted within the SANDF to determine 
capacity requirements, structural repositioning and the like to ensure 
alignment. 
 
As will be observed there are strong similarities between this proposal and 
the previous pre-1994 structure, whereby the SANDF incorporated the 
DOD and the Chief SANDF was the Head of Department, accounting 
officer and commander of the armed services. The motivation for 
proposing this alternative approach, drawn from an interview with a senior 
DOD official (Respondent 05, interview, February 11, 2016) was as 
follows: 
 
It resolves the issue regarding how to reposition and capacitate the 
Def Sec to better enable civil control of defence and to perform the 
duty assigned to it. 
 
It resolved the question regarding how the organisational structure 
could be modified to clarify the responsibilities and realign the 
functions of the Minister and the accounting officer (Sec Def).   
 
The outer office (Sec Def) will assist the Minister to exercise 
oversight over the armed services and provide various additional 
support services to the Minister. The Minister is thus duly 
supported. 
   
The Sec Def will no longer be legally accountable for the utilisation 
of resources that the SANDF controls. 
 
It will resolve the problem that has surfaced due to the interfaces 
between the Def Sec and the SANDF not being clearly and 
concisely defined which in turn causes confusing overlap of 
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functions and responsibilities.  This will eliminate those challenges 
with the functions relating to accounting status as head of 
department, issuing of comprehensive instructions to the Chief 
SANDF and ensuring SANDF compliance to the Minister’s 
directives. 
 
All duties that are deemed functional to the execution of military 
tasks and missions assigned, are then migrated to the SANDF, 
including Defence Materiel and Finance. Accountability of the Chief 
SANDF for all the resources of the SANDF will finally be clarified 
and a new accountability concept will no longer be required.  
 
There are of course a number of challenges to this concept. The primary 
concerns are that this option did not provide for either the strengthening of 
civil control of the SANDF or the separation of the formulation of 
departmental policy and programme from the preparation of forces, and 
the conduct of operations in execution of that policy.  It is also a rejection  
of the current central design precept of the balance DOD design, in that in 
this proposal the SANDF will once again incorporate the DOD (the SANDF 
and DOD become one entity) and the Chief SANDF becomes omnipotent 
as the head of department, accounting officer and commander of the 
SANDF.  
 
A mid-level DOD official (Respondent 07, interview, February 23, 2016) 
further cautioned that  
 
…the Ministry is already bloated with personnel – well in 
excess of the structure approved in the Ministerial 
Handbook – and the Minister has been challenged to 
account for the additional staff…  
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Ms S. Rabkin (interview, February 15, 2016), also offered the following 
insight regarding the proposal 
 
…the main challenge is that the outer office model makes 
the Ministry too powerful (estimated at approximately 200 
staff), more so than any other Department of State... 
Cabinet has made it clear that the National Executive 
support is for a strong Defence Secretariat, functioning 
under the Executive Authority [Minister], to exercise proper 
civil oversight and control of the SANDF… [if any change is 
required then] the Def Sec should become the fully fledged 
department of state and the SANDF the operational arm for 
execution of policy. 
 
The key driver for considering a new civil control ‘model’ is of course the 
Minister’s principal directive to review and align the functions and 
composition of the Def Sec with the changing defence mandate and the 
Minister’s specific support requirements. Particularly that the primary 
function of the Sec Def, and it follows the Secretariat, is to support the 
Minister in carrying out her mandatory duties over the Department67. 
Whilst remaining open-minded, a senior official cautioned that it may be 
too soon to speak of restructuring and that a more successful approach 
may well be “…to instead of restructuring the DOD macro-organisational 
level – rather make better use of instructions, delegations and 
performance agreements to manage the power relationships…” 
(Respondent 05, interview, February 11, 2016). 
                                                          
67
 Includes but not limited to enhancing the Minister’s ability to exercise civil control over 
the defence function; performing such functions as may be entrusted by the Minister; 
exercising powers vested through the Constitution and other statutes; assisting and 
supporting the Minister, as principle policy adviser, in contributing to the formulation of 
government’s security policy  and adapting the defence policy to best pursue national 
interests; responsible to the Minister as key mechanism in coordinating and compiling all 
relevant instruments through which the employment of the SANDF is authorised; 
determining ministerial priorities and strategic guidelines on defence matters; determining 
for the Minister strategic direction, accountability mechanisms and oversight over all 
defence public entities, including defence acquisition/procurement of defence matèriel; 
providing the  Minister with parliamentary and cabinet administrative and coordination 
services; provide Minister with legal services; and engaging with defence stakeholders 
and managing inter-governmental liaison (Defence Review 2015, p.9-16 to 9-17, 2015). 
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Ms S. Rabkin (interview, February 15, 2016) takes a similar view in that  
 
…the problem is not realignment of the Def Sec but of the 
functions/functioning. There is a lack of military knowledge 
amongst the civilian staff…and the civilians must have 
military knowledge either before appointment or they must 
be required to attend properly scheduled orientation 
programmes, like the one that Wits University presented in 
the early years of transformation with Prof Gavin Cawthra. It 
was an excellent course and the participants left with 
knowledge that they could immediately apply …   
 
Ms S. Rabkin (interview, February 15, 2016) goes on to argue that if the 
DOD wants to transform then the design priorities are that  
 
…we need a lean and effective, efficient integrated defence 
headquarters with appropriate civilian/military appointments 
as required by the posts…there is no need for an extensive 
civilian component particularly if it creates duplication in 
structures…   
 
5.6  Analysis 
 
That the Department of Defence is in a predicament is undeniable.  The 
challenge for the DOD is to find an agreeable solution that will satisfy both 
the statutory civil control precepts and the Chief SANDF’s desire for 
freedom from undue interference with his executive military command. 
Central to the entire civil control debate has been the balance DOD 
design, around which the DOD transformation project is structured, and 
the role of the Sec Def in exercising civil control in a ‘collaborative 
relationship’ with the Chief SANDF. Notwithstanding the obvious flaws in 
the balance DOD design, choices for an alternative are limited.  The most 
compelling of which, certainly from the point of view of the armed services 
and probably the Minister, is the Outer Office concept.  Whether or not the 
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Secretariat, as an institution, is quite so supportive remains moot.  
 
The point is though that such a radical transformation does not currently 
enjoy the support of the national executive and it is unlikely, given the 
results from the earlier analysis and the clear support expressed for a 
strong Def Sec exercising civil control under the direction of the Minister, 
that it would find acceptance with cabinet.  The dilemma with the current 
balance DOD design, as the ‘compromise model’, is that for successful 
implementation it is almost entirely dependent on the proper structuring of 
power relationships within the DOD and maintaining the balance between 
the defence controllers. The Minister as executing authority, the Chief 
SANDF as Commander of the SANDF, and the Sec Def as head of 
department and accounting officer. The lack of decisive leadership at 
ministerial level – that is a culture of wishing problems away – also played 
a role in accelerating/aiding the corrosion of civil-military relations. The 
ambiguity of legislation throughout the period under review, only served to 
make matters worse. 
 
The other major design weakness identified is the lack of clear delineation 
of the civil/political and military functions. As observed this leads to poor 
delineation of the interfaces between the Def Sec and the SANDF and 
consequently friction around the overlap of functions and responsibilities.  
The earlier analysis presents a clear picture of a DOD struggling with civil 
control tensions that manifested in open defiance by the SANDF, 
concerning those Sec Def functions relating to accounting status as head 
of department, issuing of comprehensive instructions to the Chief SANDF 
and ensuring SANDF compliance to the Minister’s directives. That the 
transformation of the DOD is not yet completed, can be in no doubt. 
 
The collectively the arguments advanced (Ms S. Rabkin, February 15, 
2016; Respondent 05, February 11, 2016; Respondent 07, February 23, 
2016), suggested that there was a lack of consensus regarding the 
solution for achieving effective defence.  The question, reduced to its basic 
elements, is whether the solution lies with the realignment of the functions 
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and composition of the Def Sec or whether with improving the structuring 
of power relationships within the DOD and maintaining the balance 
between the defence controllers.  In particular Ms S. Rabkin (February 15, 
2016) argues that the 
 
…Def Sec is provided for in Constitution so why do we want 
to change or realign the Secretariat. Rather the [identified] 
military divisions can be migrated to Def Sec with 
personnel... military personnel retain rank and overall 
career management but are deployed/attached to Def Sec 
for a period and then return to the SANDF. For the period 
attached they report in to their civilian supervisor and take 
instructions. This is already happening in a number of posts 
in the CDSM [Chief Directorate Strategic Management in 
the Def Sec]...so why would we want to now realign…those 
calling for realignment of roles and functions [of the Def 
Sec] do not understand the military [DOD]… 
 
Finally the analysis suggests that there is a lack of unanimity within the 
Def Sec as to whether or not a primary function of the Sec Def, and it 
follows the Secretariat, is to support the Minister in carrying out her 
Mandatory duties over the Department. That being the case, then 
delivering on the Def Sec Workgroup’s key outcome of “…a restructured/ 
re-engineered/ reorganised DOD Headquarters...” (Respondent 05, 
February 11, 2016) will continue to elude the DOD.  
 
5.7  Conclusion 
 
Historical challenges with balance DOD design and transformation of the 
DDO, as well as role identification, inter-organisational coordination, 
clearly defined jurisdiction, clear delineation of the civil/political and military 
functions and personality clashes between the civilian and military 
institutions of the defence organisation are, of course, neither new nor 
unique to SA.   On paper at least, the theory was sound. In that by means 
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of segregation of the broad defence functions, the other balances each 
party’s power, and the net effect is the collaborative achievement of the 
defence outcomes. As no party is able to unilaterally execute decisions in 
this diarchal arrangement, the intended result was that a consultative or 
negotiated decision-making process would emerge supreme.  
 
The dilemma with the current balance DOD design, is that for successful 
implementation it is almost entirely dependent on the proper structuring of 
power relationships within the DOD and maintaining the balance between 
the defence controllers. As we have previously noted this cycle of conflict, 
negotiations, and compromises between those who hold power and the 
armed services (Pion-Berlin, 2006), is not exclusive. The weakness, in the 
case of the DOD, is rather the apparent failure to deal adequately with the 
routine challenges to healthy and stable civil-military relations.  It is in this 
capacity, if there were to be a criticism, in which the DOD appeared to be 
failing.  
 
This chapter opened with a detailed analysis of the primary civil control 
issues under investigation, particularly the Sec Def’s statutory roles and 
functions, realignment and capacitating the Def Sec to better enable civil 
control of defence, and the need for better utilisation of delegations and 
comprehensive instructions within the balance DOD design.  This included 
a thorough analysis of the challenges with the present structural 
arrangement and various discussions regarding different options for 
realigning the functions and composition of the Def Sec to restructure 
power relations and achieve the optimum balance between the Def Sec 
and SANDF. What this suggested is that the statutory institutional 
arrangements for structuring power relations and maintaining the balance 
between the Def Sec and SANDF are at the centre of the conflict between 
the two institutions.  As advanced earlier the underlying cause of many of 
the deficiencies in the DOD’s existing civil-military organisational 
structures is because of the powerful influence exerted by these tensions 
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on the co-existence, power relations and working procedures between the 
Def Sec and SANDF. 
 
The roles, functions, and responsibilities of the Sec Def, as are contained 
in various pieces of legislation, including the Constitution, the Public 
Service Act, the Public Finance Management Act and the Defence Act. 
Any proposed changes to the statutory roles, functions and responsibilities 
would therefore require extensive amendments. Given that the DOD (as a 
Department of State) is already a ‘special case’ then there is probably 
grounds for a compelling legal argument for amending the applicable 
legislation to make provision for a ‘special delegation regime’ or 
performance agreements. Above all else this single issue is perceived as 
being part of the ubiquitous solution to the core challenge of structuring 
power relations and maintaining the balance between the Def Sec and 
SANDF.   
 
The central research question to be answered is how the functions and 
composition of the Defence Secretariat should be realigned – whilst 
enhancing the civil control regime and the integrity of military command – 
with the changing defence mandate and the Minister’s specific support 
requirements, as a means to achieve effective defence.  What is 
undeniable is that, notwithstanding compelling evidence of a problem, and 
the benefit of an extensive analysis of alternative approaches and models 
such as the DOD accountability and staff liaison structure and outer office 
concept, the immediate solution remains elusive.  
 
It is obvious that change is both necessary and urgent.  The next chapter 
offers an interpretation of the findings of this study and attempts to answer 
the research questions.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The military’s focus on equipping and training to win wars inevitably will conflict with the 
need for elected officials to serve the wider policies of the state.  Civil-military harmony 
requires political institutions that are capable of formulating a rational foreign policy and 
maintaining a military establishment adequate to support state policy. 
Thomas-Durell Young (1996) 
 
6.1  Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter offers an interpretation of the findings of the study in terms of 
the research questions and the fundamental theoretical concepts. It also 
comments on the methodology and data collection process, restrictions 
and challenges. The chapter opens with an introduction to the central 
research question the study attempted to address, confirms the research 
purpose, discusses each research question in detail and presents the 
research findings. The chapter also reviews the application of ‘Bruneau’s’ 
‘New Institutionalism’ framework to the DOD (in a South African context) 
and identifies and discusses theoretical lessons from the analysis.  
 
6.2 Introduction 
 
The balance DOD design has a chequered history in South Africa and one 
of the enduring questions is whether there is an alternative civil control 
model that can be translated into the DOD, copied from another 
country/institution and context (Bruneau, 2006).  A review of the literature 
suggests otherwise. Whilst the collected works on the subject of civil 
military relations, and more particularly civil control of the armed services, 
were helpful in providing a broad framework and concepts with which to 
guide the study, there was no blueprint for a universally applicable model 
that could simply be converted to South Africa.   
 
The DOD’s 2010 study to benchmark international practices fared little 
better.  Although the study did find strong parallels with both the Australian 
and New Zealand approaches the conclusion was that notwithstanding 
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some lessons for the DOD’s own transformation project, it did not reveal 
any pre-eminent Ministry of Defence models that would translate directly 
to South Africa (Document No. 11, 2011). New Zealand in particular 
presented a number of interesting possibilities (the New Zealand Ministry 
of Defence is split into two separate legal entities: a Ministry of Defence 
headed by the Sec Def; and the New Zealand Defence Force head by the 
Chief of Defence Force) that could offer insight into a new solution for the 
DOD’s own transformational challenges. The limited scope of the study did 
not allow for a detailed analysis and thus it is highly recommended that 
this model be further investigated as a detailed case study.   
 
As a whole, the combined literature sources present various models of 
civil control of armed services that whilst useful in the sense that they 
provide evidence of common challenges and some interesting results, 
they lack any particular solution for South Africa.  They shed little light on 
the DOD’s specific challenges with its apparently flawed institutional and 
legislative civil control arrangements, and it proved difficult to identify a 
particular model from another country and context that had the potential to 
be converted directly to South Africa, considering its own distinctive history 
and legislative system.  As has been debated, there is room for including 
traditional civil-military relations theories and models, providing that they 
are  ‘reconceptualised’ and adapted to render them more applicable to 
Africa (Williams, 2003), with a shift in emphasis from authoritarian civil 
control to ‘governance’ of the armed services to enable  effective defence.   
 
It is recognised that the liberal versus security equilibrium in a democracy 
is a delicate one, the universal problem being how to balance the related 
interests and consequences. The necessity to provide the national 
executive, in a constitutional democracy, with the power to meet 
challenges to national security on the one hand, must be balanced with 
the need to uphold civil and political liberties on the other. Moreover to 
achieve a state of civil control requires that the power resorts with the civil 
authority, and the armed services are subordinate to that authority. There 
is no disputing that the Defence Force operates in accordance with the 
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Constitution and wishes of Parliament and are not an end in itself but the 
primary means that the civil authority can use in defence of the country. 
Caution should, however, be exercised to ensure that the control 
measures do not usurp or interfere in operational matters, the military 
chain of command or military discipline. They should rather, be aimed at 
the integration of the SANDF into a democratic society, strengthening 
mutual trust between the public and armed services and promoting a 
sense of loyalty within the armed services in serving the country. 
Nevertheless, in the case of the DOD, whether by design or omission, it is 
replete with a number of civil control measures that continue to impede not 
only military effectiveness but also the sound functioning of the DOD. 
 
It has been established that to exercise civil control in a democracy, 
requires a department of defence structure (including in this case a 
Ministry of Defence) together with all the various oversight mechanisms 
and institutional processes required to ensure the subordination of the 
armed services to the national executive, restrain the coercive power of 
the military and promote effective and efficient defence. Higher defence 
organisational design is thus the foundation of the defence establishment 
and reflects the choice of an appropriate political-administrative and 
political-military arrangement. The historical development of the South 
African higher defence organisation, with respect to key functionaries and 
the armed services’ experiences with administrative and military command 
arrangements is key to understanding how pre-existing South African 
Defence Force (SADF) institutional models influenced the stakeholders in 
structuring power relations and maintaining the balance between the Def 
Sec and SANDF(Bruneau, 2006).   
 
In applying Bruneau’s (2006) framework, the starting point was to 
understand the conditions under which the transformed DOD was created, 
the interests of the stakeholders involved in creating the institutions, and 
the relative influence of the pre-existing SADF institutional model on the 
transformation of the DOD.  This aspect was exhaustively analysed in the 
main body and the findings were that these cogent characteristics had an 
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enduring legacy that continues to influence the DOD today. In particular 
the influence on the Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC) 
deliberations was persuasive.  
 
In 1994, the Sub-Council on Defence (SCD) approved the JMCC proposal 
for a Balance Model of civil control. This decision was derived, in the 
absence of a viable ‘imported’ model, from studies of civil control theory 
and international practices, and a strong desire to impose tight control 
over the armed services. Without the support of the SADF and Mkhonto 
we Sizwe (MK) the JMCC negotiations would have collapsed and there 
would have been no agreement reached, at the time, on the 
transformation strategy for the SADF.  
 
The positions of the ANC and MK on civil oversight and control of the 
future Defence Force were not in dispute. The challenge was, rather, to 
bring the SADF on board. Surprisingly the concept of civil control by the 
elected polity in a democracy, was not the deal-breaker for the SADF that 
it was expected to be. As has been pointed out by Fourie (2012) South 
Africa had a long history with the experience of civil control, and the SADF 
whilst not always embracing the concept, were at least familiar with it.  The 
SADF were not therefore suspicious of the moves to implement civil 
control as they accepted that it was a normal approach adopted by liberal 
democracies, worldwide.  
 
The SADF delegation for its part was also satisfied with the balance DOD 
design proposal; because the changes to the DOD left the SADF force 
structure largely intact (S. Rabkin, interview, February 15, 2016). The 
balance DOD design may not have been the ‘perfect’ choice; however, 
given the circumstances of the transitional democracy and the very real 
concern that the SANDF would use its considerable coercive power to 
entrench its dominance, it later proved to have been the best of the 
options available at the time.   
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 What the analysis did reveal is that no other liberal constitutional 
democracies have an administrative arrangement in which the armed 
services incorporate the unified combat arms as well as the department of 
defence. The Defence Force incorporating the DOD did not provide for the 
separation of policy and programme (including the budget) development 
from the execution thereof or for the separation of those control measures 
required to ensure transparency and accountability for the economic, 
efficient and effective utilisation of resources. 68  The need to create a new 
DOD that incorporated the SANDF, even in the absence of a ‘perfect’ civil 
control model, was thus a major driver of the transformation project. 
 
It is understandable that the Minister readily accepted the balanced 
relationship proposal because it placed him in a position, in theory at least, 
to balance the independent sources of defence policy advice and 
administrative control by the Sec Def with the military advice and 
execution by the Chief SANDF (both appointed at the same level). The 
management of defence in a democracy necessitates the appropriate 
distribution of power and control between the civil and military components 
with checks and balances. The decision to civilianise the DOD and pursue 
political/civil-military integration placed the locus of control for defence 
administration and military operations in the Def Sec and SANDF 
institutions respectively.  At the departmental level the balance is set 
through structuring power relations and maintaining the balance between 
the MOD, Def Sec and SANDF institutions (Bruneau, 2006). This 
particular aspect, however, proved highly contentious and difficult to 
achieve.  
 
The one unanticipated consequence that was to have a debilitating and 
enduring effect on the genesis and functioning of the balance DOD design, 
was the failure to separate the head of department from the accounting 
officer functions and the difficulty with the statutory establishment of the 
Def Sec. This proved to be a highly complex issue because it involved the 
                                                          
68
 PFMA, 2010, Sec 38 (b) 
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laws of other departments.  Initially the MOD workgroup attempted to 
establish the Def Sec through a liberal interpretation of the related laws.  
Parliament later terminated this process, on advice of the State Law 
Adviser, and confirmed that the accounting officer functions would not be 
separated from that of head of department. The decision meant that the 
Chief SANDF could not continue as head of department and that the new 
Sec Def was to be appointed in his stead. 
 
At a stroke of a pen, this decision forever altered the genesis of the 
balance DOD design. No longer would the ‘balance’ in the design, as was 
anticipated by the JMCC, be maintained by splitting the head of 
department function (Chief SANDF) from that of accounting officer (Sec 
Def). The effect of this decision was that the success of the balance DOD 
design became almost entirely dependent on the mechanics of structuring 
power relationships within the DOD, efforts to maintain the balance 
between the defence controllers and managing the heightened civil control 
tensions between the Sec Def and Chief SANDF.  
 
The unintended result of which was that according to the Public Finance 
Management Act, the Sec Def as the  head of department is also 
automatically the accounting officer for the entire DOD, as a department of 
state.  The Sec Def must account for all the DOD’s resources, whether or 
not they are under his or her control. This situation, unintended or not, real 
or imaginary, established a relationship in which the Chief SANDF was 
placed in a ‘subordinate’ position to the Sec Def. Thus setting the scene 
for the adversarial civil-military tensions that were later to plague the DOD.  
 
The collaborative relationship in an integrated defence head office is 
widely endorsed, the problem, however, lay in the execution. In the case 
of the DOD problems arose due to the failure to clearly and concisely 
define the interfaces between the Def Sec and the SANDF, which in turn 
caused confusing overlap of functions and responsibilities.  In particular 
with regard to those functions relating to accounting status as head of 
department, issuing of comprehensive instructions to the Chief SANDF 
176 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
and ensuring SANDF compliance to the Minister’s directives (Defence Act 
42 of 2002, Sec 8 (a);(e);(f);(g)). Probably unique to the DOD is also the 
situation whereby the Sec Def is legally accountable for the utilisation of 
resources that the SANDF controls.   
 
What the study highlighted was that the ultimate challenge for the DOD 
could be reduced, in simple terms, to finding an agreeable solution that 
would satisfy both the statutory civil control precepts and the Chief 
SANDF’s desire for freedom from undue interference with his executive 
military command. Central to the entire civil control debate has of course 
been the balance DOD design, around which the DOD transformation 
project is structured, and the role of the Sec Def in exercising civil control 
in a ‘collaborative relationship’ with the Chief SANDF. There is ample 
consensus that the balance DOD design has failed to live up to 
expectations and that it has proven difficult to establish and maintain the 
optimum balance between civil control and the integrity of military 
command, to assure military effectiveness.  What is equally obvious is that 
even after more than two decades of transformation and democratic 
consolidation, the DOD has yet to complete its transformation. If Defence 
Review 2015 is anything to go by then it can be expected that the process 
is set to continue for at least the next 25 years. 
 
Notwithstanding the obvious flaws in the balance DOD design, choices for 
an alternative have proven elusive.  There are a number of solutions 
identified by the study, however few if any served as the complete answer. 
What the analysis does suggest is that additional solutions will have to 
come from the DOD itself, preferably in a joint venture with the broader 
network of South African consultants and defence analysts, as the design 
would need to take into account the unique circumstances, dynamics and 
legislative prescripts that govern civil control of the SANDF. What is 
obvious is that for the DOD there is still much work to be done?  
 
 
 
177 
 
C.B.  HEPBURN 416498 
 
6.3 Reassessing Civil Control of the Defence Force 
 
The purpose of this study was broadly to reassess civil control of the 
SANDF and more particularly to determine how to realign the functions 
and composition of the Def Sec – whilst enhancing civil control and the 
integrity of military command – with the changing defence mandate and 
the Minister’s specific support requirements, as a means to achieve 
effective defence.  This also sums up the central question this study set 
out to answer. Typically it proved much more difficult to answer this 
question than initially anticipated. 
 
It must be obvious to the reader by now that the DOD is, relatively 
speaking, a large highly complex department of state (78 011 employees 
as at 31 March 2015) (Department of Defence, 2015d, p. 117), comprising 
two core integrated institutions, the Def Sec and SANDF, with multiple 
decision-making levels and an extensive national and international 
presence. Added to this is the provision of forces, in support of foreign 
peacekeeping operations and internal borderline security, as an output of 
the SANDF’s ordered commitments. All this adds up to a challenging 
environment for any department of state to transform as radically as 
required of the DOD. This is particularly true when one considers that the 
transformation occurred whilst the Department continued to operate as a 
‘department in motion’. 
 
A framework was applied, to reassessing civil control of the South African 
armed services and analysis of the data, based on the work of Bruneau 
(2006, pp.6-7). It made sense to structure the study in a chronologically 
manner, covering chapters three and four, to provide the reader with a 
point of reference as the argument developed. The approach was also to 
present and analyse the data consistently throughout chapters’ three to 
five.  The broad framework applied to the study was to: 
 
 Analyse the extent to which a particular model copied from another 
country/institution and context could be translated into the DOD. 
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 Determine how the DOD (as an institution) structures power 
relationships and maintains the balance between the Def Sec and 
SANDF – including a review of: 
 
o Conditions under which the transformed DOD was created. 
o Interests of the stakeholders involved in creating the 
institutions. 
o Influence of pre-existing institutional models on the 
transforming DOD.   
 
 Analyse both institutions (Def Sec and to lesser degree the SANDF) 
individually, before analysing their impact on one another. 
 
 Analyse what influences the institutions exert on actors and 
processes. 
 
 Evaluate the means by which the Executive Authority exercises civil 
control of SANDF and the SANDF’s concomitant military effectiveness. 
 
Generally the framework worked well. It was applied judiciously throughout 
the chapters’ three to five, to guide both the research and the integrated 
analysis per chapter. There were a few minor adaptations made to the 
framework, during the study, largely due to the narrow research scope. 
The Def Sec and SANDF were individually analysed in chapters three, 
four and five, as part of the larger DOD, however, the limits of the study 
did not allow for equal treatment of both institutions. The scope, therefore, 
was by research design, limited to acquiring an in-depth understanding of 
the Secretariat as an institution, and to a lesser degree the SANDF, as 
some knowledge was necessary in order to gauge their relationship with  
one another, and to determine the extent of influence exerted on the 
actors and processes Bruneau (2006, pp.6-7). In this the study 
succeeded. It is acknowledged that the lack of a more comprehensive 
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treatment of the SANDF is a restriction that was planned for in the 
research design. This presents an opportunity for conducting a further 
empirical study, over a longer period and with a wider scope.  The section 
that follows seeks to address and answer the key research questions. 
 
6.3.1 Repositioning and Capacitating the Defence Secretariat 
 
The entire question of how should the Def Sec be repositioned and 
capacitated to better enable civil control of defence and to perform the 
duty assigned to it, took the study in directions not anticipated at the 
outset. The question, although well formulated, probably omitted to 
anticipate the depth of data and complexity of the integrated/cross-cutting 
transformation processes executed over more than two decades. To 
address the question required not only reviewing the genesis of the 
balance DOD design, the history of transformation in the DOD, but more 
particularly identifying and analysing the statutory duties and functions of 
the Sec Def in detail as well as the challenges with the present structural 
arrangement. This includes investigating various options for realigning the 
functions and composition of the Def Sec to restructure power relations 
and achieve the optimum balance between the Def Sec and SANDF. 
 
The rationale for the balance DOD design has been exhaustively debated 
in the preceding chapters. The key challenge originated with the pre-
existing SADF design and the inadequacy of the administrative and 
command arrangements for effective civil control, and that it did not 
provide for the separation of those control measures required to ensure 
transparency and accountability for the effectiveness, efficiency and 
economical utilisation of resources (Republic of South Africa, 1999, Sec 
38 (b)). The overarching approach was to divorce the military command 
and control structures from the direct interface with political issues on the 
one hand and on the other to leave those functions which require no 
military expertise in the hands of the civilian personnel within the 
department. 
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The Minister is the executive authority responsible and accountable for 
the defence function. The Minister therefore required a Department, as 
the organisational infrastructure through which to direct and control the 
performance of the defence function, that complies with the post-
democratic Constitutional and legislative requirements for civil control and 
oversight. At the time the balance DOD design met these requirements. 
 
The organisational structures required to support the Minister are 
discussed in more detail in paragraph 6.3.2 below, for now it is sufficient 
to confirm that the department must perform three broad functions:  
 
• Advice to the Minister regarding the Defence policy, strategy, 
programme and budget.  
 
• Execution of the programme according to government policy.  
 
• Ensuring transparency and accountability for the effective, efficient 
and economical utilisation of resources.  
 
To ensure effective ministerial direction and the exercise of civil control the 
formulation of defence policy, programme and budget must be separated 
from development and preparation of forces and the conduct of operations 
to execute that policy. Separation is required because the Minister is 
responsible and accountable for the determination of the defence policy 
and programme as advised jointly by the Sec Def and Chief SANDF. It 
follows that the Sec Def and Chief SANDF are responsible for the 
execution of the approved DOD policy and programme.   Although they 
are distinguishable institutions, the two are physically collocated and 
organisationally interactive in the process of defence management.  
 
The study supports the key finding that the DOD is adequately managing 
the first two broad functions (advice to Minister and execution of defence 
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programme). This is not to say that there are no problems. The 
challenges though have more to do with structuring the power relations 
between the two main controllers (Sec Def and Chief SANDF) who enjoy 
the same seniority and privileges as head of department than any 
confusion regarding who is responsible for which functions69. The Sec Def 
as accounting officer has a clear statutory responsible for finance and 
according to the PFMA the DOD’s Chief Financial Officer must report to 
the accounting officer (Sec Def). The main dispute  
 
…is about what the Chief SANDF reports. The Chief 
currently reports on finance directly to Sec Def [for the 
statutory reasons argued above] but on everything else 
directly to the Minister, with Sec Def in support of course. 
This creates tension between the controllers because the 
Chief does not want to report to Sec Def… and only does 
so grudgingly on finance… (Ms S. Rabkin, interview, 
February 15, 2016) 
 
Another official confirmed that  
 
…the Chief SANDF has a mind-set problem regarding the 
role and function of the Sec Def and will not report to a 
civilian.  The Chief only wants to report to the Minister.  To 
my mind the Chief lacks understanding of the concepts of 
[and differences between] reporting, monitoring and civil 
control… (Respondent 02, interview, November 06, 2015). 
 
The analysis suggests that challenges with role identification, inter-
institutional coordination, clearly defined jurisdiction and personality 
clashes between the civil and military institutions of the DOD are neither 
                                                          
69 This does not in any way detract from the argument that there is dissatisfaction with 
regard to those Sec Def functions relating to accounting status as head of department, 
issuing of comprehensive instructions to the Chief SANDF and ensuring SANDF 
compliance to the Minister’s directives, that are dealt with as a special case. 
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new nor unique to SA. The problem is rather the key role-players failure to 
cogently deal with the inherent civil-military tensions. Legislative ambiguity 
has only served to exacerbate an already tense situation. Further fuelled  
by a  lack of decisive leadership at ministerial level – a culture of wishing 
problems away – that also played a role in accelerating the corrosion of 
civil-military relations. Left unresolved the simmering civil-military tensions 
continue to impede military effectiveness and would need to be resolved 
as part of the overall defence review.   
 
It is with regard to the third broad departmental function (ensuring 
transparency and accountability for the effective, efficient and economical 
utilisation of resources), that the problems are foremost and demonstrate 
an area of least success in respect to civil-military collaboration. The study 
supports the finding that the current use of delegations in the DOD has not 
succeeded in solving problems with accounting for DOD resources. This 
will require an extensive review of the DOD’s internal processes regarding 
the utilisation of resources and the need for better use of delegations and 
comprehensive instructions within the balance DOD design. This issue is 
dealt with in detail in paragraph 6.3.3 below. 
 
Ultimately what the study finds is that it is more about how the Def Sec 
should be capacitated rather than being repositioned to better enable civil 
control of defence and to perform the duty assigned to it. Structural issues 
are clearly a factor and should indeed be dealt with in the broader DOD 
reorganisation as part of the implementation of Defence Review 2015. In 
terms of capacity it is evident that the core functional structures are in 
place within the Def Sec and the recommendation would be for the DOD 
to focus, in the interim, its energies on enabling more efficient 
performance of these functions. It is important to recognise that policy, 
programme and financial functions are common to all state departments 
and are, by all accounts, being performed competently by civilian civil 
servants. Notwithstanding the fact that civil control is still a contested 
concept in the DOD, in terms of purely organisational business process, 
there should be no reason why civil servants, in conjunction with the 
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military functionaries (collaborative arrangement), cannot perform these 
functions in the DOD.   
 
It is recognised that this will require the DOD to train and develop 
additional functionaries as specialists according to their functional 
employment. Mostly the DOD should train and develop civilians in the 
processes of government and public administration (policy, programme 
and finance) and train the military personnel in the process of planning, 
commanding and controlling military operations. The key to success 
though will be to determine the extent of cross-functional training and 
exposure required to enable the civilian-military teams to work 
collaboratively on defence policy, strategy, programme, finance and 
departmental administration.  
 
6.3.2 Modifying the Organisational Structure and Realign Functions  
 
The study finds that there is a lack of consensus regarding whether the 
solution for effective defence lies with modifying the macro-organisational 
structures to clarify the responsibilities and realign the functions of the 
Minister and the accounting officer (Sec Def) or with improving the 
structuring of existing power relationships within the DOD.  Both options 
have merits and are not mutually exclusive.  The challenge for the DOD is 
to find an agreeable solution that will satisfy both the Ministers support 
requirements and the Chief SANDF’s desire for freedom from undue 
interference with his executive military command.  
 
The analysis suggests that at the centre of the dispute is a differences of 
opinion as to whether or not a primary function of the Sec Def, and it 
follows the Secretariat, is to support the Minister in carrying out her 
Mandatory duties over the Department. There is no disputing that the Sec 
Def as Director-General of the DOD (as a department of state) has a 
clearly defined responsibility to the Minister. It is rather the extent of the 
support functions to be performed on behalf on the Minister, which are in 
question. In this function at least, there is agreement that the Def Sec 
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currently falls short of effectively supporting the Minister.  The reasons for 
this include structural, capacity and system inadequacies which 
collectively render the Def Sec unable to fulfil this role.  
 
Notwithstanding the obvious flaws in the balance DOD design, choices for 
an alternative are limited.  The Outer Office concept, as the solution to 
clarifying the responsibilities and realigning the functions of the Minister 
and the accounting officer, for all its motivation, is unlikely to be accepted 
as a ‘replacement’ of the balance DOD design. As argued at some length 
in chapter five, the Outer Office concept is not currently endorsed by the 
national executive.  Its value lies rather in exposing the DOD to a radically 
different approach, whilst controversial, it does offer a glimmer of 
opportunity for considering a different way of ‘doing business’.  Further 
analytical enquiry may well succeed in unlocking new ideas and 
approaches that could form the basis for the next range of solutions for 
the DOD’s ongoing transformation.  
 
For example one idea that warrants further investigation (Ms S. Rabkin, 
interview, February 15, 2016), is the organisational restructuring whereby 
the Def Sec evolves into a fully functional department of state and the 
SANDF becoming the operational arm.  The Def Sec would need to shed 
all superfluous functions and become lean and highly efficient whilst the 
SANDF would focus on execution and reporting on operational ordered 
commitments. The obvious benefits would be that the budget for the 
SANDF would be ‘ring-fenced’ and more visible in respect to performance 
in execution of ordered commitments. The funds would no longer be 
hidden inside the larger DOD organisational structure where they are 
consumed by the non-deployable ‘blunt-end’ tail. Any possible wastage 
would also be more visible. Ultimately it should be easier to confirm 
exactly what funds are available for deployments in support of national 
foreign policy and the limits of what South African can actually afford. 
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6.3.3 New Accountability Concept for the Department of Defence 
 
The key question was whether the DOD requires a new accountability 
concept within the DOD. The inescapable fact drawn from the analysis 
was that accountability is at the heart of the exercise of sound civil control.  
Accountability was determined as the ability to be able to measure and 
assess performance against objectives and to clearly attribute 
accountability (answerability). In the context of the study on the DOD this 
means:  
 
 Leaving the military operations to the SANDF, subject to the control of 
the Minister (to fulfil the constitutional requirement for the subordination 
of the military forces to the authority of Parliament), and making them 
fully accountable for those activities (civil control – performed by the 
National Executive). 
 
 Clearly defining military outputs, that is the provision of operationally 
capable forces (military effectiveness - in achieving ordered 
commitments and defence efficiency – sound resource management) 
(Ratchev, 2011, p.4). 
 
 Clear separation of macro and functional policies, and attaching the 
relevant civil and military roles thereto.  
 
 Applying accepted business criteria in evaluation and assessment of 
performance of those responsible for departmental resources. 
 
It is in the aspect of accountability that the DOD has not performed 
particularly well. This was identified as being at the root of many of the civil 
control tensions and imbalances in the structured power relations between 
the Sec Def and Chief SANDF.  Secondly a situation whereby the Sec Def 
is legally accountable for the utilisation of resources that are controlled 
under the SANDF is entirely undesirable.   
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The requirement for a new DOD accountability and staff liaison structure 
has been thoroughly argued in chapter five. What is not so clear is how 
such a structure would be organised and operate.  The detailed analysis 
lies outside of the scope of this study (with its focus on the Def Sec and 
not SANDF per se). Having said that it is necessary to define the problem 
and offer a brief analysis of the findings. The overarching problem was 
defined as the fact that the current delegation regime compromises 
military command and control. The accounting officer delegations to 
SANDF members and posts makes it impossible to maintain the integrity 
of the line of command. The implications are that the delegate remains 
accountable to the Sec Def instead of the next highest authority in the line 
of command. Legally the command line cannot therefore be accountable 
for the non-compliance with delegations by their subordinates. This makes 
it almost impossible for the command line to account for the performance 
of members against those delegations. The universal principle is that the 
commander/manager can only be held accountable if he has both the 
responsibility and the authority necessary to fulfil his obligation. In other 
words responsibility and accountability must be commensurate. 
 
What can be deduced from the findings is that regardless of the corporate 
structure that is pursued for the DOD, the following considerations would 
have to be taken into account. Firstly recognition that the military 
organisation is a hierarchical one and whilst the armed services must be 
governed democratically, it can never, in itself, be a democratic institution 
(Cawthra et al., 2003, p.  305). Secondly responsibility and accountability 
must formally cascade down the command line and thirdly the command 
line must be free from outside influence. To achieve this recommendation 
would require the amendment of the Defence Act to provide for a 
delegation system in which the powers and duties can be delegated down 
the command line – one step at a time along the command line – with 
commanders at all levels being responsible and accountable for their 
resources. 
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The study supports the finding that the Chief SANDF is responsible for all 
activities in the SANDF and should be accountable for the correct 
delegation of authority and accountability to subordinate levels. The Chief 
SANDF via his subordinate commanders who in turn will be accountable 
up the chain of command, directly to the Chief, should issue all 
delegations, directives, instructions and tasks assigned. The study 
therefore supports the finding that the investigation of a new accountability 
concept by the DOD, is both overdue and necessary. 
 
6.4  Insight on data collection and challenges 
 
Efforts to track down a complete and detailed record of the entire DOD 
transformation process, proved elusive.  Various attempts were made to 
try to locate records in ‘official archives’, however this proved less than 
successful. For a number of reasons, the maintenance of standard record 
keeping, in terms of a central registry that logged all internal documents 
produced by the DOD, had not continued in the same manner, as prior to 
1994. Based on largely anecdotal evidence, there are a number of 
explanations for this.  
 
There is some evidence to indicate that the restructuring of the DOD and 
technological progress made with the availability of personal computers 
meant that more of the key senior personnel were typing and distributing 
internal documents themselves (in a number of cases via email or the 
internal DOD intranet facility (LAN)).  As a result recordkeeping of 
documents received and dispatched from the various sections, were 
largely managed at the individual office or section level. The problem with 
this arrangement was that not all documents were itemised and 
transferred across when there was a handover between the departing 
official and the new incumbent. The consequences of which is a large gap 
in records.   
 
A particular troubling example is the recordkeeping for the various earlier 
internal reviews conducted by the department on both the Defence White 
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Paper, 1996 and Defence Review, 1998. Very few of the original records 
could be unearthed. This proved to be more than just an inconvenience for 
the researcher as one senior official who was intimately involved with 
Defence Review 2015 complained that the absence of records materially 
hampered the work of the workgroup. Specifically what was missing was a 
detailed empirical record that demonstrated critical analytical engagement 
and reasons for the failure of Defence Review 1998 (Respondent 03, 
CDSM work-session, 01 December, 2015).  The fact that many of the 
original personnel who worked on the implementation of these reviews, 
are retired and unavailable or are otherwise no longer employed by the 
DOD, served to exacerbate matters.  
 
The researcher was fortunate, notwithstanding the above challenges, to 
discover at least one senior DOD official who had managed, remarkably 
as it seems, to amass a collection of extremely useful documents. These 
were hard copies of various military restricted papers (DOD minutes, 
correspondence and parliamentary records/submissions since about 
1995) and electronic (scanned) copies of more recent documents from 
about 2006 (Respondent 01, April 12, 2015). Although incomplete as a 
record, and non-collated, it went some way to allowing the researcher to 
piece together the outline of the DOD transformation process. 
 
In general the researcher also experience first-hand how fallible memories 
are.  Due to the time that has elapsed over more than two decades and 
the high turnover in personnel the few available respondents who 
participated in the transformation, were only able to provide a snapshot of 
their experiences. No one person seemed to have a full picture of the 
transformation process since inception. Very few, if any, have attempted to 
conduct a proper empirical study of the entire civilianisation process that 
was central to the transformation of the DOD and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of civil control of the SANDF.  Greater reliance was thus placed 
on primary documentary sources and using key respondents to fill in the 
gaps, provide confirmation and validate reliability. 
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6.4.1 Restrictions 
 
The DOD keeps formal minutes of all statutory committee and council 
meetings, for record and audit purposes. However, only those personnel 
with the required security clearance levels can access the minutes, once 
authority has been provided based on a need-to-know basis, which also 
covers research projects approved by the DOD. This restriction is based 
on the fact that serving officials, both civilian and uniformed, are require to 
maintain their security clearance. Part of the restrictions placed on 
personnel by that clearance is that they may not divulge classified material 
to anyone not possessing an equivalent clearance. This is a definite 
limiting factor.  It is therefore probable that numerous additional records 
exist that are still to be discovered. The relatively short six month 
timeframe provide for this study and as a result the limited scope, did not 
allow time or space for extending the search.  
 
This presents an opportunity for a new more expansive study that can 
broaden the base of data sources and include military restricted 
documents. It must be cautioned though that the formal process, even for 
serving DOD personnel, to secure permission to conduct post-graduate 
research on current restricted data, is bureaucratic although not 
impossible. A primary requirement is to demonstrate, by means of official 
correspondence, that the sponsoring university faculty and research 
supervisor support the post-graduate research study. Secondly that the 
results/findings are of some material benefit to the DOD or at least 
contribute meaningfully to the general body of knowledge.     
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6.5 Concluding Comments 
 
What the study highlighted was that the ultimate challenge for the DOD 
could be reduced in simple terms to finding an agreeable solution that 
would satisfy both the statutory civil control precepts and the Chief 
SANDF’s desire for freedom from undue interference with his executive 
military command. Central to the entire civil control debate has of course 
been the balance DOD design, around which the DOD transformation 
project is structured, and the role of the Sec Def in exercising civil control 
in a ‘collaborative relationship’ with the Chief SANDF. There is ample 
consensus that the balance DOD design has failed to live up to 
expectations and that it has proven difficult to establish and maintain the 
optimum balance between civil control and the integrity of military 
command, to assure military effectiveness.  What is equally obvious is that 
even after more than two decades of transformation and democratic 
consolidation, the DOD has yet to complete its transformation. If Defence 
Review 2015 is anything to go by then it can be expected that the process 
is set to continue for at least the next 25 years. 
 
Answering the central research question with respect to realigning the 
functions and composition of the Defence Secretariat with the changing 
Defence Mandate and the Minister’s specific support requirements, whilst 
striking the optimum balance between civil control and the integrity of 
military command, proved highly challenging and offered varying results.  
Although the study could not deliver comprehensive solutions, it did 
fundamentally succeed in providing a new empirical study, detailing the 
DOD transformation project, as it evolved chronologically over more than 
two decades. It also succeeded in providing numerous new insights and 
perspectives into the civil control challenges confronting the DOD.  
 
That civil control remains a contested concept within the DOD is not in 
doubt.  The solutions may be elusive; however, the DOD cannot afford to 
stop now.  There is still much work ahead of the DOD, if it is to finally 
strike the optimum balance between civil control and the integrity of 
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military command and in so doing assure effective defence.  There is 
strong evidence that the solutions lie more with how the Def Sec should be 
capacitated rather than the current focus on repositioning to better enable 
civil control of defence and to perform the duty assigned to it. Structural 
issues are clearly a factor and should indeed be dealt with in the broader 
DOD reorganisation as part of the implementation of Defence Review 
2015. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument presented that instead of 
restructuring, better use should be made of performance agreements, 
delegations and detailed instructions. The DOD can already be considered 
a special case as a department of State with its ‘two heads’, both being 
entitled to the benefits and privileges due to a Head of Department, 
Section 7(2) and 13(2) (Republic of South Africa, 2002). Given that it is 
recognised in law as a ‘special case’, there should be a strong legal 
argument for amending the applicable legislation to make provision for a 
‘special delegation regime’ or performance agreements, as a solution to 
the DOD’s immediate needs for providing an effective armed service.   
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